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Abstract
This research involved an investigation into the role of store level managers in the 
employee resourcing decision-making process in multiple retailing in the UK. The 
context of the retail industry is considered, including the employment characteristics of 
the workforce. The nature of HRM and employee resourcing in multiple store retailing 
and its link with corporate strategy is discussed. Particular consideration is made to 
the devolution of employee resourcing responsibilities to store level managers. The 
nature of retail management at local level is investigate followed by an examination of 
their choices and constraints takes place.
An embedded case study research methodology was adopted, which comprised of 
three multiple store retail organisations and six branches. Qualitative face-to-face 
interviews were conducted with management throughout the organisational hierarchy. 
The majority of interviewees were managers at store level. An inductive approach was 
adopted for analysing the data.
A number of key findings were made and conclusions drawn through the inductive 
analysis of the data. Store level managers held significant responsibilities for employee 
resourcing, particularly in the recruitment and deployment of labour. They operated 
within a context of increasing centralisation and constraints. This resulted in their 
practice of strategies of independence to circumvent these increasing limitations. 
These strategies of independence had significant implications for the implementation of 
corporate policy and the management of human resources at store level. It was in the 
execution of employee resourcing where strategies of independence were most 
frequently deployed as HRM was the functional area where store level managers had 
greater autonomy. This resulted in a focus on 'hard' HRM practices at store level, 
regardless of head office 'rhetoric'.
In conclusion, a modification of Stewart's (1982) 'Choices For Managers' model is 
made, to more accurately reflect the reality of management processes. The 
consequences of store level managers' choices and constraints is conceptualised in the 
'The Organisational Vicious Circle' model. This outlines how strategies of 
independence will perpetuate the limitations of local management.
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The aim of this chapter is to introduce the key areas of literature pertaining to this 
research and consider how they have shaped and focused the investigation. The main 
issues and areas of work are briefly reviewed and the study placed within its wider 
context. The aims of the research are established, and the structure of the thesis 
presented.__________________________________________
The retail industry is a major employer in the UK (Labour Research 1994) accounting 
for approximately 10 per cent of national employment (National Retail Training 
Council [NRTC] 1995). Retailing is thus an important sector for any research 
concerning the management of human resources. The thesis focuses on multiple store 
retailing, which in recent years has been subject to increasing competition, rapidly 
changing market conditions, and increases in the average size of outlet over recent 
years (Freathy and Sparks 1994; Ogbonna and Whipp 1999). This has been 
particularly evident in the grocery sector which has been described as "intensely 
competitive" (Ogbonna and Whipp 1999:80), and often at the forefront of the industry 
in terms of competitive strategies.
Increased customer demands for longer opening hours, lower prices, and improved 
standards of product and service have also been noted (Christopherson 1996; Doogan 
1992; Freathy and Sparks 1996; IDS 1993a, 1993b). Competitive strategies based on 
cost reduction have resulted, together with a corresponding improvement in the quality 
of customer service (Christopherson 1996; Doogan 1992; Freathy and Sparks 1996; 
Gardener and Sheppard 1989; Sparks 1992c). Advancements in information 
technology have been cited as a key component of competitive advantage in the retail
industry. The adoption of Electronic Point of Sale (EPOS) has been hailed as having 
revolutionary implications for retail managers (Johnson 1992; Retail Business 1994; 
Smith 1988).
These distinct characteristics of multiple store retailing raises questions about the 
management of human resources, particularly considering the large number of UK 
workers employed within the industry. Yet the retail industry remained academically 
neglected for many years (Lowe and Crewe 1991). Recent research has tended to 
focus on specific issues such as employment flexibility, or gender, when examining HR 
issues (Marchington 1995a). Little research has been conducted on lower level local 
management in retail, and commentators in general has tended to overlook these 
managers in the management of human resources (Lowe 1992). While previous 
research has identified some of the issues relating to lower and middle management 
(for example, Child and Partridge 1982; Patten 1968; Roethlisberger 1945; Watson 
and Harris 1999), few of these have been linked to HRM or conducted in the retail 
industry.
An examination of the choices and constraints of local management in multiple store 
retailing identifies retail managers' decision-making powers (Ackroyd and Thompson 
1999; Stewart 1982, 1999). These stem from a number of factors including corporate 
strategy, organisational structure, budgetary controls and technology (see Berry et al 
1995; Blyton and Morris 1992; Child 1984; Huczynski and Buchanan 2001; Merchant 
1985; Mintzberg 1979; 1980; 1983, 1989; Mullins 1999; Piper 1980; Retail Business 
1990; Walters and Hanrahan 2000). A key trend in multiple store retailing has been 
the increasing centralisation of store level functions and responsibilities (Freathy 1993; 
Freathy and Sparks 1994; Ogbonna 1992; Ogbonna and Whipp 1999; Smith 1988; 
Sparks 2000b). This is combined with an increasing use of budgets and performance 
targets to achieve a competitive advantage (Freathy and Sparks 1996; Lusch and 
Serpkenci 1990; Walters and Hanrahan 2000). However, the geographical dispersion
of stores in multiple store retailing means some decentralisation of decision-making to 
local management is necessary (Berry et al 1995; Child 1984; Mintzberg 1983; Stewart 
1999). The literature outlines that retail store managers maintain a prime responsibility 
for the management of their workforce (Freathy and Sparks 2000; Neathey and 
Hurstfield 1995; Tamkin et al 1997; Tomlinson et al 1997). The devolution of 
responsibility for human resource management (HRM) to local junior managers is 
evident, with a concurrent centralisation of other functional areas.
With labour making up to 50 per cent of gross margins (Alexander 1988), and 
evidence of the delegation of HR to line managers (Neathey and Hurstfield 1995; 
Tomlinson et al 1997), the retail industry is an important sector for the study of HRM. 
This thesis will examine the previously neglected role of junior managers in the 
execution of human resource management in the previously overlooked industry of 
retail in order to address gaps in current knowledge.
The research is based around two broad objectives: first, to establish the role of local 
managers in the management of human resources in multiple store retailing; and 
second, to establish how the choices and constraints of these managers impact on the 
employee resourcing decisions in multiple store retailing organisations. A review of 
the literature relating to HRM in retailing shows that particular consideration needs to 
be given to this previously neglected area of research. Gaps in the literature have been 
identified, and the research will consequently focus on these to provide a more holistic 
perspective on the management of human resources at operational level in multiple 
store retailing organisations.
The research was grounded in a phenomenological approach using the case study 
method. The empirical study focused on three multiple store retailers, encompassing a 
total of six stores. Each of these retailers was concentrated in the superstore sector of
retailing and operating large scale store operations. Central to the research design was 
a series of interviews conducted at different levels of management at both head office 
and store level. A longer-term approach was adopted with the research conducted 
over a minimum of nine months in each store. The results of the fieldwork were 
analysed before modifications of existing models and theories were made.
This section serves as a 'route map' (Saunders 1997:375) to the thesis by introducing 
each chapter and detailing its contribution to the work. The thesis adopts a logical 
approach to examining the literature, which is covered in Chapters two to five. 
Chapter two provides some background information to the retail industry, including 
retail competitive strategy, with a focus on multiple store retailing and the superstore 
format. Chapter three seeks to examine the employment characteristics of multiple 
store retailing. This encompasses an outline of the main characteristics of the retail 
labour market with a particular focus on the nature of local management. Chapter four 
introduces the management of human resources in the retail industry with a focus on 
employee resourcing and the role of store level management. This is followed in 
Chapter five by a consideration of the choices and constraints of local managers in 
their management of human resources and execution of employee resourcing. Where 
possible a focus on retail management is adopted, but where gaps in the literature 
prevail, more generic management literature is considered.
The research design is explored and justified in chapter six. The research objectives 
are reviewed in light of previous research and the study's philosophical and 
methodological approach presented and examined. Chapter seven outlines the 
fieldwork procedures, before detailing the process of data analysis. Chapters eight to 
ten present the findings of the research for each case study organisation. Chapter 
eleven then discusses these findings by considering the similarities and differences 
between the case study companies, drawing tentative conclusions. In chapter twelve
the thesis is concluded by considering the implications of this academic study for the 
management of human resources in the retail industry. The original contribution of 
this work is highlighted and some suggestions for future research are made.
This chapter has introduced the thesis by identifying the key areas of literature 
pertaining to this research, thus placing the study in its wider context. The broad aims 
and research methodologies of the research are introduced, followed by a presentation 
of the structure of the thesis. The following chapter will begin the in-depth review of 
the literature pertaining to the retail industry and the nature of its workforce: the 
context of this research.
To appreciate the role of store level managers in the management of HRM, it is 
important to consider the nature of the industry in which such managers operate. The 
aim of this chapter is to frame the research study in the context of the multiple store 
sector of the UK retail industry. A brief historical perspective of the development of 
the industry is given, together with an outline of the industry structure and current 
prevailing corporate strategies. Particular attention is paid to the superstore format, on 
which the empirical research of this study was focused.
Retailing is one of the largest sectors in the UK economy with a history of change, 
conflict and competition (Davis 1966; Jeffrey 1954; Shackleton 1998). "It is 
undeniable that retailing is an important sector" (Sparks 2000a: 13), and that major 
multiple store retailers are critical in economic terms. Dawson (2000) argued that the 
nature of the retail company is becoming increasingly difficult to define with recent 
diversification into banking, health and travel services. For the purpose of this 
research study, retailing is defined as "any type of business whose marketing efforts are 
directed towards selling merchandise and services to the final consumer" (Howe 
1992:190). The retailing sector covers both the retailing of goods and services. The 
activities covered in this research study exclude the retailing of services such as 
financial services and public utilities, concentrating instead on the sale of goods.
Retailing is distinctive from other industries in many ways. These differences include 
the geographical dispersion and nature of operations that brings about a widespread 
network of operational units. The industry tends to be more responsive to local 
culture, whilst having a large number of items which constitute the produce and service 
range. This is combined with low profit margins per employee (Dawson 2000). There 
is also a growing sense of internationalisation in the industry, with an increasing 
involvement in international activities, particularly among food multiple retailers 
(Dawson 2000; McGoldrick and Davies 1995; Sparks 1995). Retailing has been 
described as undergoing increased competition producing concentration, increases in 
scale, technological innovation, and rationalisation of labour use (MacEwan Scott 
1994). The combination of these characteristics makes an appreciation of retail's 
development and context vital for any research study undertaken in this industry.
The growth of the retail industry in recent decades has led to the identification of 
retailing as a significant contributor to tertiarisation of the economy and leading to 
Bell's (1973) 'post-industrial society', with a predominant service sector (Rajan 1987). 
However, the extent to which retailing can be described as a major contributor to a 
'post industrial society' is questionable. Retailing has been present during all three 
stages of economic development and revolution. During the pre-industrial stage goods 
and services were sold directly to the buyer at local markets. During industrialisation 
the retail industry evolved with the introduction of independent fixed stores, which 
then developed into multiple outlets. This placed an emphasis on the rationalisation 
and concentration of retail branches. The significance of economies of scale continues
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to the present day with small, independent retailers losing market share to the multiple 
retailers (Ruston 1999). The average size of retail outlets has continually increased 
since the Second World War. Superstore retail outlets, particularly in the grocery 
sector, are employment units in their own right and employing more people than many 
factories, often operating for longer hours (Howe 1992).
Academic research on employment in the retail industry has emerged from "two 
separate strands" (Marchington 1995a: 1). Retail specialists have recorded the generic 
employment dimensions of the industry, with a particular focus on new retail formats. 
The most significant contributions of these are from the Institute for Retail Studies at 
Stirling University. Their emphasis is on measurement and prescription, rather than on 
understanding aspects of work, employment or industrial relations. Some of the later 
work began to focus on labour market segmentation and flexibility. As such, 
Marchington was critical that a lack of grounding in the mainstream human resource 
literature meant this work was limited in its ability to advance a more general theory of 
HRM in retailing. In contrast to the retail specialists, the HRM perspective came 
rather later to research in the retail industry. The focus of research was a concern with 
more specific employment patterns and issues, such as contractual terms and 
conditions, considerations of flexibility such as the rise in part time working (for 
example, Gregory 1991, 1993; O'Reilly 1992, 1994; Robinson 1990, 1993), the role of 
gender (for example, Bradley 1989; Broadbridge 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998; MacEwan 
Scott 1994; Neathey and Hurstfield 1995), and the link between strategy, culture, and 
HRM (for example, Ogbonna 1992; Ogbonna and Whipp 1999). This research was 
criticised by Marchington (1995a) for focusing too heavily on individual issues,
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restricting the ability to produce holistic theories about HRM in retailing. He 
advocated a combination of the 'two separate strands' to enable the advancement of 
knowledge in the field of retail HRM practices.
The emergence of the retail trade can be traced from Elizabethan times when a 
distinction was made between the function of retail distribution and that of production. 
Prior to this suppliers of goods and services sold their products directly to buyers in 
the local markets or at larger fairs. By the beginning of the 17th century a separate 
retailing function began to develop in the larger centres of population, which had 
spread across the country by the end of the 18th century. During this period shop 
keeping was considered a trade that involved a variety of skills such as production, 
purchasing, stock-keeping and accounting (Howe 1992).
The advent of the industrial revolution was not immediately accompanied by further 
developments in retailing. It was not until after the middle of the 19th century that the 
retail trade, as it is recognised today, started to evolve. The latter half of the 19th 
century saw fundamental changes in the shopping habits of the UK population on the 
basis of a much enlarged, urbanised and increasingly well-off population. This in turn 
changed the structure of retail distribution from a pre-industrial form to one which still 
exists today. Initially there was a replacement of street sellers by independent fixed 
stores, both general and specialist. The importance of these were soon overtaken by 
multiple store organisations in the final quarter of the 19th century, initially in the field 
of groceries, but later in non-food areas. These multiple outlet developments were
accompanied by the growth of co-operative stores and department stores. The 
multiple store continued to appeal predominately to working-class customers on the 
basis of price. Competition in retailing increased with the emergence of the variety 
chain stores which developed considerably in the inter-war period. The distinguishing 
features of these were an emphasis upon high-volume trading in a wide range of low- 
priced goods, with shoppers operating a system of self-selection. It was not until this 
period that the multiple chains began to increase their range of goods in an effort to 
reach more customers (Howe 1992).
By the early decades of the 20th century multiple chains were able to enjoy economies 
of scale through their ability to buy in bulk as well, as standardisation and 
specialisation of retail functions such as buying, merchandising and administration. 
The inter-war period saw supply conditions continuing to favour large-scale retailing. 
An increase in the manufacture of standard goods, the introduction of pre-packaged 
goods, and extended use of branding, encouraged the formation of a national market 
for products (Howe 1992; Johnson 1992).
As with many other industries, retail underwent a fundamental transformation in the 
post-war period. It has been described by some as a 'retail revolution' and is claimed 
to be as dramatic and influential as the industrial revolution (Segal-Horn 1987). 
Others dispute the term 'retail revolution' arguing that "retailing is an evolving 
industry" (Dawson 2000:142) as there is little evidence of major paradigm shifts. 
Segal-Horn (1987) described the retail revolution as a "combination of market changes 
together with new ways of organising and conducting retail business" (p. 31). Lower-
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cost multiple retailers were able to fully exploit their economies of scale by competing 
in terms of price. This increased the rate of penetration of those multiple shop 
organisations able to exploit this advantage (Ruston 1999).
The decrease in the number of retail outlets in the UK reflects the maturity of the 
industry and increased competitive pressures (Musannif 1988). The first phase of 
concentration occurred in the post-war period up to 1971 that saw the fastest decline 
in absolute numbers of shops. Since then there has been a slower rate of decline. 
Different sectors of the retail industry experienced different timings of concentration. 
Rationalisation began to occur in the grocery industry in the 1960s when supermarkets 
competed heavily on price. Not only do different types of retailing format compete 
against each other, but increasingly competition is among multiples themselves - a sign 
of market maturity. With companies getting larger in size and smaller in number, the 
catchment area of potential customers is expanding (Business Monitor 1988; Ruston 
1999).
Changes in lifestyle have resulted in consumers increasingly demanding more 
convenient and longer opening hours, and improved service provision from retail 
outlets. The retail industry responded by extending opening hours. This is also linked 
with legislative changes, which gave retailers the opportunity to open for longer hours, 
for example, Sunday trading. Some food retailers even began operating 24 hour 
opening, predominately those in the food and home improvement retailing sectors 
(Ruston 1999).
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A number of changes and external influences have had a significant impact on 
employment in the retail industry. Increasing competition, rapidly changing market 
conditions, more selective customer demands, longer opening hours, and increases in 
the average size of outlet have been key trends in the retail industry (Freathy and 
Sparks 1994; Ogbonna and Whipp 1999; Walters and Hanrahan 2000). However, as 
Doogan (1992) and Shackleton (1998) point out, these changes are difficult to discern 
in large scale statistics because the data offers a scant impression of the realities of 
restructuring that have taken place.
One of the trends in retailing over the last ten to fifteen years has been the increasing 
overlap of the major store format groupings so that the rationale for differentiation into 
the traditional categories is becoming difficult to sustain (Ruston 1999). Although 
specialisation is gathering pace, the boundaries between products and services are 
becoming increasingly blurred. For example, many grocery stores now stock a 
selection of household goods, and retailers are beginning to compete with banks and 
insurance companies in the financial services market. This fragmentation of markets 
has led to a multiplicity of retail formats. For the purpose of this research the 
following classifications of retail formats are used:
The multiples are traditionally defined as 'enterprises with over ten shops' (Musannif 
1988; Ruston 1999). There has been an increase in the size of average multiple store 
organisation in terms of outlets, and also the increased size of these outlets in terms of
12
employment (Business Monitor 1988). This form of retailing organisation has come to 
dominate the UK retail industry in terms of sales and market share. Multiples have 
been largely reliant on market share gains to fund their growth, rather than volume 
growth (Segal-Horn 1987).
There are two types of multiple stores - the variety chain stores, and the specialist 
multiple shops. The definition of variety stores is not clear because they sell a wide 
range of merchandise on a self-selection basis, for example Marks and Spencer and 
Woolworth. The specialist multiple store has its origins in one product market, for 
example, Superdrug, WHSmith and The Burton Group. These initially majored in 
food and footwear, but are now dominant in most other sectors. The relative position 
of multiples differs across major specialist sectors of the retail trade. Its market 
penetration is greatest in the grocery sector, followed by clothing and footwear, and 
household goods. However, in the Confectioners, Tobacconists and Newsagents 
(CTNs) and other non-food sectors, multiples do not appear to hold such a dominant 
position (Segal-Horn 1987).
The independent retailer has suffered a vital loss in their share of the retail trade over 
the past four decades (Business Monitor 1988; Ruston 1999). They have been reeling 
under the onslaught of the multiples, but can always survive because of their long-term 
role in society, and by virtue of the unique service that they offer. Meanwhile, the 
independent retail establishment does remain the dominant physical feature of retailing 
in terms of outlet numbers.
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The department store is a mature retailing format which has been in decline since its 
peak in 1950 (Howe 1992). The traditional definition of a department store is 'selling 
space in excess of 25 000 sq. ft. on more than one level, selling at least five types of 
merchandise including women's wear on a departmental basis' (Musannif 1988). Since 
1971 department stores have been omitted from separate analysis in the Census of 
Distribution report, but the sector is estimated to account for approximately 4.5 per 
cent of total retail sales (Howe 1992). It would seem unlikely that department stores 
can regain any significant share of the retail market, especially with the emergence of 
'up-market 1 chains such as Next and Principles (Ruston 1999).
The Co-operative movement comprises the individual societies and the Co-operative 
Wholesale Society (CWS), which is in turn owned by the individual societies. CWS 
acts as a central marketing organisation, major wholesaler, and supplier (Musannif 
1988). Since 1950 the Co-operatives' share of the total retail trade has more than 
halved, suffering from the growth of the multiple store groups (Retail Business 1994).
Mail order prospered in the 1950's and 1960's (Howe 1992). Today this retailing 
format can be divided into two sections, the traditional agency mail order system, and 
direct mail sales. The traditional form of mail order retailing accounts for 90 per cent 
of home shopping sales and being dominated by five large organisations, has one of the 
highest concentration in retailing. However, advancements in technology may lead to
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a revival of non-shop retailing through tele-shopping. The expansion of access to the 
Internet means that customers can shop from the 'information highway' as well as 
through satellite television channels. The grocery sector is the first of the large UK 
multiple retailer sector to operate tele-shopping with Virtual supermarkets' and home 
delivery (Ruston 1999).
Another increasingly popular form of retailing is the business-format franchise. This 
occurs where a franchiser develops a particular form of product or service and a 
number of independent businesses (franchisees) pay the franchiser for the right to 
conduct the franchise operation in a particular locality. Business format franchises 
accounted for 3.7 per cent of retail sales in the UK in 1995. This equated to 474 
business formal franchises, employing 222,700 staff, with sales worth £5.9 billion 
(Ruston 1999).
This research study concentrates on multiple store retailing. Given its dominance of 
the industry, both in terms of employment and trading, it is an very important employer 
in the UK. Consequently, its execution of HRM and employee resourcing practices 
has widespread implications for a large proportion of the UK's workforce. A 
particular focus of the empirical research was on multiple store retailing and the 
superstore format. Consequently, a more detailed discussion of this sector of the retail 
industry will take place in section 2.4.
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As outlined in Section 2.2.1 market concentration has occurred in the UK retail 
industry over recent years, whereby a few multiple organisations dominate various 
retail sectors. For the purpose of this thesis the term multiple store retailers will be 
used to describe those organisations with over ten outlets and operating on a national 
basis. The market power of these large firms in the UK retail industry has expanded 
considerably over recent decades (Baret et al 2000). The largest firms in retailing are 
amongst the largest companies in the UK (Labour Research 1994; Sparks 1989), 
underlining their significant role in the UK's economy.
The list of top UK employers is dominated by multiple branch retailers (Labour 
Research 1994), thus highlighting the concentration of employment in a few large 
businesses. This is such that multiple retailers represent less that one per cent of 
businesses, yet account for 46 per cent of retail employment, and over half of retail 
turnover (NRTC 1995). Retailing is a labour intensive industry (Shackleton 1998), 
making it a key area for any HRM study.
A key feature of the industry is the domination of the market by a few, large multiple 
retail companies. These multiple retailers have dominated the retail industry since 
rationalisation began in the 1960s. Independent retailers, particularly those in the 
grocery sector, attribute their decline to unfair and discriminatory trade practices by 
multiples and suppliers. The industry displays significant pockets of oligopolistic 
behaviour in what is otherwise a highly competitive industry. Acquisitions have meant 
increasing rationalisation in the retail sector with the major multiple store retailers
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claiming growing shares of the total market. This has been aided by aggressive 
marketing and promotional activity. The 1980s was a decade of mergers and 
acquisitions that saw the development of'super-multiples' such as Kingfisher, Dixons, 
Burton, Tesco, Sainsbury, and Argyll (Ruston 1999). However, the 21st Century is 
witnessing some reverse in this trend with the on-going de-merger of the Kingfisher 
group.
The growth of multiple store retailers in the UK has led to their requirement for large 
amounts of finance. Many of the companies are quoted on the stock exchange and 
have generated financial capital on these markets. The ownership of multiple retailers 
is becoming more and more concentrated into a small number of financial institutions. 
The large size of many of these organisations has brought about changes in the nature 
of their relationships with the institutional investors:
"The imperative to meet short-term tactical targets becomes stronger as 
institutional investor involvement increases and becomes more active." 
(Dawson 2000:128) 
This is particularly so for food retailers who have become increasingly answerable to
the City and shareholder pressure (Freathy and Sparks 1994). Multiple store retailers 
are generally owned and controlled by those not in charge of their day-to-day 
operations. The imperative has subsequently become the maintenance of a high share 
price to sustain profits (Sparks 1989). As a result many multiple store retailers are 
required to perform against specified quantitative targets through the development of 
more sophisticated retail strategies.
The dominance of the large retail organisation in recent decades has led to an 
increasing complexity of their operations. This has demanded a more professional
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approach to operations, which has been witnessed in their search for products and 
sites, the merchandise and design of stores, logistics, and employment (Sparks 2000b). 
This has been a key component in organisational change and the rise of the multiple 
store retailer. Until recently the focus of growth was on the development of larger 
shops, in new locations, with the impetus on efficiency and effectiveness of operations 
(Sparks 2000a).
The efficient administration of such complex organisations requires a centralised 
structure and functional specialisation at head office (to avoid duplication of common 
back-up services), as well as a high degree of monitoring and co-ordination of all its 
activities (Sparks 1989, 1992a). At the same time this flexibility is supported by very 
tight cost management and financial controls. Such systems tend to require 
centralisation of policy, planning and investment, with multiple retailers thus needing 
high control and high flexibility to compete effectively in the market (Segal-Horn 
1987).
As multiple store retailers have grown larger they have centralised many of their 
functions and facilities. This process has included the centralisation of functions such 
as buying, advertising, pricing and merchandising. Consequently, while the stores are 
"substantial operations in their own right", they are "attached through an umbilical 
cord and data cord to the central part of the business" (Sparks 2000a: 18). A further, 
and more detailed, discussion of this centralisation of store level managers' 
responsibilities takes place in Chapter five.
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Large multiple retailers are also associated with the geographical decentralisation from 
high streets to out-of-town locations. The grocery multiples tend to be at the forefront 
of change in the retail industry. It is a highly concentrated and competitive sector 
dominated by five non co-operative operators who between them have a 64 per cent 
share of grocery retail sales in the UK (Marchington and Harrison 1991). They spear- 
headed the move towards self-service shopping and larger retail outlets in the 1950s 
culminating in superstores and hypermarkets operating in out-of-town locations. The 
trend of expansion in size and geographical decentralisation was followed by the DIY, 
furniture and electrical multiples setting up 'retail warehouses' in retail parks, and then 
other multiple retailers moving to out-of-town shopping centres.
The increase in size of multiple store retailers has been accompanied by format 
development, and in particular the rise of the superstore format. The standard 
definition for 'superstores' is of stores "with a sales area greater than 25,000 sq.ft. on 
one floor and with adjacent parking facilities" (Ruston 1999:100). Superstore 
development in the UK began in the 1960s. The format was relatively slowly 
introduced until it became increasingly accepted by consumers, retailers and planners. 
Improved economies of scale and lower unit costs became paramount in the 1980s. 
Capacity became increasingly rationalised which led to the emergence of superstores in 
out-of-town locations. While in 1980 only 5 per cent of sales took place through out- 
of-town retailing, by 1991 this had grown to 17 per cent (Ruston 1999).
The penetration of superstores into the UK accelerated dramatically during the 1980s 
and early 1990s until planning regulations curtailed their expansion (Bromley and
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Thomas 1993; Davies 1995; Davies and Sparks 1989; Freathy 1993; Guy 1994; 
McGoldrick 1990; Wrigley and Lowe 1996). Subsequently, multiple store retailers 
shifted their focus from new store build to a concern with the operational efficiency of 
existing stores (Freathy and Sparks 1996). Sparks (2000b) has warned that the 
superstore format is now under threat because of planning restrictions, but believes it 
"will remain the dominant format for some time" (p.88), particularly in the food 
retailing sector.
The retail format through which some multiple store retailers have become more 
successful is the superstore (Sparks 2000a). Food retailing is now dominated by a few 
multiple store retailers, predominately operating the superstore format. Figure one 
outlines the characteristics of superstore food retail outlets, according to Dawson
(1984).
1. Retail establishment run by horizontally integrated chain
2. Sales areas of > 2500m2
3. Merchandise mix of >35% sales area in non-food
4. Gross floor space >120% sales area
5. Product range wide, but shallow
6. Mass scrambled merchandising
7. Prices are relatively low
8. Customer self-service
9. Extended opening hours
10. Associated operations e.g. petrol 
11 .High technology use 
12.Supply channels
13.Car parking space provided
14.Development by retailer 
15.Off-centre locations
16.Design stresses functionalism
17. Store management decentralised_______
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Due to their operational efficiency, the development of the superstore format quickly 
became the sole focus of multiple store retailers in the grocery sector (Shaw et al 
1989). Retailers in other sectors also followed, particularly those in the home 
improvement and electrical areas. These out-of-town superstores are cost effective, 
with greater economies of scale. The emphasis on larger outlets to realise economies 
of scale became apparent with out-of-town superstores tending to be more cost- 
intensive than labour intensive (Dawson et al 1987; Segal-Horn 1987). This has 
resulted in a polarisation of the market between large out-of-town superstores and 
smaller in-town outlets. A further discussion relating to the employment 
characteristics of superstore retailing takes place in Section 3.3.
Crucial to a firm's growth and prosperity in large-scale multiple store retailing in the 
UK is the ability to gain and retain a competitive advantage (Howe 1992; Walters and 
Hanrahan 2000). This involves a success factor in the market substantial enough to 
make a difference, and sustainable in the face of changing conditions and competitive 
actions (Johnson 1992). A competitive advantage is gained by focusing on variables 
that clearly differentiate a company from its competitors enabling an organisation to 
increase volume, reduce costs, retain customers, and hence increase profitability 
(Walker 1992).
Many retailers were quick to realise that economies of scale could be best achieved 
through repetition. Adding identical departments and branches led to quantity buying 
and other favourable terms, which could provide a considerable competitive
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advantage. In the early 1990's the strategies for achieving this were through 
dominating local markets, increasing store size, sales and gross profit productivity, 
improving store operating costs and central cost productivity, and reducing 
merchandising costs. However, to the extent that one company gained the initiative, 
competitors were obliged to respond and thereby play a reactive rather than a 
proactive role. This, combined with the openness on issues of strategy and 
performance demanded of multiple retailers from their investors, has created problems 
in competitive terms "with the copying of tactics and strategies widespread in 
retailing" (Dawson 2000:129). In the 1980s and early 1990s retailers could be 
described as 'defenders' (Miles and Snow 1984).
Retailing is very often viewed as a mature industry despite also being described as 
'dynamic' (Musannif 1988; Sparks 1992a, 1992b). A portfolio classification could 
thus be used which draws on the concepts of product life cycle and experience curve - 
a tool recommended by Baird and Meshoulam (1988). Multiple branch retailing could 
be generally defined as a 'cash cow' using the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) 
portfolio model. This places the emphasis on costs in order to maintain growth. 
However, large retailers have begun to recognise the need for innovation in order to 
remain competitive, particularly in the more developed food retailing sector. This has 
encouraged them to enter new markets, such as banking and Internet shopping. Using 
the BCG matrix these new ventures could be defined as 'question marks', which create 
a demand for new skills and effective management. In essence retail companies have 
had to do more to sustain their profit growth targets in the face of changing markets 
(Whitefield 1987).
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During the 1990's and into the 21st century some major retailers appeared to be 
practising two generic strategies simultaneously by placing an emphasis on both quality 
enhancement and cost reduction (Ogbonna and Whipp 1999). This was particularly in 
terms of offering customers a high quality of customer service and shopping 
experience, together with low prices. Compounded by competitive pressures, 
particularly in the food retailing sector, retail strategies have tended to focus on the 
maintenance of a high share price, through cost saving initiatives (Christopherson 
1996; Freathy and Sparks 1996; Ogbonna and Wilkinson 1998; Ogbonna and Whipp 
1999). The economic recession of the early 1990s intensified the situation by placing 
price at the forefront of retailers' competitive strategies (Ogbonna and Whipp 1999). 
This search for operating efficiencies and improved methods of meeting customer 
needs transformed the operations of leading retailers.
Parallel to pursuing this strategy of cost reduction, many retailers placed the quality of 
customer service at the heart of their competitive strategies in the mid to late 1990s. 
As Ogbonna and Whipp (1999) noted, even the recession of the early 1990s, and the 
subsequent re-focus on cost savings was not at the total expense of quality and service. 
"The critical role of customer service" (Doogan 1992:23) and "quality of staff' issues 
(Sparks 1992b: 11) became key determinants in contemporary strategies of retail 
competition. There is a clear association in the literature between the rise of customer 
service as an important facet of the retail business and the competitive edge which can 
be gained (Gardner and Sheppard 1989). The customer care programmes are 
important strategies for today's multiple store retailer gaining prevalence during the 
1990's. However, Sparks (1992c) noted, "in looking at the realities of British retailing,
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customers might be forgiven for believing that retailers understand only lip service 
rather than customer service" (p. 165). As Lowe and Crewe (1996) found, increased 
efficiency for the retailer has often meant declining standards of service to the 
customer. Yet, pursuing a strategy of quality customer service requires a culture 
which always puts the customer first. Many retailers have attempted to encourage a 
strong sense of company culture and corporate identity in the workplace (Doogan 
1992), which would suggest a 'soft' HRM approach is necessary to secure the success 
of such corporate strategies.
In all retail activities there appears to be a strategic drive towards serving the customer 
better, but within an acceptable cost base (Freathy and Sparks 2000). Many retailers 
are now moving towards customer-centric marketing models, recognising that the 
customer has high expectations of service (Ruston 1999). This has in part been caused 
by speculation that growth could only be achieved by attracting customers from 
competitors (Ogbonna and Whipp 1999). This seems to have served as the impetus 
for change, and a majority of retailers now embrace the philosophy of customer 
service. Some retailers have undergone enormous strategic change to address the 
combination of strong competition in the industry, together with a more discerning 
customer. One example of this was Safeway whose strategy was re-focused, which 
involved a massive overhaul of the whole company (Ruston 1999).
The concurrent strategies of cost reduction and improved quality of customer service 
appear diametrically opposed goals. It also does not accord with the typology put 
forward by Porter (1985) that only one strategy type can be pursued within the same
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organisation at the same time. This suggests that an alternative approach to generic 
strategy is needed. Ogbonna and Whipp (1999) found that staff were confused about 
the conflicting messages arising from changes to competitive strategy in the food 
retailing sector. These competitive strategies have obviously had various 
repercussions on the practice of HRM and employee resourcing within retail 
organisations, which will be discussed in more detail in Section 
This chapter has sought to outline the industry context within which local managers 
operate and HRM is executed. A brief historical perspective was provided, before the 
discussion focused on multiple store retailing, with an emphasis on the superstore 
format.
Increasing rationalisation in the retail industry has led to multiple store retailers 
claiming an increasing share of the total market. Many multiple retailers are now 
answerable to shareholder pressure, which has placed an emphasis on cost reduction 
and profit maximisation through the development of appropriate corporate strategies. 
The growth of multiple store retailers has been accompanied by a rise in the superstore 
format, particularly in the food retailing sector. These superstores have tended to be 
located out-of-town, achieving greater economies of scale than equivalent high-street 
stores.
Current retail strategies appear to be focused on two aspects - customer service and 
cost minimisation. This equates to Porter's (1985) quality enhancement and cost 
reduction strategies being pursued simultaneously - two apparently diametrically
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opposed strategies. The literature places doubt on retailers' true strategic intentions of 
quality enhancement, and the consequences of these strategies for employment issues 
will be examined in the following chapter.
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This chapter seeks to examine the employment characteristics of the retail industry. It 
adopts a particular focus on multiple store retailing and the superstore format in order 
to reflect the empirical work of this research study. This encompasses an outline of the 
main characteristics of the retail labour market before proceeding to consider the 
nature of local management.
To discern the role of store level managers in the process of employee resourcing it is 
important to consider the nature of the retail workforce. A review of current trends 
and key characteristics will enable a full understanding of the context within which 
HRM and employee resourcing is practised in multiple store retailing. Statistics and 
key trends are taken from the period of the mid 1990s to enable a picture of the nature 
of retail employment, at the time of the empirical research, to be established. Key 
features of the retail workforce are examined with a focus on the high use of non- 
standard employment; the above-average employment of women; and the increasing 
employment of student workers.
Sparks (1992a) described British retailing as characterised by:
"low pay, poor levels of staff remuneration, sometimes inadequate working 
conditions, and minimal staff levels, motivation and concern." (p. 182)
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The workforce is often described as "youthful" and "feminised", employing a large 
number of young workers, together with having a predominately female workforce 
(Sparks 1992a, 1992b; Shackleton 1998; Sly 1996).
Another of the features common to retail employment is the high level of labour 
turnover. USD AW (Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers) estimated 
average staff turnover for 1989 to be 62 per cent. Exacerbated by these high levels of 
turnover is a low level of unionisation. Overall it is estimated that less than 30 per cent 
of retail employees belong to a trade union (Sparks 1992a); Toye et al (1992) put the 
figure even lower at 17 per cent. Of these, most will belong to USDAW (Sparks 
1992a). However, some companies have maintained substantive agreements with 
trade unions, which culminated in the first partnership agreement in the retail industry, 
between Tesco and USDAW in 1998 (IDS 1998).
Retailing is a labour intensive industry (Shackleton 1998) with three key 
characteristics. Retailers are high employers of part timers who constitute a substantial 
part of the industry's workforce (IRS 1993b; Naylour 1994; Shackleton 1998; Sparks 
1992b). In recent years the introduction of zero hour and minimum hours contracts 
have been witnessed (IDS 1993a, 1993b; Neathey and Hurstfield 1995). Retailers also 
employ high numbers of women and young workers, particularly students. Each of 
these will be examined in more detail in this section.
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Retailers employ large numbers of part timers, and a significant proportion of the retail 
workforce could be categorised as 'flexible', i.e. working less than full time under non- 
permanent contracts (Hakim 1987). In Spring 1995, part time employment accounted 
for 43 per cent of the British retail workforce (Sly 1996). Between 1984 and 1994, 
part time employment in retailing increased by 63 per cent in the UK (Naylour 1994), 
while the incidence of temporary working remains low, accounting for 4 per cent of 
the total workforce (Alpin and Walsh 1997). The industry also accounted for the 
largest share of part time workers, with the biggest increase in part time jobs occurring 
in the food retailing sector (Naylour 1994). This increase in part time employment led 
to a concurrent decrease in the employment of full timers, particularly in the food 
retailing sector (Freathy and Sparks 1996; Naylour 1994; Sparks 1992b). However, 
the retail industry's dependence on part time employment has been a long standing 
feature of their labour market structure, and not simply "a phenomenon of the 
recession and uncertainty of the 1980's" (Walsh 1991:107).
McGregor and Sproull (1991, 1992) found that the main reasons for employers 
recruiting flexible workers (in particular part time and temporary workers) were 
traditional ones. These were defined as providing short term cover, catering for tasks 
requiring only limited inputs, or attracting certain segments of the labour force. 
Recruiting part timers avoids the under-use of labour and the higher level of wage and 
non-wage payments which need to be meted out if full timers were employed to fill 
these jobs. This is classified as the supplementary rationale for the recruitment of part 
timers (Tarn 1997). The use of part timers enables retailers to match labour demands
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with changing patterns in operational and customer requirements. This has been 
particularly evident in the superstore sector and is said to indicate a shift from the 
employment of full time workers to part time workers (Sparks 1992b). It could 
therefore be argued that the deployment of part time workers in the retail industry is a 
combination of both supplementary and substitution factors, with the use of 
substitution a relatively new phenomenon.
Much of the literature concludes that retailers have increased their employment of part 
timers in order to develop flexible groups of employees for the achievement of 
economic gain. This is particularly through their ability to increase hours without 
incurring premium rate overtime payments (Gregory 1991; Robinson 1990; Walsh 
1990). Gregory (1991) found that retailers consider part timers to be the main vehicle 
for flexibility, particularly through overtime. Neathey and Hurstfield (1995) has found 
that retailers commonly employ non-standard employees to contain or reduce costs, 
whilst having the flexibility to cover regular fluctuations in business. Meanwhile, 
Gregory (1991), Robinson (1990), and Walsh (1990), found that retail employers were 
using part timers to control costs and increase productivity within a competitive 
environment.
Almost all sectors of the retail industry experience fluctuations in demand over the 
year, usually attributable to seasonal factors (Sparks 1992a, 1992b; Walsh 1990, 
1991). These fluctuations enhance the attractiveness of temporary workers. The use 
of temporary staff on fixed short-term contracts has been advocated as an important 
component of the retail labour force (Walsh 1991). It is most frequently used to cope
30
with fluctuations in demand as a result of seasonal factors, which generally occur 
during the Christmas period when some retail employers earn up to 40 per cent of 
annual revenue in a six week period (Sparks 1992a). Walsh (1990), and Hunter and 
Maclnnes (1991, 1992), found that the seasonal variation in retail sales was commonly 
met by temporary employees, usually for sales and summer seasons. However, the 
incidence of temporary employment in retailing is low (approximately 4 per cent) and 
appears to affect mainly the youngest workers, particularly students (Alpin & Walsh 
1997).
McGregor and Sproull (1991, 1992) found that although supply-side explanations 
were quite salient for employers of part timers, they were cited less frequently in the 
case of temporary workers. Flexible working practices open up opportunities of 
employing different groups of people - those with family or caring responsibilities, 
those with other time pressures, such as education, and those who simply do not want 
to commit themselves to 'standard' employment. There is a majority of part time 
workers who prefer to work in their current pattern (Wareing 1992) and these workers 
are termed as Voluntary' part timers. These are typically women with dependent 
children, full time students, or semi-retired persons. Women, especially those with 
children, value flexibility of work hours and seek job opportunities which offer this 
advantage, particularly in the UK where employer-provided child care provision is 
scarce (Feldman and Doerpinghaus 1992).
Research indicates that part time workers are often treated less favourably than full 
time workers in respect to some conditions of employment. They are commonly
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excluded from receiving overtime premia. Few employers pay any premium to part 
timers for working overtime beyond their contractual hours until the full time standard 
weekly hours are exceeded (Dickens 1992, 1995; Walsh 1990, 1991). Promotion 
beyond a certain level is also limited for part time employees (Tilly 1992). Robinson 
(1990) found a few part time supervisors in existence in the retail industry, but they 
typically worked over 30 hours a week and were only used where full time supervisory 
staff could not provide adequate cover, such as at week-ends and late evenings. 
Consequently, part timers are confined to certain occupational groups within the 
lowest grades of a store (Robinson 1990; Walsh 1991).
Research has also confirmed that part time employees are particularly disadvantaged in 
skill levels (Gallic 1991; Gallie and White 1994), tending to be found in the lower 
skilled jobs directly responsive to customer demand (Cockburn 1991; Gregory 1991). 
Elias and Gregory (1994) concluded that part time work remains heavily skewed 
toward the low-skill end of the spectrum of occupations, with the occupational 
structure of part time jobs changing little since 1980. Gallie and White (1994) found 
that part timers were not only the lowest skilled workers on all criteria, but were least 
likely to have experienced an increase in either skills or responsibility over the previous 
five years. They concluded that in terms of skill, part timers conform most closely to 
the secondary, or peripheral, labour market.
The ultimate form of part time working is the zero, or minimum hours contract, where 
there is no specification as to the exact hours which an employee is expected to work. 
A number of retailers have adopted this form of working for a small proportion of their
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workforce to achieve maximum flexibility of working time (IDS 1993a; IRS 1993b). 
This has resulted in a further fragmentation of working hours for some retail 
employees and they have been identified in the literature as the true 'peripheral' 
workforce in the retail industry (Neathey and Hurstfield 1995; Purcell and Purcell 
1999).
In the course of the 20th Century, the retail industry changed from a predominately 
male full time workforce, to a female one with large numbers of part time workers 
(Bradley 1989; Hoffman 1947; Winstanley 1983). As Howe (1992) described:
"retailing is dominated by women and managed by men." (p. 192) 
Sixty one per cent of the retail workforce is female, while in 1994 sixty five per cent of 
women working in retail were employed on a part time basis, compared to only twenty 
five per cent of men (Census of Employment 1994). The expansion of female 
employment has been particularly prevalent in the superstore sector (Booz et al 1990; 
Dawson et al 1986). The vast majority of part time positions within superstores, 
particularly supermarkets, were filled by women (Dawson et al 1986). However, the 
rise in the number of part time jobs and the substitution of part time jobs for full time 
jobs has taken place largely within the female workforce. Therefore, the majority of 
male jobs remain full time (MacEwan Scott 1994).
The retail workforce, particularly in the superstore sector, reveals a distinct gender 
bias, with women being used primarily as sales assistants and men tending to occupy 
managerial roles (Freathy 1993). While women are more likely to be managers in the
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retail industry than other occupational sectors, they tend to be concentrated at the 
lower levels of management (Davidson and Cooper 1992). Wacjman (1996) implicates 
masculine organisational cultures in the retail industry for the existence of vertical 
occupational segregation, claiming that macho management is in the ascendancy. 
Barriers for females in reaching senior retail management positions of 'not being male', 
long hours, lack of part time management positions, and locational mobility, have been 
cited (Broadbridge 1998; MacEwen Scott 1994). This has led to conclusions that 
masculinity and male values still constitute an essential qualification for many retail 
management posts.
The retail industry employs a large proportion of part time female labour and various 
attempts have been made to explain this. One approach argues that it is the nature of 
the retail industry and demand factors that contribute to the high incidence of flexible 
working practices (Dale 1987). This argument asserts that the retail industry 
demonstrates all the factors that have been identified as likely to lead to the 
construction of part time jobs within an occupation or industry. These are that it 
draws upon the local labour market, is labour intensive, has staffing requirements that 
fluctuate, requires employees to work unsociable hours, and the work has traditionally 
been carried out by women (Dale 1987). Conversely, it has been argued that 
feminisation of the retail workforce has enabled employers to deploy a flexible 
workforce more easily. Retailers have been provided with a readily available pool of 
labour that accepts inferior terms and conditions of employment, as working mothers 
strive to accommodate their child care and domestic obligations (Brockbank and Airey 
1994a, 1994b).
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Occupational segregation is prevalent in the retail industry (Broadbridge 1995; Craig 
and Wilkinson 1985; Dawson et al 1987; Freathy 1993; Sparks 1991) and research has 
shown there is a long history of job gendering in retailing (Broadbridge 1991; Craig 
and Wilkinson 1982; Game and Pringle 1984; Winstanley 1983). This pattern of 
segregation began to develop as women were drawn into the retail industry and can be 
traced back to the late nineteenth century. Men have always filled the occupations that 
were considered skilled and requiring training, where the value of the products sold 
was high, the work was considered heavy and rough, or where there was a 
predominately male clientele. Women traditionally conducted jobs which required 
minimal training, the work was considered light, the clientele was predominately 
female, and where the wage bill was highly important to the shopkeeper (Holcombe 
1973). As a result, female workers were found in confectionery, millinery, corsetry, 
china goods, women's clothing, and where refreshments were sold. Men dominated in 
the grocery, jewellery, butchery, ironmongery, fishmongery, and pharmacy sector. The 
most striking feature is how firmly the pattern of segregation persisted once it was 
established. 'Masculine' jobs have today retained their associations with craft and 
training, as well as being the more senior positions in retail.
Horizontal segregation is also prevalent within the retail industry, where even within 
the same retail store occupational segregation often exists. Sales (other than buyers, 
brokers and sales representatives) is one occupation in which the greatest proportion 
of women work part time (Sly 1996). MacEwen Scott's research (1994) highlighted 
the tendency for retail managers to allocate men and women to different sections 
within a store according to the types of activity and merchandise. The main reasons
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was the close association between the goods sold and the salesperson and the 
customer. This was justified in terms of economic efficiency as retail managers 
attributed it to producing better sales. However, job gendering also occurred behind 
the scenes where no customers were involved.
Research in the food retailing sector indicates that men working on the shop floor were 
mainly confined to specialist areas such as butchery, bakery, or warehouse (Freathy
1993). MacEwan Scott (1994) found that men tend to hold most of the senior 
positions in stores and dominated departments with expensive or bulky consumables. 
Tolich and Briar (1999) found major gender divisions between apparently equal 
workers that were clearly detrimental to female employees' promotion prospects. 
Gender differences must therefore be recognised as not always arising out of natural, 
or biological differences between men and women, but out of social processes and the 
specific implementation of employment policies by managers (Rubery and Wilkinson
1994).
Women are also disproportionately found in business support functions, and least likely 
to hold operational roles within retailing (WH Smith 1994). This is despite 13 retail 
companies being members of the Opportunity 2000 initiative (Times Books 1995). 
Broadbridge (1998) concluded that this must equate to a considerable divergence 
between espoused company policy and organisational reality.
The retail industry has a workforce with 50 per cent of all workers aged 34 or less; 
higher than the national average for all employment (NRTC 1995). Many of these 
younger workers are students working part time to fund their studies (Dex and 
McCulloch 1995; Lucas 1997; Taylor and Smith 1998). The numbers of part time 
workers in the 16-19 age group exceeds those of full time workers (Employment 
Department 1994). Taylor and Smith (1998) found that 47.9 per cent of their sample 
of full time students, worked in the retail sector. According to Labour Force Survey 
data, the majority of retail employees aged 16-19 worked part time, and 15 per cent of 
Britain's retail workforce were enrolled on full time education courses in Spring 1995 
(Alpin and Walsh 1997). The significance of the retail sector as an important location 
of the student worker is clearly apparent. Dex and McCulloch (1995) suggest that 
Britain "may be in the process of moving to the USA model of part time employment 
where the rates of part time employment are highest amongst the young workers who 
are in full time education" (p. 136-7).
Existing literature focuses on the supply of student workers to the labour market and 
the experiences of those student workers, rather than employer demand for student 
labour (for example, Hakim 1996; Lucas 1997; Lucas and Ralston 1997; Taylor and 
Smith 1998). This is in contrast to other research conducted on flexible employment 
where demand-side factors are often examined at the expense of the employee 
perspective. The research shows that student workers tend to be treated as peripheral 
by their employers. Whilst located in low skilled jobs they "tend to get the worse jobs, 
the lowest pay and often find themselves pressurised to work extra hours and shifts"
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(Taylor and Smith 1998: 3). Lucas (1997) claimed to have strong evidence 
demonstrating employers' attempts by employers to maximise labour control through 
low cost and high flexibility strategies by using student labour.
With much of the literature defining student workers as part of the peripheral 
workforce this raises the issue of working mothers' part time employment. Dex and 
McCulloch (1995) concluded that women's part time employment linked to family 
formation has appeared to have peaked. They believed that employers are now 
increasingly turning to student workers to maximise flexibility. This forces women 
into direct competition with students, for the availability of part time jobs, as noted by 
Rubery and Tarling (1988):
"women are being increasingly forces into competition with other 
disadvantaged groups in their traditional employment areas........thus women
could lose their dubious advantage of being an important source of 
disadvantaged labour supply." (p. 126) 
This is particularly applicable to the retail industry as a large employer of both female,
and student, part timers.
The employment implications of superstore retailing have attracted academic interest 
over recent years (Sparks 1982, 1983, 1991; Dawson et al 1986; 1988). Of the 2.2. 
million persons employed within retailing over 380,000 are directly employed by 
superstores (Freathy 1993). The growth of superstores has therefore had a significant 
retail employment.
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As store sizes increase so economies of scale are encountered, including economies of 
labour input. Large multiple store retailers have been associated with the most modern 
changes in the labour process, particularly through their use of technology, with 
retailers becoming one of the most innovative users of information technology 
(Walters and Hanrahan 2000). This introduction of information technology has also 
led to some reduction in the need for labour. The use of Electronic Point of Sale 
(EPOS) technology has enabled a better matching of staff supply to customer demand, 
with a resultant increase in employment flexibility (Sparks 2000a). The rise in the 
superstore format has consequently led to a reduction in labour input in retailing, 
particularly in the food retailing sector where a large proportion of superstore formats 
are in operation.
Much of the work carried out by shop-floor sales assistants in multiple retail 
companies is tedious and low-skilled. This has led to the retail workforce being 
described by MacEwan Scott (1994) as the 'new proletariat of modern times'. The 
increased use of information technology means that retailing is becoming increasingly 
standardised relying on mass production methods for economies of scale and increased 
productivity. For example, cashiers in superstores are often monitored for their 
throughput by store managers and head office (Ogbonna and Whipp 1999). This 
negates Bell's (1973) notion of work in a post industrial society as being of a pleasant, 
skilled and challenging nature. Conversely, in superstores there has been an increased 
demand for "craftsmen" on the shop-floor as multiple store retailers increasingly 
compete on a quality basis. As a result stores have seen the re-introduction of
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traditional craft skills on the shopfloor in the form of butchers and fishmongers in the 
food retailing sector, and carpenters in the DIY sector (Ruston 1999).
Another feature of superstore employment is the marked increase in female 
employment within this format (see also section 3.2.2). It has been estimated that over 
70 per cent of total superstore employment is female (Dawson et al 1987; Booz et al 
1990). Accompanying this increase in female employment is a growth in the use of 
part time labour in superstores. An emphasis upon cost reduction together with the 
increased opening hours in superstore trading has driven this rise in part time 
employment in the superstore sector (Freathy 1993). In contrast to food retailing, 
non-food superstores have a more even split between male and female workers 
(Dawson et al 1987; Sparks 1991). Within the superstore labour market there is also 
evidence of occupational segregation with female workers occupying the majority of 
unskilled and semi-skilled occupations, whilst male employees are disproportionately 
represented in the managerial function (Broadbridge 1991, 1998).
Superstores are also considerable employers of the under-18s and over-60s (Dawson 
et al 1986). Young workers have been a traditional source of labour supply for the 
retail industry, and this has been particularly prevalent in the superstore sector. 
However, the decline in the number of school leavers has also led to retailers focusing 
on the semi-retired. Research has found that superstore retailers who have recruited 
older workers have been more successful in their demand for labour (Freathy 1993).
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The de-skilling thesis, first put forward by Braverman (1974), could be applied to the 
superstore sector of the retail industry. The effects of de-skilling in the retail industry 
can be traced back to the 1850s in the grocery sector. At the beginning of the 19th 
century shop-keeping was considered a trade requiring a variety of skills, but new food 
production methods began to erode the production skills of shop-keeping from the 
1850s. The structure of the retailing industry began to change from the middle of the 
20th century; as did the occupations within it. With the advent of large multiples came 
the role of the shop assistant. The shop assistant carried out very different tasks from 
those of the skilled apprentice with a more limited range of responsibility (Bradley 
1989). The skills required for retailing were no longer craft oriented under an 
apprenticeship scheme, but were social skills and industry-specific experience.
Technology has since taken over many of the tasks previously executed by humans, 
such as stock-ordering and cashier skills. The use of EPOS and laser scanning has 
diminished the cashier's skills, with the latest technology allowing customers to enter 
their own bar codes. It can be concluded that the use of technology, particularly in the 
superstore sector, has de-skilled the roles of cashiers and store level managers (Smith 
1988). Such standardisation of the labour process is in line with Braverman's (1974) 
de-skilling thesis, and the Tordisf approach to management. As the largest industry 
in the UK economy for female and part time employees, combined with the high 
density of young workers and low levels of unionisation, it could be argued that the 
retail industry is utilising weaker segments of the labour market in its search for profit.
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Conversely, attempts have been made to professionalise the function of retail 
management (see also Section 3.4), which suggests a conflict of interests for retailers. 
This could result in a polarisation of the retail workforce with senior managers 
enjoying enhanced terms and conditions of employment, while staff at the lower levels 
appear to be experiencing the opposite.
Dawson et al (1986) found significant differences between employment levels and 
types of labour in superstores operated by different companies. These differences were 
greater than the variation in employee types within superstores operated by any one 
retailer. The main differences were in the balance between part time and full time, and 
male and female, employment within superstores. They concluded that the major 
determinant of employee characteristics of superstores was the store operator. This 
led to calls for research that explains why such differences exist, and why different 
retailers pursue apparently convergent corporate employment policies for "often 
seemingly similar superstores" (p.360). This research study aims to address this gap in 
the literature by examining the processes and management rationale of employee 
resourcing decision making at store level.
To fulfil this study's research objectives it is necessary to consider the nature of local 
management in UK multiple store retailing. This will enable any characteristics unique 
to retail management to be considered when examining the execution of HRM and 
employee resourcing at operational level.
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Retail store managers occupy an indispensable role between the corporate 
organisation, the store operations, and the marketplace. Over the past decade research 
interest has grown in the employment aspects of retailing (Broadbridge 1991, 1996, 
1998; Freathy 1993, 1997; Freathy and Sparks 1994, 1995, 1996, 2000; Sparks 1987, 
1991, 1992a, 1992b, 2000a, 2000b). However, much of this work has been concerned 
with the position of shop-floor workers, rather than store or head office management 
(Broadbridge 1998; Freathy and Sparks 1995). Consequently, the factors that may 
help or hinder the job outcomes of these managers, and how those factors may affect 
the organisational outcomes have been rarely studied (Lusch and Serpkenci 1990).
The characteristics of retail managers appear consistent throughout the industry. The 
jobs are nearly always full time, and the more senior the position within a store the 
greater the likelihood the job will be full time (Freathy and Sparks 2000). The 
managerial structure also resembles a distinct gender bias (Freathy 1993; Sparks 
1992a). Much research has indicated that women, despite their numerical dominance 
in the retail industry, are disproportionately represented within the lowest occupational 
grades (Broadbridge 1995, 1996, 1998; Craig and Wilkinson 1985; Dawson et al 1987; 
Freathy 1993; Sparks 1991). In particular women are under-represented at senior 
retail management levels (Broadbridge 1997; Collins 1990; HOC 1991; Hansard 
Society Commission 1990). Research conducted by the Institute for Retail Studies 
found that of 481 randomly selected stores from four multiple food retailers, 97.5 per 
cent of store managers were male, with only 2.5 per cent female. This trend continues 
through the management hierarchy to middle and junior managers (Freathy and Sparks 
2000). Only in superstores large enough to warrant a personnel department do women
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seem to be more fully represented, with the majority of personnel managers being 
female (Freathy 1993).
Research has revealed a highly segmented labour market between management and 
shop-floor employees, which broadly reflects the primary/secondary divide identified 
by Doeringer and Piore (1971). Managerial and supervisory staff have been found to 
have terms and conditions of employment which most closely correspond to primary 
sector employment, while shop-floor staff more closely resemble Doeringer and 
Piore's secondary employees. In practice, the managerial tier in retailing has been 
further sub-divided in the literature. The terms 'senior', 'middle' and 'junior' 
management are the conventional terms used by the retail industry to describe the 
typical management hierarchy (Brockbank and Airey 1994a, 1994b). Senior managers 
include store managers, and grades similar and above at head office. Middle 
management includes assistant store managers, personnel managers, and department 
heads, while junior management comprises supervisory positions.
The bureaucratic store management hierarchy has recently been dismantled by many 
retail companies in an effort to reduce costs, and increase the flexibility and job content 
of remaining managers, in a search for higher productivity (Sparks 2000a). This de- 
layering has been particularly extensive in the superstore sector. For example, Tesco 
placed a major emphasis on the de-layering of management at the store level in the 
1990s in an effort to reduce the cost burden of a bureaucratic hierarchical 
organisational structure (Sparks 2000b). This has led to a breakdown of the traditional 
management hierarchy, particularly in superstores. In this retail format, stores are
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more likely to have a senior store management team, while the level of supervisor/ 
junior management has been eradicated and merged into middle management. This has 
led, in some stores, to a reduction in management to two hierarchical levels: senior and 
lower level managers (Sparks 2000b).
As already discussed, senior retail managers tend to occupy full time, relatively secure 
positions, with conditions of primary labour (Freathy 1993; Freathy and Sparks 2000). 
As a result turnover is much lower than the industry average at just over 5 per cent 
(Freathy 1993). Such senior managers are also considered to be on a structured career 
path. Doogan (1992) found that movement between stores is also a significant feature 
of managerial career progression. Other features of store management is the 
expectation to work considerably longer than the 'standard' week, including evenings 
and weekends (Brockbank and Airey 1994a, 1994b). Even middle managers have 
been cited as having relatively secure conditions of employment (Freathy and Sparks 
1996). Department heads are typically empowered with responsibility for a specific 
area of a store, although their function usually differs from senior management. Their 
duties are more highly defined with their roles governed by a formal set of work 
procedures. They have little or no control over space allocation, product placement, 
merchandising or promotion. This has led Sparks (2000b) to conclude that:
"the requirement at the store level is a simple one - keep the shelves stocked 
and the customers served." (p. 17) 
Meanwhile, junior managers are primarily in charge of the shop-floor with work which
is usually repetitious, acting as first line of complaint from the customer (Freathy and 
Sparks 2000). The overwhelming majority of junior managers have previously worked 
on the shop floor, and progression from sales assistant to a supervisory position is
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considered a traditional promotional path for the sales force (Freathy 1993). 
Supervisory skills are generally not considered company specific and experience is 
regarded as an important promotional criteria. Freathy (1993) believed these features 
would "limit supervisors' ability to progress on to lower managerial positions" (p.74). 
Freathy and Sparks (1996) consequently classified these jobs as comprising lower 
primary tier employment.
Organisational and technological changes have altered the nature of retail management 
jobs (Broadbridge 1998). The success of retail businesses has required rapid responses 
from its managers (Freathy and Sparks 1995). However, the recruitment for a store 
manager is often for a generalist rather than a specialist, as many of the control and 
management issues are now handled away from the store at head office (Sparks 
1992b). These developments led Tomlinson et al (1997) to suggest that the store 
manager's role now demands increased awareness of the expectations of more 
demanding and diverse consumers, significant HRM skills, and information technology 
competence.
Retailing management has traditionally been associated with a style characterised by 
task orientation, competition separation, self-assertion and control. In the past, retail 
companies have required people in key management positions who can deliver 
measurable 'hard' objectives (Broadbridge 1998; Brockbank and Airey 1994a, 1994b). 
Broadbridge (1998) claimed that today's retailer now places a greater emphasis on 
'softer' management skills, such as delivering high morale, customer care and 
employee care, as a means of achieving competitive advantage. This has yet to be fully
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supported with empirical evidence, and much of the literature actually describes retail 
store level management as becoming de-skilled through a centralisation of managers' 
tasks and responsibilities (Doogan 1992; Freathy and Sparks 1996; Smith 1988).
As retail companies have expanded, so many of their functions have become 
centralised at head offices. At store level, many managers have experienced a change 
in the nature of their role and a reduction in their decision-making responsibilities 
(Broadbridge 1998). Doogan (1992) noted that store management functions reflect a 
low position in the multiple chain of command of large, multiple retailers. This equates 
to an inability to make any valuable contribution to policy formation and strategy. 
Essentially, local management responsibilities seem geared towards the delivery of a 
service that has been designed and packaged centrally, and exhibit comparatively little 
autonomy in decision-making. This was supported by Smith (1988) who found that 
store managers "had little or no say in number of lines carried, selection of lines 
carried, store layout, promotions, price, window display, staff budgets, marketing, 
store design and decorations, or delivery dates" (p. 149). Freathy and Sparks (1996) 
had similar findings concluding that the autonomy and control of store level managers 
has been reduced over time, resulting in a de-skilling of their positions. They 
attributed this to retailers' efforts to remain competitive and secure operational 
efficiency. Kelly et al (1981) commented that being geographically separated from 
head office, while undergoing a centralisation of their tasks, could lead to a lack of role 
clarity for store level managers.
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Greater central control of store managers by head office has been facilitated by 
advancements in technology, enabling more managerial decisions to be made at head 
office, and reducing the content of local managerial positions (Sparks 1987). This 
highly centralised pattern of retail management is particularly British, and other 
European countries are more decentralised in their approaches (Burt 1989). In the 
UK, even responsibility for the transfer of trading information to head office has been 
eradicated as a result of EPOS, which allows data to be transmitted to head office 
without any intervention by store personnel. Consequently store managers have 
become "executors of orders emanating from head office, and the emphasis of their 
role has altered from trading to administration" (Houlton and Thomas 1990:15).
An explanation for the decline in autonomy for store level managers, through the 
centralisation of many elements of the local decision-making process was offered by 
Smith (1988). He found, in the majority of retail chains in his research, that senior 
managers at head office were keen to eliminate local management discretion. They 
"saw the branch manager as a problem" (p. 152), who could not be trusted to make 
effective decisions, particularly regarding stock and sales decisions. In many cases 
they were not even given access to the EPOS data to allow them to develop such 
skills. At one chain he found:
"what the Board wants to do is remove that discretion from shops, to make the 
computer system so clever that the system would get [re-ordering] basically 
right every time." (p. 153)
As Freathy and Sparks (1996) noted, while there remains a need for the presence of 
management at store level to "organise and manage what cannot be controlled 
centrally" (p. 193), their responsibilities are relatively minimal. This has left store level
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managers with responsibility for staff punctuality and presentation, and some control 
over day-to-day staff deployment (Smith 1988). Even training is commonly devolved 
to a training supervisor, and the content of training often set centrally to ensure 
consistency throughout a national chain (Smith 1988). In the case of employment 
policy, Doogan (1992) found evidence of clearly stipulated labour cost to sale ratios 
with the ability to specify part time to full time ratios, all determined by head office.
This process of centralisation has reduced the demands on store managers, yet Sparks 
(2000a) argues that their tasks remain considerable, if only because of the sheer size of 
many stores, particularly the superstore format. Accusations of de-skilling and decline 
in autonomy are in contrast to the increased remuneration packages offered to retail 
managers, and the tying in of senior store management to structured career paths 
(Freathy and Sparks 1996; Sparks 1992a, 1992b). Retailers are having to balance their 
requirement for better educated and better trained staff to cope with increased store 
size with the removal of areas of decision-making responsibility from the store. The 
requirement of retail management is of more practical generic management skills. The 
industry has made efforts to increase the number of graduates and many retailers have 
graduate management training schemes, in an attempt to professionalise their 
managerial workforce. Many store management positions in the larger companies now 
require a degree as a prerequisite reflecting these efforts (Freathy and Sparks 2000). 
Retail companies are also using advancements in IT to monitor and reward store level 
managers' performance. Data from management information systems is commonly 
used by major retailers to compare managers across stores enabling promotions and 
raises to be tied directly to country-wide competition (Lusch and Jaworski 1991).
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Head office can remind store managers where they rate relative to other stores by 
disseminating company-wide reports (Lusch and Dunne 1990). This enables the 
career-conscious manager to present evidence of effective performance to superiors 
(Brockbank and Airey 1994a).
There appears to be a centralisation of store level managers' tasks occurring in UK 
multiple store retail organisations aimed at achieving improved efficiency and 
consistency across branches. This is combined with an apparent low trust culture of 
local managers' ability to make effective decisions, together with facilitating 
enhancements in technology and management information systems. Meanwhile, 
retailers are concurrently making attempts to professionalise store level management, 
which could result in some role conflict for these local managers.
This chapter has sought to examine the employment and management characteristics of 
the multiple store retail workforce. The retail industry's workforce has three dominant 
features: female workers; young workers; and a large part time workforce. Research 
has shown that the superstore sector is a large and growing employer of these three 
types of workers, particularly food retailing stores. This has been attributed to a 
number of reasons, although the store operator appears to be a major determinant in 
the employment characteristics of the superstore workforce, with retailers seeming to 
pursue different employment policies to achieve similar strategic goals.
The nature of store management was also considered in this chapter in order to frame 
the context of the multiple store workforce. Evidence of a de-skilling of store
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managers' responsibilities, with an accompanying increase in professionalism has been 
witnessed in recent years. This has been facilitated by improved technology and the 
use of management information systems.
There appear to be changes occurring in the retail labour market, some of which have 
been driven by the growth of the superstore format. The nature of retail store 
management is also changing in multiple retail organisations. The following chapter 
will more closely examine the nature of HRM in the industry, with a particular 
emphasis on the execution of employee resourcing policies and procedures at store 
level.
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This chapter provides a focus on the nature of HRM and employee resourcing in the 
retail industry. It considers the role of HRM and employee resourcing in multiple store 
retailing, concentrating on the operational level. This includes an outline of the general 
characteristics of HRM, followed by a summary of the nature of HRM and employee 
resourcing in multiple store retailing, and the consequences of retail corporate strategy 
for the management of human resources. This is followed by a study of employee 
resourcing decisions at the operational level in retail, considering the role HR 
managers and store level managers play in the decision-making process.
HRM is not dissimilar to organisational behaviour in that both are concerned with the 
individual members of an organisation's workforce. However, organisational 
behaviour is concerned with a set of behaviours, whereas HRM recognises that people 
must be effectively managed if an organisation is to achieve its objectives (Maund 
2001). HRM is often seen as a product of the 1980s (Blunt 1990; Bratton and Gold 
1999) representing a move away from traditional personnel management towards a 
wider perspective (Wood 1994). Whilst one approach has been to contrast HRM with 
traditional personnel management (for example, Storey 1992), this division is not 
necessarily straight forward and Legge (1995) discusses the problematic nature of 
these attempts. Storey (1992) 'maps' the various meanings of HRM on a matrix of 
'strong' to 'weak' and 'hard' to 'soft'. The two most widely adopted models of
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human resource management are the 'hard' and 'soft' versions (Truss et al 1997). 
Guest (1987) and Storey (1992) viewed the key distinction between soft-hard models 
of HRM as being whether the emphasis is placed on the human or the resource. Hard 
HRM stresses the "quantitative, calculative and business-strategic" (Storey 1992:29) 
aspects of managing human resources. It focuses on the importance of a strategic fit 
between HR and corporate strategy, both internally (where HR policies and practices 
are closely linked to the strategic objectives of the organisation), and externally (where 
HR policies and practices are coherent among themselves), to achieve a competitive 
advantage (Baird and Meshoulam 1988; Devanna et al 1984; Hendry and Pettigrew 
1986; Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall 1988; Miles and Snow 1984; Storey and 
Sisson 1993b; Tichy et al 1982; Tyson and Fell 1986). Meanwhile, soft HRM is 
associated with the concept of high employee commitment based on high levels of 
trust, and associated with the goals of flexibility and adaptability (Storey and Sisson 
1993b; Walton 1985; Wood 1996). To summarise, the hard model is "based on 
notions of tight strategic control", while the soft model is "based on control through 
commitment" (Truss et al 1997:53). These two perspectives on HRM make 
assumptions that are diametrically divergent with conflicts and tensions evident in the 
models developed by both Guest (1987) and Storey (1992).
A review of the literature in the field of HRM also indicates divergence about what 
HRM actually is and what it represents. Initial criticism alleged that HRM was simply 
a restatement of traditional personnel management (Armstrong 1987; Fowler 1987; 
Keenoy 1990a, 1990b; Keenoy and Anthony 1992). Keenoy (1990a, 1990b) claimed 
HRM is more rhetoric than reality, full of contradictions in both theoretical and
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practical terms. Others have indicated that the financial orientations of most 
companies, are their stronger objectives, which are generally incompatible with HRM, 
particularly 'soft' HRM (Armstrong 1989). Truss et al (1997) concluded that even if 
the rhetoric of HRM embraces the tenets of soft HRM, "the reality is almost always 
'hard', with the interests of the organisation prevailing over those of the individual" 
(p.70). As Dawes (1995) outlined, while the view of senior managers might be that 
people are the key resources, "there is little evidence to show that managers behave as 
though this is true" (p.8).
These ongoing debates demonstrate the attention being paid to HRM and its use within 
organisations. However, the concept of HRM has been criticise as being often seen as 
"vague and elusive" (Maund 2001:25). Truss et al (1997) maintained that this 
distinction between rhetoric and reality must be considered in any conceptualisations of 
HRM. The remainder of this chapter will focus on one feature of the model of HRM - 
the role of the line manager in the execution of HRM with particular attention to 
employee resourcing. This will satisfy the objectives of this research study to focus on 
the role of local managers in the execution of HRM and employee resourcing at the 
operational level of multiple store retail organisations.
For clarification purposes, a definition of employee resourcing is provided. Employee 
resourcing has been described as difficult to define meaningfully (Taylor 1998), but 
attempts include:
"the range of methods and approaches used by employers in resourcing their 
organisations in such a way as to enable them to meet their key goals" (Taylor 
1998:2)
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"that part of personnel and development which focuses on the recruitment and 
release of individuals from organisations, as well as the management of their 
performance and potential whilst employed by the organisation." (CIPD PQS 
Scheme, cited in Corbridge and Pilbeam 1998:1)
In summary, employee resourcing includes three fundamental groups of personnel and 
development objectives: staffing, performance, and administration. Staffing includes 
"securing the services of the right people, in the right place, at the right time" (Taylor 
1998:2). The performance activity aims to ensure the workforce is well motivated and 
willing to perform to the best of its ability. This carries with it a need to monitor and 
improve employees' performance levels. Administration objectives are to ensure that 
employee resourcing is carried out "in accordance with the law, professional ethics and 
natural justice" (Taylor 1998:2). Combined, these three functions broadly form 
employee resourcing. This research study is fundamentally concerned with the 
deployment of staff at store level, including the choice of contract type (i.e. full time, 
part time, permanent or temporary), the recruitment and selection of new staff, the 
management of working hours, and the delegation of tasks, i.e. the 'staffing' element 
of employee resourcing.
Labour is critical to retail operations because of the need to serve customers and to 
manage stores:
"Retailing by its very nature is a people-centred activity." (Sparks 1992a:201) 
Labour is the biggest expense a retailer has after the purchase of stock (Freathy and 
Sparks 1996), which makes the efficient use of labour imperative to retailers. This is 
combined with growth in the superstore sector, which has initiated a restructuring of
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both the labour composition and the labour process within the retail sector (Freathy 
1993). The scale of activity in the superstore format has also required retailers to re- 
consider the "within-store organisational structures and the way in which this 
workforce is managed" (Sparks 2000a: 17).
Retail distribution has low levels of union membership relative to some other sectors of 
the economy (as discussed in Section 3.2). The low trade union density is 
compounded by the high labour turnover prevalent in the retail industry, whereby 
USD AW would require 100,000 newcomers to join the union each year to avoid a net 
decrease in membership (Sparks 1992b). The extent of multi-employer bargaining in 
retailing was weakened in the 1980s as negotiations were decentralised (Jackson et al 
1991), although some companies have maintained substantive agreements with 
partnership agreements. Therefore, the influence of trade unions is far less than in 
manufacturing or public sector organisations, where trade union density tends to be 
much higher (Bird and Corcoran 1994).
The lack of trade union input in retail employment relations is combined with a lack of 
credibility bestowed to the personnel profession by the retail industry. Ho we (1992) 
attributed this to the evolution of personnel management in a mainly non-retailing 
context, which has led to its services not being universally recognised as useful, "let 
alone vital to the needs of retail business" (p. 189). Consequently, strategic business 
decisions are often taken in functional areas with little or no consideration given to the 
impact on personnel-related issues. Personnel departments in retail organisations are 
commonly "only given lip-service by other managers" (Sparks 1992b: 193), and tend to
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be allocated to problems affecting staff welfare, wages records, counselling and staff 
recruitment, and only for shop-floor hourly paid sales assistants.
Therefore, it can be surmised that existing literature is generally pessimistic about the 
role of personnel in the management of human resources in the retail industry. While a 
later article by Sparks (1992b) was more optimistic about retailers' recognition of HR- 
related issues, this seemed to be restricted to recruitment and retention issues to reduce 
the costs of high labour turnover. Tomlinson et al (1997) concluded that the high 
labour turnover in the retail industry has created:
"an unstable, untrained, demotivated workforce which is expensive to maintain. 
Resources for training and development are diverted to recruitment and line 
supervision, tending towards an autocratic work environment, itself a factor in 
labour turnover." (p. 220).
Robinson (1990) found that while retailers recognised the need for training and ran 
formal training programmes, there was a comparative disregard for the training and 
development of part time employees - a significantly large proportion of the retail 
workforce. It can thus be concluded that where retailers have developed training 
packages these have been directed predominately at primary labour market employees. 
The development of self-service has enabled retailers to remove the traditional skills of 
the sales assistants. This has allowed employers to reduce labour costs and give 
minimum training to employees with few formal qualifications (Gregory 1991). 
Training for secondary employees - namely hourly-paid sales assistants appears limited 
to induction programmes (Freathy and Sparks 2000).
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Historically, retailers have placed their emphasis on the quantitative reconciliation of 
supply and demand, because costs and cost reduction have been crucial. Hence, many 
retailers have a target cost for employment at store and/or company level (Sparks 
1992b). With labour making up to 50 per cent of costs, its use is of vital importance 
to overall operating efficiency (Alexander 1988; Freathy and Sparks 1996; Robinson 
1990; Walsh 1990). This equates to "a clear need to monitor such expenditure and to 
seek means of measuring and promoting labour productivity" (Sparks 1992a: 189). 
The focus has become the need to reduce the costs of employment, while attempting to 
maintain service levels. This strategy is discussed in more detail in section 4.3. The 
focus on costs by multiple store retailers has led to the conclusion that retailers have 
tended to pursue 'hard' versions of HRJVI (Ogbonna and Whipp 1999).
The growth of the superstore format has also had implications for HRM in retail 
organisations. The companies which operate this format are growing in strength and 
one important component of this is their efficiency in labour management. This has 
provided both operational efficiency through cost control and profitability, and 
corporate recognition through service and attitude generation (Freathy and Sparks 
2000). It would therefore appear that retail organisations are more likely to pursue a 
'hard' HRM approach to employment issues, with some 'soft' HRM tools such as 
training and development, focused at their core workforce of managers.
4.3 HRM AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
Labour in the retail industry constitutes a large proportion of a firm's costs (Alexander 
1988; Doogan 1992; Freathy and Sparks 1996; Townsend et al 1996). It is argued
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that this places human resources at the forefront of retailers' competitive strategies 
(Doogan 1992). Fundamental changes in the business environment are thought to be 
making human resource concerns more important (Schuler and Walker 1990). In 
particular, conditions of increased market competition are said to have focused 
attention on the role of human resource strategy within the wider business strategy 
(Kinnie 1989). This section will consider retailers' corporate strategies and the 
implications of these for the management of human resources.
The link between strategy and HRM is regarded as essential, in both theory and 
practice, for the model of HRM to be fulfilled in practice. One reason for the 
popularity of HRM is its perceived relationship with organisational strategy (Ogbonna 
and Whipp 1999). However, not all the literature is enthusiastic about the link 
between HRM and strategy. Ogbonna and Whipp (1999:77) concluded that "HRM 
not only lacks a coherent theoretical base", but also proves difficult to link to strategy 
and for organisations to actually achieve. Nevertheless, there is evidence in the 
literature, in often prescriptive linkages between HRM and the theory of strategic 
management (for example, Beer et al 1984; Dyer 1984; Fombrum et al 1984; Guest 
1987; Hendry and Pettigrew 1986, 1992; Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall 1988; 
Miles and Snow 1984; Miller 1987; Purcell 1989, 1991, 1995; Purcell and Ahlstrand 
1994; Schuler and Jackson 1987; Watson 1986, 1999).
The literature also provides differing perspectives on the formation of strategy and 
hence human resource strategy. This is alongside the debate as to how corporate 
strategy links with human resource strategy. Just as corporate strategy may be
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deliberate, emergent or a mix, so too can human resource strategy. Attempts to link 
human resource strategy to corporate strategy have taken three approaches. These 
include the matching of human resource strategy with corporate strategy (for example, 
Baird and Meshoulam 1988; Beer et al 1984; Devanna et al 1984; Fombrum et al 
1984; Guest 1989; Hendry and Pettigrew 1992; Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall 
1988; Miles and Snow 1984; Porter 1980, 1985; Schuler and Jackson 1987), which 
maintains that organisational effectiveness depends on a fit between HR strategies and 
corporate strategy. Yet empirical research has found that many organisations actually 
operate what Golden and Ramanujan (1985) term the 'one-way' linkage, where 
business strategy informs human resource strategy, but not vice versa (Truss et al 
1997). Some of the literature has adopted a contingency approach to proposals for a 
strategic HRM model (for example, Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall 1988). Another 
approach is to view strategy as a layered concept in that it is found at different levels in 
an organisation (Boxall 1992; Gunnigle and Moore 1994; Miller 1989; Purcell 1989; 
Purcell and Ahlstrand 1994). An alternative perspective adopted by the literature is to 
see strategy as a pattern viewing it as outcomes of both planned and unplanned 
activities (for example Grundy 1998; Mintzberg 1987; Quinn 1980, 1991; Watson 
1999).
With regard to retail strategy and the link to employment strategy, research has 
attempted to examine this area further (for example, Ogbonna and Whipp 1999). 
Retailers' need for staff has grown for a number of reasons, as summarised below by 
Sparks (2000b):
"As businesses have grown, store formats have increased in size, opening hours 
have been extended and customers have expanded their horizons from price to 
service, so the need for staff has grown. Retailers have therefore had to make
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a managerial and financial examination of their cost base in this area and new 
policies towards employment have been implemented." (p. 14) 
From an employment perspective the changes in retailing have focused on the search
for efficiencies at store and head office level. The need to serve customers and manage 
stores, together with the high cost of labour, has been said to have increased the 
critical role of human resources in retail strategy (Freathy and Sparks 1996). In order 
to maximise returns, retailers have had to consider how best to manage their 
employees (Sparks 2000b). Consequently, efficiencies in the area of labour have 
become of great importance to today's multiple branch retailer.
A problem of labour efficiency in retail is the utilisation of capacity in the face of 
irregular customer arrivals and different levels of demand over days, weeks and 
seasons. Walsh (1990) argued that this has led to a move from "extensive use of 
labour through trading hours, to intensive use at peak hours" (p.253). As a result the 
industry employs a large number of part time employees, and has introduced the 
concept of zero and minimum hours contracts (IDS 1993a, 1993b; Neathey and 
Hurstfield 1995) (as discussed in section 3.2.2).
Intensive competition, particularly in food retailing, creates a strong requirement to 
match workforce levels over the day and during the week to fluctuations in consumer 
demand (Townsend et al 1996). Many retailers appear to have adopted flexible 
employment as a human resource strategy focusing recruitment, retention and 
development on a core talent of staff with critical skills that the firm requires. Variable 
needs are then staffed through more contingent employment arrangements, such as 
temporary and part time employment. This strategy can also provide significant savings
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on labour costs through the deployment of large numbers of part time employees 
enabling retailers to cut labour costs (O'Reilly 1994). It also accords with the 
matching models of human resource strategy assuming a rational approach to strategy 
and a need to 'fit 1 employment practices around the corporate strategy. However, 
there are also problems associated with applying the theories of human resource 
strategy to the retail industry, particularly when examining the high use of part time 
labour. Empirical research has found employer strategies on flexibility being of both 
an incremental and ad hoc nature (Collinson et al 1990; O'Connell Davidson 1993, 
O'Reilly 1992,), thus rejecting the 'matching' theories of strategic HRM. This 
argument is strengthened by empirical research evidence which suggests HR 
professionals are rarely involved in strategy formulation in multiple store retail 
organisations:
ccBut for the day-to-day operation of the business certain personnel specialists 
occupy a low profile role. Strategic business decisions are often being taken 
in function areas with little or no consideration given to the consequences 
affecting personnel related issues." (Howe 1992: 193)
As discussed in Section 2.5, an increasing emphasis in retail strategy has been placed 
on the provision of high quality customer service. Christopherson (1996) suggested 
that the ultimate goal of retail strategy is the improvement of customer service without 
any increase in costs, particularly labour costs. Freathy and Sparks (1996) noted that 
the movement up-market of many leading retail chains in the 1990s was coupled with a 
vigorous attack on labour costs throughout companies' operations. Sparks (1992c) 
predicted that customers would increasingly reject inadequate service provision, and 
hence retailers must continue to apply customer service as a strategic tool. Freathy 
and Sparks (1996) noted the ambivalent relationship produced by the dichotomy
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between costs and services. They came to the conclusion that labour is usually seen by 
retailers as a cost to be minimised, and thus HRM can be used to mediate the 
relationship between costs and profit levels.
The employment of large numbers of part timers appears a continuing trend among 
many large-scale multiple retailers. However, there remain contradictions between this 
and the strategic goal of improving the quality of customer service (Lowe and Crewe 
1996; Shackleton 1998; Sparks 1992c). As Doogan (1992) summarised this can exert 
"contradictory pressures on corporate personnel policy, expressing, on the one hand a 
need to raise the calibre and competence of the workforce, but on the other a 
downward pressure on labour costs" (p. 24). It could be concluded that until retailers 
link customer care with adequate staff development their strategies are "at best flawed 
and at worst suspicious" (Gardner and Sheppard 1989:207). As Ogbonna (1992) 
outlined, retailers are faced with a dilemma between staff who are likely to be 
committed to the organisation, and career-minded, but wanting full time employment, 
and staff who can work part time, improving flexibility and offering substantial cost 
savings. He concluded that "it is clear that most companies....will go for the latter" 
(p.92).
Armstrong (1989) suggests that the pervasive influence of accountants poses a 
problem for those who believe the personnel function has a part to play in corporate 
strategy. Subsequently, the view of HRM as strategic is naive because it ignores the 
fact that decision making on human resources often takes place at a level considerably 
subordinate to budgetary planning and control (Hill and Pickering 1986). This is
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compounded by evidence that HR professionals do not appear to be highly regarded in 
the retail industry (Howe 1992), as illustrated by the following quote from a leading 
UK food retailer's Managing Director:
"personnel management is a burden on our profitability, but is occasionally 
useful." (cited in Howe 1992:193) 
While it can be accepted that some retailers are re-structuring retail employment
relations to reduce costs, and if possible improve service, there are limits to this. 
These are determined by the service level that the market agrees among itself or which 
is deemed acceptable by consumers (Freathy and Sparks 1996). Therefore the cost 
reduction strategies of some retailers, may not be suitable as the quality of service 
could suffer beyond that considered acceptable by the customer. Retailers appear to 
be playing a balancing act with their corporate strategies, focusing on productivity 
savings as a means to offer cheaper goods, parallel with improved services to 
customers.
Research findings to date necessitate an examination of the influence of human 
resource strategy in any empirical study of the deployment of labour in the retail 
industry. However, a subsequent re-evaluation of the current notions and typologies 
of human resource strategy may be needed in order to facilitate a deeper theoretical 
understanding in this area.
The objectives of this research study are to consider the role of store level managers in 
the execution of employee resourcing decisions. Therefore it is important to consider 
the relevant literature on the devolution of HRM responsibilities to line managers, and
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where possible, a particular focus on the management of employee resourcing at store 
level.
One of the key theoretical features of HRM is its devolution to the line. The 
devolution rationale is that people management is critical to effective business 
performance. It therefore needs to be enacted by empowered line managers who are 
responsible for co-ordinating and directing all resources, including human resources, 
towards organisational success (Corbridge and Pilbeam 1998). Empirical research 
supports this and has found that responsibility for managing aspects of the human 
resource elements of business are increasingly falling, in varying degrees, to line 
managers (Armstrong 1989; Bevan and Hayday 1994; Guest 1982; Hill and Picketing 
1986; Hutchinson 1995; Kinnie 1989; Maund 2001; Sisson and Scullion 1985; Tamkin 
et al 1997). Hill and Pickering (1986) found that this devolution occurred mainly in 
the multi-divisional organisation. In case study research conducted for the Institute for 
Employment Studies, the tendency in the retail company under study, was to devolve 
responsibility for HRM as far down the line as possible (Tamkin et al 1997).
However, as Maund (2001) highlights, while HR responsibilities may have been 
devolved to line managers, they often have minimum control over the objectives that 
are set for them. They are unlikely to have the power to determine budgets, although 
there may be some leverage on how they spend their budget. As Armstrong (1989) 
warned, the line manager's performance is often evaluated in budgetary terms, with
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short-term bonuses or long-term career progression sometimes linked to these 
measures of performance. He believed that:
"the delivery of HRM practice into the hands of managers controlled in such a 
fashion, whatever the rhetoric behind it, promises to turn the treatment of 
human resources into an instrument for the achievement of short-run 
accounting targets." (p. 164) 
Kirkpatrick et al (1992) concluded that the decentralisation of HR decisions has meant
that personnel now has to "justify itself using the same criteria of short term 
effectiveness as everyone else" (p. 142).
Maund (2001) maintained that line managers instead have a sizeable control over the 
people who work in their teams. This has meant that line managers have become more 
concerned with the operational aspects of personnel activities within their own 
departments. This would encompass the organisation of work and allocation of duties, 
minor disciplinary matters, grievances from staff, standards of work performance, 
health and safety, on-the-job training, and the communication of information (Mullins 
1999). Hutchinson (1995) found that line managers tend to be more heavily involved 
in recruitment choices, discipline procedures, and decisions about who receives 
training.
Research has revealed a suspicion amongst personnel professionals over the ability of 
line managers to competently take on responsibility for the management of human 
resources due to a lack of time, or inadequate training (Hutchinson 1995; Tamkin et al 
1997). As Gilmore and Ferris (1989) found, training in HRM practices is vital if 
successful and appropriate decisions are to be made. Bevan and Hayday (1994) 
observed that line managers sometimes view the devolution of HRM as merely
66
'dumping'. Further problems have been identified in the difficulties monitoring 
standards of HRM and ensuring accountability for HR decisions. Tamkin et al (1997) 
found that formal monitoring and measures of effectiveness in the devolution of HRM 
often occurred some time after the devolution of responsibility. Hutchinson (1995) 
concluded there was little evidence that organisations successfully evaluated line 
managers' HR activities. This was despite acknowledgement that failure to do so 
could lead to the inconsistent treatment of HR decision-making, an increase in 
breaches of the organisation's policies and procedures, which may send out a message 
to line managers that HRM was a less important facet of their role (Hutchinson 1995; 
Tamkin et al 1997).
Retail employers have been found to be increasingly devolving personnel responsibility 
to branch level giving line managers freedom to control labour and operational costs 
(Neathey and Hurstfield 1995; Tomlinson et al 1997). This means many decisions on 
the management of human resources and deployment of labour are no longer taken by 
HR specialists, but instead by line managers. Opportunities for local managers to 
influence the managerial style of a store have increased as responsibility for human 
resources is devolved to them. More recent work has found that the focus for store 
managers is now on managing the store labour force, particularly as a centralisation of 
control has directly removed many of the areas of decision-making responsibility in 
other functions (Sparks 2000b). This suggests that the store level manager's role now 
demands significant HRM skills (Tomlinson et al 1997).
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This devolution of HRM practice to line managers (Bevan and Hayday 1994), along 
with the line manager becoming a 'budget holder', means that the management of 
human resources could simply turn into an instrument for the achievement of short-run 
accounting targets (Armstrong 1989). Armstrong (1989) also believed that the 
transfer of personnel functions to the line would subordinate the management of 
human resources further to the management accountancy framework. Within the retail 
industry it is clear that while HR activities have been devolved to line managers, head 
office continues to control stock levels and set budgets and targets. Thus control is 
vested at HO while responsibility for meeting targets remains with individual store 
managers (Freathy and Sparks 1994). When contrasting the "rhetoric and reality of 
HRM" Sisson (1994:15) found the rhetoric of "customer first" actually meant the 
reality of "market forces supreme". This suggests a 'hard' approach to HRM is likely 
to be more prevalent in such a competitive industry as multiple store retailing.
The context within which retail managers operate is an important factor in the 
management and deployment of labour (see also chapter two). In many retail firms the 
context is one where the emphasis is on delivering the bottom line within decentralised 
units, and operating under tight financial controls (Tomlinson et al 1997). Changes are 
taking place in the systems used by managers to exercise control over their 
organisations through an increased use of financial management control systems. This 
is typically established by head office setting budgets, or through measuring 
performance in terms of profit (Freathy and Sparks 1996). Consequently, the context 
in which local managers in the retail industry operate could lead to the deployment of 
the 'cheapest' labour in order to fulfil head office budgets and targets. This logically
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equates to the deployment of'flexible labour' using cheaper forms of labour supply, 
such as women, students and older workers to keep costs down. This may actually 
disregard the rhetoric of any human resource strategy espousing 'soft' HRM practices 
because the predominate guiding principle becomes meeting financial budgets. This 
has significant implications for the management of human resources and suggests that 
'hard' HRM techniques may be preferred at store level.
The employment composition of superstores is related to several variables and based 
on the employee resourcing decisions undertaken. Generally, decisions on labour 
policy in retail organisations are made by corporate planners and individual store 
managers, who are influenced by local labour market conditions and the type, quantity 
and mix of labour available. The demand for labour in superstores is related to sales 
turnover, the size of store, the store operator, the store opening hours, and the type of 
goods retailed by the store. Dawson et al (1986) concluded that the size of the 
superstore has become less deterministic in decisions on labour levels, and instead the 
store operator is the major determinant (see also section 3.3).
Robinson (1990) and Doogan (1992) found that the Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) level 
in retail organisations tended to be set centrally. Store level managers then determine 
the mixture of employment within the constraints of wage budgets related to annual 
sales targets. However evidence has also been found of part time shift hours being 
determined centrally using technology that identified trading fluctuations (Robinson 
1990; Smith 1988).
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Case study research undertaken by Freathy and Sparks (2000) provides an interesting 
insight into the nature of HRM and employee resourcing at store level. Three 
superstores were selected for research of which the staffing and working time 
arrangements of each were examined. Where a HR manager existed at store level they 
were found to occupy a relatively autonomous position in a store's structure. Their 
chief areas of responsibility included recruitment, selection, training and disciplinary. 
In one organisation they were also responsible, in conjunction with the store manager, 
for the financial allocation of working hours to each department. However, it was then 
junior managers' responsibility to devise the shift pattern for staff under their control. 
Where there was no HR manager at store level, responsibility for all HRM and 
employee resourcing-related decisions fell to the store manager. This included 
decisions as to whether vacancies were filled by part time, full time, temporary or 
permanent workers, recruitment, selection, and disciplinary issues. Support was 
provided from the head office on any human resource issue a store manager may face. 
In many cases decisions on store promotions were made by head office and 
communicated to the store manager.
The literature reveals a divergence in approach to employee resourcing activities, in 
terms of both hierarchical levels and management decision-making responsibilities. 
This research study aims to provide a richer insight into this process.
This chapter has focused on the nature of HRM and employee resourcing in multiple 
store retailing organisations. To achieve the research study's objectives the chapter 
focused was made on employee resourcing decisions and the link between HRM and
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retail corporate strategy. This examination of the literature has revealed that retailers 
tend to adopt a 'hard' version of HRM. Where 'soft' HRM tools are deployed, these 
are more likely to be directed at core employees. Responsibility for HRM and 
employee resourcing at store level appears to vary from retailer to retailer. In some 
organisations a HR manager will be present at store level, whilst in others the store 
manager will take responsibility for HR issues. Nevertheless, evidence of centralised 
decision-making, particularly in terms of employment budget, was apparent. Decisions 
regarding the composition of a store's workforce is predominately the responsibility of 
store level management, while the determination of shift patterns seems to vary from 
centralised control via a computerised system, through to responsibility at junior local 
management level. In conclusion, a wide variation in employee resourcing practices 
and responsibilities between different retailers is apparent, dependent on store operator 
and management discretion.
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This chapter considers the choices and constraints of line managers in their 
management of human resources and execution of employee resourcing. Where 
possible a focus on retail management is adopted, but where gaps in the literature 
exist, more generic management is considered. This will facilitate an examination of 
the choices and constraints of line management, with an evaluation of the 
consequences of these for HRM at the empirical research stage.
In service operations such as retail, work activities are people-oriented and the 
characteristics and management of the workforce are particularly important in 
determining organisational effectiveness (Fitzsimmons and Sullivan 1984). Together 
with increasing competition, the role of company human resource (HR) policies within 
the wider business strategy has been paid increasing attention (Kinnie 1989). The 
retail industry is no exception - whatever the format and competitive situation, labour 
is crucial to retail operations and business development. It is critical because of the 
need for people to serve customers, and to manage stores and direct businesses, but is 
also critical because "labour is the single biggest expense a retailer has after the 
purchase of goods" (Freathy and Sparks 1996:181). Therefore:
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"the effective management of human resources in retailing is critically 
important for achieving a competitive market position and a high rate of 
return." (Lusch and Serpkenci 1990:85) 
Doogan (1992) argued that changes in the retail industry, particularly in terms of the
concentration of retailing power, has significant implications for the management of 
human resources.
5.2 
Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) maintained that "making choices within parameters is 
central to the managerial role" (p.86). It is this centrality that makes the study of 
management choices and constraints imperative to the study of HRM. However, as 
Kinnie (1989) pointed out, despite the increasing attention focused on HR policies and 
practices, relatively little attention has been paid to changes in control systems and the 
management of human resources. He concluded that this neglect of HR issues in the 
study of management control systems makes the influence of managers' choices and 
constraints on HRM policy and practice an important consideration for researchers.
To appreciate the choices and constraints available to retail store level managers in the 
management of human resources, the choices and constraints of general management 
need to be considered. To do this Stewart's (1982) model of'Choices For Managers' 
will be used. Stewart considered this model to be illustrative of the choices and 
constraints of generic management. She divided management tasks into three 
categories of demands, constraints, and choices, as outlined in Figure two. The 
demands of a manager's job are influenced by the demands of the organisation in 
which the incumbent works. This is determined by corporate strategy, which is in turn
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influenced by the external environment, particularly in terms of competition. Retail 
managers have recently witnessed an increasing centralisation of store level activities 
with responsibility and decision-making powers reverting to head office. This is 
combined with an escalating competitive environment, particularly in the food retailing 
sector. Applying Stewart's model of'Choices for Managers' (Figure two) to retail 
store management, this would suggest that the demands and constraints of their roles 
are increasing. However, with research evidence showing a devolution of HR 
responsibilities to local managers in the retail industry, this would suggest that their 
autonomy in this functional area is increasing. The remainder of this chapter will 
consider these propositions, with particular reference to the execution of employee 
resourcing, using both general management literature, and where feasible, specific 
retail management literature.
DEMANDS CONSTRAINTS CHOICES
For example, 
meeting minimum 
criteria of 
performance, 
complying with 
bureaucratic 
procedures which 
cannot be avoided.
For example, legal, 
trade unions, 
technology, physical 
location, 
organisational 
constraints, attitudes 
of other people.
For example, what work is done in a 
defined area, to change the area of 
work, the sharing of work, and 
participation in organisational or 
public activities.
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With much of the literature pointing to the devolution of HR responsibilities to line 
managers the assumption could be drawn that line managers' discretionary powers 
have increased as a result. However, it is important to consider how other trends in 
management and organisational behaviour in the retail industry, such as increased 
centralisation, are impacting on this devolution of HRM down the line.
Management consists of a number of choices and constraints within which the 
incumbent must operate. Previous research has been conducted to establish the role 
and nature of management (for example, Mintzberg 1980, 1989; Stewart 1991, 1999). 
As Stewart (1999) outlined, various limitations on management behaviour exist, which 
can restrict the decision making process. These stem from the political and social 
background, competition and economic scarcity, and people's attitudes. The 
examination of management choices and constraints emanates from the topic of control 
and power. Child advocated (1984) that organisations, "are fundamentally structures 
of control and power" (p. 13 7). However, as Huczynski and Buchanan (2001) 
suggested, the notion of power is a controversial topic, difficult to define and measure 
with precision, and being abstract makes it difficult to conceptualise. Hales (1993) 
went further in proclaiming that a lack of agreement exists in the literature "on how to 
distinguish among power, influence and authority" (p. 18). Child (1984) believed the 
notion of control was surrounded by ambiguity, which was "partly a reflection of its 
different facets, and of its close relationship to those equally fuzzy phenomena power 
and influence" (p. 136).
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Berry et al (1995) maintained that the basis of management control arises from 
corporate strategy and organisational goals. Senior managers are concerned to 
influence the behaviour of organisational participants so that overall organisational 
goals are achieved. This was supported by Anthony et al (1992) when they stated that:
"management control is primarily a process for motivating and inspiring people 
to perform organisational activities that will further the organisation's goals." 
(pll)
Mintzberg (1980) argued that all managerial jobs are constraining, and it is the 
personality of each individual manager that determines their control over the role. 
Therefore, only strong-willed managers can actually control their jobs, regardless of 
their position within an organisation. However, it has been acknowledged that 
bureaucratic control can be so rigid as to prevent any autonomy in their jobs 
(Mintzberg 1980; Stewart 1991). Mintzberg (1980) cited branch managers in large 
banking firms as appearing to fit this pattern - a role very similar to store level 
management in retailing. Stewart (1999) argued that decision making in organisations 
is often made simpler if management sets the boundaries within which business is to 
operate. However, she did acknowledge that "knowing the parameters within which 
one can act can give a sense of freedom, unless these parameters are seen to be 
unreasonably restrictive" (1999:37).
It is apparent that the choices and constraints of line managers derive from the need for 
organisations to control employees' behaviour in order to achieve their strategic goals. 
Hales (1993) identified 'control' as one of the major elements of managing work:
"to manage work in general means....controlling what is to be done to ensure 
that it conforms with what was intended." (p. 18)
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The methods to achieve this are varied, and discussed in more detail in the following 
section (section 5.4).
Retail control is said to be a topic of increasing concern for senior retail managers in 
order to facilitate the achievement of high performance results (Lusch 1990; Lusch and 
Jaworski 1991). Attention has been paid in the literature to the methods of control 
which can be placed on lower managers and employees. Mintzberg (1989:101) termed 
these "co-ordinating mechanisms". Such controls can be enacted through 
organisational structure and culture, staff training, setting resources and performance 
targets, and the use of technology.
Two different forms of control systems can exist within organisations as a means of 
controlling behaviour. Mintzberg (1983) proposed that employee behaviour can be 
controlled through either personal control systems, or bureaucratic control systems. 
Managers can use personal control systems to control the behaviour of their 
subordinates through giving direct orders, establishing guidelines or specific 
constraints on decision-making, reviewing decisions, or allocating resources (usually 
budgets). This determines whether a subordinate will have a wide or narrow latitude 
of decision-making powers. Merchant (1985:4) termed this "personnel control", 
involving social and self control.
Bureaucratic control systems represent impersonal standards that guide the behaviour 
of employees. These can constrain the incumbent's autonomy through the
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standardisation of work content, outputs, or individual skills and knowledge 
(Mintzberg 1983). The skills and knowledge an individual brings to their work may 
also be standardised through the establishment of procedures for training and selection, 
although these can also be developed externally to the organisation. Output control is 
achieved through systems of planning and control, where the work content itself 
cannot be specified so the results, not the process are standardised. Ouchi (1977) 
found output control to be more effective in larger organisations with many 
hierarchical levels. Performance control systems express results in specific objectives, 
or quantitative measures, through which the formal goals of the organisation are 
directly operationalised. Merchant (1985:4) termed this "results control", referring to 
an approach which holds individuals accountable for achieving particular results, and 
then rewards them for their achievement. In doing so it allows the possibility of 
managers having autonomy for detailed action, provided they can produce the desired 
outcome, and therefore the outcomes must be quantifiable. As Lusch and Jaworski 
(1991) commented, retail management tends to have an overriding concern with 
bottom-line performance measures, which makes the use of output control widespread 
in retail settings.
However, as Emmanuel et al (1990) outlined, organisations often have many objectives 
which cannot be easily measured. Not all aspects of performance, especially HRM, 
can be measured in quantitative terms, which makes the standardisation of outputs 
difficult. Merchant (1985:4) proposed, that where quantifiable criterion is not 
available "action control" might be used, similar to Mintzberg's (1983) standardisation 
of work content. Here the actions required can be specified so that the control system
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is geared towards seeing that the correct actions are carried out. This can be achieved 
through the formalisation of work content via rules, procedures, and job descriptions. 
Merchant (1985) concluded that in functions where it is difficult to define and measure 
outputs, and where it is not entirely clear what procedures are required, social controls 
are more important. However, both Mintzberg and Merchant concluded that where 
many organisations place the emphasis on rewarding results and not behaviour, 
managerial behaviour becomes geared towards the achievement of reported results. 
This supports Mintzberg's (1979) earlier concerns that when managers are forced to 
prioritise economic benefits, they tend to ignore the social consequences of their 
actions, and explains Truss et al's (1997) conclusions that the reality of HRM is 
"almost always hard" (p.70).
In the retail industry control appears to be enacted through both personal control 
systems and bureaucratic control systems. The centralisation of control in the retail 
industry has had the effect of turning stores into cost centres (Freathy and Sparks 
1994). Many of the decisions that would previously have been made by managers at 
the store level are now taken elsewhere in the organisation - usually by head office 
(Freathy and Sparks 1994; Smith 1988). Nevertheless, managers at store level remain 
responsible for meeting targets set by head office. This led Freathy (1993) to conclude 
that, while senior managerial store level staff are not subjected to elaborate work rules, 
they experience a high degree of centralised control over both strategic and operational 
functions, particularly as a result of bureaucratic control systems.
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The size and structure of an organisation can considerably influence the format of the 
control systems within it. The nature and effectiveness of control systems can also be 
manipulated by the presence and strength of the informal organisation. Decisions 
about job descriptions, organisation charts, and types of authority relate to the formal 
organisation. This refers to the collection of work groups that have been consciously 
designed by senior management to maximise efficiency and achieve organisational 
goals. However, as Huczynski and Buchanan (2001) noted:
"to understand and explain the behaviour of people in an organisation it is 
necessary to become familiar with the informal organisation." (p.460) 
Within the formal structure, an informal organisation will always be present. This
informal organisation is described as:
"the network of relationships that spontaneously establish themselves." 
(Huczynski and Buchanan 2001:462). 
As Mullins (1999) points out, organisational charts to not show "the extent of personal
delegation from superior to subordinates, or the precise relationships between line and 
staff positions" (p. 546). This raises issues about the role of the informal organisation 
in management processes and practices.
As discussed in chapter two, a key trend within the retail industry has been the 
increasing power and size of multiple store retailers, and the increasing size of stores 
with the growth of the superstore format. Mintzberg (1989) concluded that as 
organisations in an industry become big so others "must become big in response" 
(p.340). They must grow bigger and try to dominate other organisations, and avoid 
being dominated themselves, as is evident in the retail industry. Child (1984) 
suggested that the size of an organisation affects its control systems, so that "as
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organisations grow they become more formalised" (p. 153). This formalisation 
establishes a framework of rules and systems within which decision-making can be 
delegated with reasonably predictable results. Mintzberg (1989) agreed that the larger 
an organisation, the more formalised its systems.
Sparks (2000b: 16) believed that all large organisations "have at their heart a 
centralised model of control". This has been witnessed in the retail industry, where the 
centralised control model has gathered together at head office many of the functions 
that might otherwise have previously been undertaken at the store level. This 
centralisation of retailers' functions and facilities has been driven by a requirement for 
organisational control and to achieve cost savings:
"This has effectively relocated the locus of control of company (and store) 
operations away from store managers and into head offices. Decisions about 
most aspects of store operations are now made away from the store and the 
activities of managers are severely circumscribed. This control....... .has
reduced the freedom of store managers to operate independently, and has 
placed the emphasis on more specific head office tasks." (Sparks 2000a:9) 
Ogbonna and Whipp (1999) also found that senior retail managers at head office
admitted that the increased size in the company had led to the centralisation of control:
"the company had grown to such a point where the prevailing autonomy at store 
level could not be justified. " (p.81) 
Meanwhile, Smith (1988), in his research, found that Taylorism and its accompanying
centralisation of control was the dominant organisational form among larger retail 
companies.
Freathy and Sparks (1996) outlined how store level managers are expected to adhere 
to strategies and systems developed by managers at the organisation's head office. 
They argued that to realise shareholder and customer expectations, multiple branch
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retailers require a centralised structure. Within this structure head office maintain 
responsibility for functional specialisation, together with a close monitoring and co- 
ordination of store activities - a formalisation of organisational control systems. This is 
evident with the centralisation of buying, marketing, branding, and logistics - all 
examples of how the scale of the business has been linked to the centralisation of many 
store management processes.
Mintzberg (1989) proposed typologies of organisations whereby large, mature 
organisations, such as multiple retailers, could be classified as either machine 
bureaucracies, or diversified organisations. Within a machine bureaucracy the prime 
co-ordinating mechanism becomes the standardisation of work processes. This is 
evident in the retail industry where the centralised model of control is said to demand 
"at least a knowledge of what is occurring at branch level, if not, in some instances, 
outright total control" (Sparks 2000b: 17). In support of this, Ogbonna and Whipp 
(1999) found that senior retail managers at head office considered it necessary to 
institute bureaucratic control with effective surveillance systems. However, as Child 
(1984) indicated, communication links become more tenuous in larger organisations, 
and a "lack of co-ordination is one of the charges most frequently levelled against large 
organisations" (p. 112). This places retail head office's actual ability to control and 
have a knowledge of store operations in some doubt.
According to Mintzberg (1989), the prime means of regulation and control in a 
machine bureaucracy is through an organisation's 'technostructure'. He defined the 
'technostructure' as the technical support staff, whose role it is to standardise the work
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throughout the entire organisation, by designing systems and procedures, redesigning 
work processes, providing information, and building financial systems. Mintzberg 
(1989) believed that machine bureaucracies represented the force for efficiency, with 
the 'technostructure' controlling managers through the development of "work rules 
and standards to make sure everything comes out as planned" (p.256). He argued 
that the solution to a machine bureaucracy's problems becomes rationalising, such as 
redundancies, cutting budgets and restructuring, and being in control means "having it 
down on paper" (p.342). From case study research conducted in the retail industry, 
Smith (1988) concluded that the majority of retailers could be categorised as machine 
bureaucracies, which he termed the "Taylorian ideal type" (p. 149). He found an 
intense division of labour, a pronounced centralisation of control, a lack of discretion 
for store managers, and a reliance on the 'technostructure'.
Conversely, a diversified organisation, has the standardisation of outputs as its prime 
co-ordinating mechanism, with middle line managers forming the key part of the 
organisation. However, these middle managers also exert a pull to "balkanise the 
structure", thus representing a countervailing force for concentration, or as Mintzberg 
(1989) described.
"middle managers arguing they should be left alone...and ..be free to 
manage...as we see fit, subject only to the performance controls." (p.257) 
He cautioned that geographically dispersed operations can mean an organisation's
head office ends up maintaining:
"central control of all critical functions, to ensure operating standards for all the 
divisions, which leads to a less than complete form of divisionalisation." 
(p. 160) 
Truss et al (1997) found at Lloyds Bank that a major programme of re-structuring had
led to the centralisation of many activities, thus realising Mintzberg's warning.
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Mintzberg (1989:255) discussed the use of typologies, via "lumping", or playing 
"organisational LEGO". The 'lumping' approach would require a retail organisation 
to be defined as either a machine, or diversified organisation. Playing "organisational 
LEGO" enables the characteristics of different typologies to be combined to describe 
an organisation. Applying Mintzberg's typologies to multiple store retailers, a 
combination of machine bureaucracy and diversified organisational models seem to be 
in operation. Research evidence (for example, Freathy and Sparks 1996; Ogbonna and 
Whipp 1999; Smith 1988; Sparks 2000a, 2000b) shows that multiple store retailers are 
increasingly centralising store operations and controlling managers' actions, thus 
realising Mintzberg's machine bureaucracy typology. However, the geographical 
structure of a branch network and sheer size of the organisations themselves means an 
element of diversified organisational typology must be in operation together with a 
reliance on a standardisation of outputs as the prime control system.
The tension between centralisation and decentralisation is another feature of 
organisations that can determine a manager's choices and constraints in his/her 
decision-making powers. Hutchinson (1995) found that many organisations claimed 
their main problem was achieving the right balance between the need to provide line 
managers with autonomy and the need to retain central control. Stewart (1991) 
believed that the difficulty in finding the right balance between order and flexibility was 
the major dilemma underlying the nature of control. She argued that this led to a 
second related dilemma of finding the appropriate balance between centralisation as a 
means of exercising control, and decentralisation as a means to improving 
organisational flexibility.
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Child (1984:146) defined centralisation as "a condition where the upper levels of an 
organisation's hierarchy retain the authority to take most decisions" while 
decentralisation represented "a condition when authority to make specified decisions is 
passed down to units and people at lower levels in the organisation's hierarchy". 
Centralisation also implies that control of information is passed to the top of an 
organisation, while delegation implies that some passes to lower levels. In the retail 
industry the organisational relationship between the centre and individual stores is a 
significant determinant of the efficiency with which a retail chain is operated. It can 
influence the speed and accuracy in which information is passed up and strategy is 
passed down, and will also affect human relations in the organisation (Howe 1992). 
The trend towards the adoption of an organisation-wide national image for multiple 
retailers, and the availability of operational and administrative economies of scale from 
centralising particular functions, have all tended to keep retail organisations relatively 
centralised in their management structures (Howe 1992).
In his case study research Ogbonna (1992) found that the retail company was 
embarking on policies to enhance management control, and the main indication of this 
was the centralisation of operations. Doogan (1992) argued that the drive towards 
centralisation occurred in the late 1980s when very large retail employers began to 
emerge out of a series of take-over, mergers and acquisitions. In his research he found 
centralised structures and 'top down' management styles. He concluded that this 
equated to centrally located strategic decision making with the delivery of policy 
organised locally under close monitoring, or within nationally determined guidelines. 
To support this, of the fourteen retail companies examined as part of Smith's (1988)
/
research, eight conformed to the centralising tendency, particularly the national chains 
in Do-It-Yourself (DIY) and food. Howe (1992) suggested that many retail 
companies have a mechanistic culture, particularly in the food retailing sector. Indeed, 
Channon (1978) concluded that the lack of success of certain non-food store groups in 
the 1960s and 1970s was due to the failure to adequately centralise and control the 
critical function of merchandising.
Today, information technology provides head office with relevant, immediate, and 
detailed data from which to make better decisions and to assess the risk arising from 
management actions, thus signifying a low trust culture in UK retail organisations. As 
Houlton and Thomas (1990) commented "the computer has made a vital contribution 
to the transformation in balance of power and authority within retail organisations" 
(p. 15), with the resultant transfer of power from stores to the centre (see also section 
5.4.4). In employment terms these changes have led to a removal of some areas of 
responsibility away from the store and their replacement by decision making at head 
office. This trend undoubtedly has implications for the role and responsibilities of 
retail managers, which in turn may affect the employee resourcing decision-making 
processes.
This thesis is particularly interested in the role of lower level managers in the 
management of human resources in the retail industry. The term junior manager will 
be used in accordance with the terms 'senior', 'middle' and 'junior' management,
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which follow the conventional pattern adopted by the retail industry (Brockbank and 
Airey 1994b) (see Section 3.4).
Mintzberg (1980) concluded that the level of a manager's job in the organisational 
hierarchy appears to be a key determinant in the constraints which are placed upon him 
or her. He maintained that the higher in the hierarchy, the greater the degree of 
autonomy, and the higher the level of commitment to the organisation. He found that 
further down an organisational hierarchy "controls become more and more onerous" 
(p. 127), with bureaucratic controls in particular becoming more intense and stringent. 
However, middle managers still look up to a clearly defined hierarchy of authority, 
often dominated by a "full-time superior with some potent means of formal control" 
(Mintzberg 1983:126), and so do not escape bureaucratic control systems.
Mintzberg (1989) depicted the different levels of management in an organisation as 
'thin' and 'thick'. He argued that to manage at the senior level of today's large, 
complex, and diversified organisations, means having only the most superficial 
knowledge of the things that must be decided about. He described this level of 
management as 'thin', in that it was very detached from the operational level and based 
on analytical methods of control. According to Mintzberg these 'thin' managers rely 
heavily on information received via management information systems. This data is 
then used to evoke general action by subordinates through the development of 
systems, the design of structures, and the implementation of directives. Conversely at 
the lower organisational level, managers were described by Mintzberg as 'thick' 
managers, in that they were heavily involved in day-to-day operations, dealing directly
87
with customers and shop-floor employees. Mintzberg (1980:128) used the term 
"disturbance handler" to describe the role of junior managers. Child (1984) described 
their role as consisting of "handling a stream of different disturbances" (p.48). To 
summarise, strategic decisions are often vested in top management, whereas operating 
decisions are the prerogative of divisional managers (Ezzamel 1992; Williamson 1970). 
This highlights the differences in roles and responsibilities of managers at different 
levels of an organisation.
Mintzberg (1989) argued that as organisations become larger it becomes very difficult 
for higher levels of management to practice 'thick management', due to the distance 
between themselves and the operational level. As Truss et al (1997) found, a lack of 
trust often exists between staff at head office and the operational level, with head 
office viewed as being very remote. Watson and Harris (1999) also found from their 
research that store level retail managers inadvertently, but very accurately, described 
the 'thick' management approach of senior management at head office:
" Head Office are not as close to the customers and do not see the customers 
on a daily basis as we do. I don't think they really fully understand." (p. 182) 
Tamkin et al (1997) supported these conclusions with their research, which found a
sense that head office did not fully understand the problems and issues of operational 
level, and therefore developed unsuitable corporate policies because they were not best 
placed for supplying tailored solutions. They found that this tension was most marked 
where the devolution of HRM was advanced, or where there was a greater distance 
between Head Office and the operational units, with many layers in between. This 
supports Mintzberg's (1989) notion of'thick' and 'thin' management, particularly
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applicable to the multiple retail industry where stores are geographically dispersed 
from head office.
Using a similar typology, Duncan (1975) identified three distinct levels of 
management: 'philosophical', 'scientific', and 'art'. At the 'philosophical' level 
managers develop the organisation's strategy and goals, while the 'scientific' level of 
management devises plans, methods, and techniques to achieve these goals, as well as 
monitoring and evaluating progress. The 'art' level of management then implements 
these decisions, making tactical and administrative decisions to deploy the 
organisation's resources, and attain the optimum degree of operational efficiency. This 
can be related to Mintzberg's 'thin' and 'thick' management levels, with the thinnest 
level of management being Duncan's philosophical manager, through to the thickest 
managers at the art level. Mintzberg's (1989) 'technostruture' could be described as 
Duncan's scientific level.
As Beardwell and Holden (1997) outlined, the very nature of organisations "generates 
a number of tensions between people with different stakes in the organisation and 
different perspectives and interests in it" (p.37). Management is said to be the process 
which keeps an organisation from dividing because of these tensions (Watson 1995). 
Yet conversely, tensions between middle and junior managers, and those managers at 
more senior levels have been well documented in the literature (Hales 1993; Mintzberg 
1983; Rawson 1997; Roethlisberger 1945; Sayles 1999; Watson and Harris 1999). 
Roethlisberger described middle managers as the 'man in the middle', while Sayles 
(1999) noted that they often become the players who facilitate the necessary trade-offs
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to make the systems, imposed by senior managers and the 'technostructure', workable. 
Sayles (1999) argued that "it takes a middle manager to get senior management's 
attention and make the case for change" (p.600).
Watson and Harris (1999) found that middle managers in particular, have to make 
"other people's policies work" (p. 178), with pressures from senior managers to 
maximise output, and pressures from below about work intensification. Other 
descriptions used include Drucker's (1954) "orchestra conductors" whereby middle 
managers interpret the strategy to relay to lower level managers and staff. As 
Mintzberg (1989) described, middle managers can get distracted from their operational 
responsibilities by "the gaze from above...and having to glance up from time to time" 
(p.355). Rawson (1997) believed the greatest tensions lie between senior and middle 
managers:
"the divide deepens as each accuses the other of pursuing their own personal 
rather than organisational ends. Middle managers accuse senior of being 
concerned with their own career advancement; senior managers accuse middle 
of directing their efforts to protecting their positions." (p.3) 
Therefore, middle and junior management would appear to bring with them conflicting
demands that need to be addressed.
The role of junior management has been a neglected aspect of the literature, 
particularly in the management of human resources (Kinnie 1989; Lowe 1992). This is 
despite Stewart's (1999:28) observation that management decision making at different 
organisational levels, is "a very neglected, but potentially useful area of research" (p. 
28). Research has found that a social and education gap often exists between qualified 
middle managers and unqualified supervisors (Child and Partridge 1982; Ogbonna
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1993). This level of management has been described as representing "two 
organisational families" (Mann and Dent 1954 in Blyton and Turnbull 1992:152). 
While their role represents management's interests, their occupational background and 
work experience is more reflective of the shop floor. A persistent theme in the 
literature is the divorce between the responsibilities assigned to first-line managers and 
the lack of authority associated with the position (Child and Partridge 1982; Patten 
1968). Mintzberg (1983) concluded that "by the time we reach first-line supervisors, 
the individuals cannot really be called managers" (p. 127). However, Kinnie (1989) 
disagreed with this by suggesting there was a widening of the responsibilities of junior 
managers, with a concurrent increase in accountability. Yet Tamkin et al (1997) found 
the relationship between the devolution of HRM and accountability in retail to be one 
of high devolution and low accountability. These conflicts in the literature highlight 
the need for further research to examine the reality of the execution of HRM and 
employee resourcing at local management level, particularly at the most junior level, 
where previous research efforts have been sparse.
Bureaucratic organisations commonly make use of accounting control systems (for 
example, Mintzberg 1983, 1989; Mullins 1999; Piper 1980). These are often geared to 
highlight easily identifiable performance levels such as sales, costs, and profits. 
Organisational goals and strategies are usually expressed in financial terms, with 
success measured in terms of profitability, and results reported in monetary terms. 
Such financial limits are easy to apply as a measure of control, and easy to relate to 
(Mullins 1999). This form of control conforms to Goold and CampbelFs (1987)
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financial mode of management, whereby an organisation's head office limits its role to 
approving budgets and monitoring performance.
Stewart (1999) noted that the minimum of centralisation customary in a large 
organisation is financial control. Such budgetary control publicly determines the 
boundaries within which managers can operate, by defining their latitude of decision- 
making (Mintzberg 1983, 1989; Stewart 1991). Senior managers subsequently rely on 
accurate information systems as a basis of control with information frequently 
expressed in financial terms (Mullins 1999). However, as Berry et al (1995) noted, a 
top-down approach to budgetary control, can cause organisational members to 
consider the budgets as a severe constraint. Prior (1984) found that budgetary control 
is often regarded by managers as another head office restriction.
The competitive strategies of multiple store retailers have very much focused on the 
use of cost minimisation as a means of achieving organisational goals, improving 
market share, and raising shareholder value. Piper (1980) advocated that when an 
organisation is under competitive or financial pressures, such as in the retail industry, 
accounting controls are liable to become more elaborate and specific. This could be 
applied to multiple store retailers, where an emphasis on cost cutting and accountancy 
control is evident (Freathy and Sparks 1996; Lusch and Serpkenci 1990). As Walters 
and Hanrahan (2001) pointed out, store managers are often measured against profit 
generated, despite having little control over major expenses such as stock and 
advertising. This increases their constraints, while reducing the remit of their 
autonomy. Legge (1995) and Sisson (1994) discussed the pressures from shareholders 
that often make the maintenance of dividends and short term financial results take
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precedence, with a resulting "tendency to think mainly in terms of short-term 
profitability, and ignore the long-term and social consequences of actions" (Burnes 
2000:506).
Mintzberg (1989) was also very critical of organisations' search for efficiency who 
believed that machine bureaucracy organisations represented the force for efficiency. 
He warned of the dangers of cutting tangible costs at the expense of intangible 
benefits, particularly the quality of working life for employees. As Bhallacharya (1985) 
pointed out:
"a company can increase its short-term profit very easily.......the question is,
for how long?..There is also a point to made about non-financial factors, some 
of which indicate a great deal about the future performance of a company". 
(P-37) 
Storey and Sisson (1993 a) argued that this short-term nature of UK business meant a
tendency "for managers to have recourse to opportunistic quick-fix agreements, fire 
fighting solutions" (p. 76). A large body of research has found British management to 
be reactive and pragmatic in its approach to business decision-making in general, and 
the management of human resources in particular (Hunter and Maclnnes 1991; Storey 
1992; Sisson and Marginson 1995). Scott (1994) found how quickly British 
management reverted to traditional authoritarian methods when faced with pressures, 
problems, and non-compliance. These characteristics have been attributed to the low 
quality of British management in terms of technical expertise, and to the prevalence of 
short-termism in British businesses (Lane 1995; Nolan 1989; Sisson and Marginson 
1995). This is particularly pertinent for the retail industry where retailers are keen to 
satisfy the short-term needs of shareholders, and the management skills required have
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traditionally been considered to be at a lower level than in other industries, resulting in 
lower quality managers.
An emphasis on budgetary control and short-term financial results also has implications 
for the management of human resources, as discussed by Armstrong (1989) and Kinnie 
(1989). As Emmanuel et al (1990) outlined, not all aspects of performance, especially 
HRM, can be measured in quantitative terms (see section 5.4). From an employment 
perspective, the changes in multiple store retail organisations have focused on the 
search for efficiencies at store and head office levels (Sparks 1992b). These changes 
are interlinked with changes in retail operations. The search for operating efficiencies 
and improved methods of meeting customer demands have transformed the operations 
of leading retailers (Freathy and Sparks 1996).
The pressures from head office in retail organisations to reduce costs is said to be 
typical in the UK, with very little evidence of centrally devised HR strategies, 
particularly in the area of employment flexibility (Blyton and Morris 1992; Hunter et al 
1993; Marginson et al 1993). Blyton and Morris (1992) concluded that interest in 
employment flexibility is primarily focused on the short-term, rather than strategic, 
long-term HR strategies. Brewster et al (1993) found that a focus on cost reduction 
led to a belief by managers that 'standard' employment contracts were more expensive. 
In the retail industry research has found that managers commonly employ non-standard 
workers to reduce costs (Gregory 1991; Neathey and Hurstfield 1995; O'Reilly 1994). 
A strategy of increased customer service and cost reductions has often meant an attack 
on labour costs (Freathy and Sparks 1996). This supports the conclusions drawn by
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Blyton and Morris (1992), Child (1984), and Cully et al (1999), that the UK approach 
to labour flexibility is characterised more by cost minimisation based on cheap labour, 
than by productivity enhancement. As Freathy and Sparks (1996) noted, "in addition 
to providing a degree of flexibility, secondary sector employment can provide 
significant savings on labour costs" (p. 183). This produces an element of tension 
within the concept of HRM, where 'hard' HRM, in emphasising managing the size of 
the workforce and utilising labour more efficiently, is inconsistent with the emphasis of 
'soft' HRM, on obtaining worker commitment through improved skills and motivation 
(Beardwell and Holden 1997).
Legge (1995:170) found that "decisions about manpower contracts and usage appear 
to rest on a weighing of the costs and benefits.... in the light of immediate 
organisational requirements", which tends to be in conflict with 'soft' HRM 
approaches. This poses the problems which arise "where appraisal systems assert the 
primacy of cost control, while senior management rhetoric espouses quality and 
customer service" (Legge 1995:96). As Mintzberg (1989) stressed, lower level 
managers will favour tangible benefits, because "he or she can measure them and 
attribute them to his or her efforts" (p.333). This has implications for the management 
of human resources, whereby if HRM is being devolved to the lowest levels in the 
retail industry, with few measures of accountability, an emphasis on 'hard' HRM could 
be found.
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One of the major enabling devices for increased control over operational matters has 
been the advancement of technology. In particular, information technology now forms 
an important part of management information (Lynch 1997), and the use of 
management information systems a vital part of any manager's job (Maund 2001). 
Retailing has been cited as one of the most innovative users of information technology, 
with many retailers deploying technology to standardise the retail process and make 
efficiency savings (Tordjman 1994; Walters and Hanrahan 2000). This concern was 
central to Braverman's (1979) argument that advances in technology give management 
greater opportunity to tighten management surveillance and control over workers. 
This has been supported by research which has concluded that information technology 
can be used to control individual workers (for example, Child 1984, The Economist 
1999; Freathy and Sparks 1996; Huczynski and Buchanan 2001; Ogbonna 1992; Retail 
Business 1990; Smith 1988; Tordjman 1994; Walters and Hanrahan 2001; Whitmore 
1990). Huczynski and Buchanan (2001) noted that this improved control can lead to 
lower costs, and in turn to higher profits. As they concluded:
"some of the implications of technology may .. be viewed .. as the result of 
management strategies to improve control through appropriate forms of work 
organisation." (p.78)
Lloyd and Rawlinson (1992) inferred that information technology "allows a greater 
degree of control of managers by senior managers" (p. 185). Freathy and Sparks 
(1996) argued that information technology has been one of the most influential 
mechanisms changing retail managers' methods of working. The impact of new 
technology over the past few decades has been the transfer of power from stores to the 
centre of multiple store retailing organisations (Houlton and Thomas 1990). As
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Ogbonna (1992) commented, more control can now be exerted from head office with 
the up-to-the minute data which is provided via technology. Smith (1988) found that 
most of the features of retail store management were centrally determined, through 
such use of technology - sales data was used to plan distribution, with EPOS 
technology automatically replenishing stocks. Child (1984) cited the retail industry 
and its deployment of EPOS as an example of how information technology extends the 
possibility for management control. He maintained this was achieved through faster 
and more precise knowledge of operating conditions and results, a reduction in the 
scope for inter-determinacy in the behaviour of employees, and the unification of 
previously segmented control systems.
Some of the literature outlines how the use of EPOS has enabled retailers to introduce 
staff scheduling software so that changes in sales revenue more accurately reflect 
labour costs, particularly those which are more readily controllable by line managers. 
Automated staff scheduling has been facilitated by the introduction of new technology 
in the field of stock control and point-of-saie monitoring (Doogan 1992). Graves 
(1990) outlined how analysis of checkout activity makes possible a scheduling system 
which improves customer services, and allows for the monitoring of wage costs and 
efficient labour utilisation. However, not all researchers have been convinced of the 
staff scheduling and labour deployment consequences of new technology in the retail 
industry. Both Smith (1988) and Dawson et al (1987) concluded that the effects of 
EPOS would not be immediately visible through a reduction in labour costs. Instead 
Smith (1988) concluded that not all retailers planned to use EPOS for staff scheduling 
purposes, while Dawson et al (1987) maintained that the technology was more likely
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to be applied to marketing and merchandising decisions. Empirical evidence suggested 
EPOS tends not to be used to determine the deployment of labour. It appears more 
likely that the information provided by the new technology was being utilised for stock 
and marketing purposes. However, it is clear that the opportunity for the facilitation 
of a more economic use of staff exists, through the availability of trading patterns and 
staff scheduling systems on EPOS systems.
Tomlinson et al (1997) found that the use of technology in the retail industry has 
shifted the focus towards a more efficient use of human resources, which maximises 
service elements, whilst maintaining control of labour costs. Such savings on labour 
costs through the use of technology have also been noted elsewhere in the literature 
(Dawson et al 1987; Smith 1988; Whitmore 1990). Sparks (1987) attributed the 
development of information technology to aiding the process of increased part time 
employment and zero hour contracts in retailing. Ogbonna (1992) believed the use of 
technology freed store management "from the routine task of ordering stock, to 
concentrate on HRM" (p.86).
From this review of the literature, technology would appear to be limiting the decision- 
making powers of retail store level managers, transferring many of their responsibilities 
to head office. This could certainly have consequences for the management and 
deployment of human resources in the retail industry, which prompts the need for 
further empirical investigation.
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5.5 
Most organisations necessarily involve a degree of decentralisation arising from such 
features as size, or geographical dispersion of different parts of the organisations 
(Mullins 1999; Stewart 1999). This decentralisation refers to authority and 
responsibility for decision making being dispersed more widely downwards and given 
to lower level managers. This is particularly applicable to multiple store retailers 
operating large businesses, with stores in numerous locations, where a branch is 
located some distance away from head office. Here store managers would be assumed 
to need an "adequate level of delegation in order to maintain day-to-day operational 
efficiency" (Mullins 1999:185). Child (1984) noted that in such a structure, junior 
managers tend to be in a better position to make decisions relating to their stores, 
because they know local conditions well, and are therefore more able to assess the 
circumstances of any issue that arises. Mintzberg (1983) described middle managers in 
charge of organisational units, such as retail stores, as being like a "mini CEO" within 
that unit, "with many of the same types of power over it that the CEO has over the 
whole organisation" (p. 126).
Berry et al (1995:86) found there is often a tension in multiple retail companies 
between centralised control and the delegation of decisions to stores. This places the 
emphasis on output control (as discussed in Section 5.4), when "once agreed, 
subordinates can work with a semi-autonomous relationship to management, free from 
detailed control over how tasks are carried out" (Mullins 1999: 777).
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As discussed in Section in order to gain a full understanding of management 
behaviour it is important to examine the informal organisation as "one way to 
recognise why people behave as they do at work" (Hellriegel et al 1998: 6). The 
informal, or covert, features of organisations can include attitudes, communication 
patterns, informal team processes, personality, conflict and political behaviour (Mullins 
1999). Mars (1982) advocated that "we cannot understand how our society operates 
unless we consider the informal side of our social institutions" (p.7). Therefore, the 
study of management cannot be fully understood as simply the result of control 
systems imposed on people in organisations. This is because these control systems are 
concurrently adapted, interpreted, and challenged by those they are supposed to 
control (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999). As Hales (1993) pointed out control does 
"not simply flow as predictable, inevitable consequences" (p.28), because power and 
influence is relational. This means that the success of organisational control systems 
depends upon the responses of those over whom control is being exerted. It is the 
unstructured decisions that are actually more common in organisation, and more 
susceptible to politicking (Hales 1993; Huczynski and Buchanan 2001). "Given the 
ambiguity surrounding the means to attain targeted ends in retail" (Lusch and Jaworski 
1991:401), particularly in the management of human resources, it can be expected that 
the informal organisation has the potential to play an important role in influencing the 
choices and decision-making processes of store level managers.
Another issue to consider is the potential distortion of corporate strategy, as outlined 
by Mintzberg (1989), whereby the expressed intentions of corporate strategy may not 
necessarily be shared by others in the organisation. As Child (1984) said:
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"if other members do not share top management's objectives, (and indeed they 
cannot readily do so because in strategic terms they are resources, the costs of 
which are to be minimised), then the potential is present for resistance to 
management control" (p. 138). 
Mintzberg (1989:112) described middle managers as exerting "a pull to balkanise the
structure", and do not necessarily conform to senior management's expectations of 
behaviour. Therefore, implementation and control of strategy is increasingly 
recognised as one of the most important dimensions of strategic management (Berry et 
al 1995; Child 1984; Marchington and Parker 1990; Mintzberg 1989). In the retail 
industry there are elements of the "unique perception of individual managers, power 
with the organisation, and interactive decision making" (Howe 1992:100), which 
influence the strategy adopted at operational level.
It would appear that the formation of corporate strategy does not necessarily indicate 
successful implementation without resistance from employees, particularly in the area 
of HRM where there is the added "difficulty of monitoring standards of performance 
management" (Tamkin et al 1997:39). This is particularly true when 'espoused policy' 
is frequently the approach of organisations to HR strategy, consisting of "a summation 
of proposals, objectives and standards that top-level management hold and/or state 
they hold for establishing the organisation's approach to it employees" (Brewster et al 
1993.63). This provides an opportunity for HR strategies to be modified or resisted by 
line managers, in order to prevent them being converted into practice (Marchington 
and Parker 1990). These include opposition within management itself, on either the 
basis of function or hierarchy, caused by the competing pressures of different sets of 
objectives. This can be applied to the retail industry with corporate strategies 
appearing to strive for two diametrically opposed aims of cost reductions and
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improved customer service standards. Managers and supervisors may not agree with 
the policies, or may fail to implement them, precisely so as to allow themselves 
discretion and leeway in their dealings with subordinates. With evidence of the 
increased centralisation of store level managers' tasks in the retail industry, HRM may 
be the only remaining functional area where they can impose their authority and exert 
their discretionary powers. This is particularly relevant given the low level of 
monitoring HR policies that research has found (for example, Tamkin et al 1997). 
Alternatively, practices may develop through acts of omission without managerial 
intent. Marchington and Parker (1990) concluded that there needs to be a 
differentiation between the formulation of strategy and its implementation, as well as 
between resistance to management actions, and consent to the goals of the 
organisation:
"To describe strategies without assessing whether or not these operate on the 
shop floor is to provide a partial picture of the concept" (p. 74). 
Therefore, research needs to be concentrated on both the senior and lower levels of
management to reveal the reality of the execution of HRM and employee resourcing at 
the operational level, and enable an evaluation of the effectiveness of corporate 
strategies and HRM.
Centralisation and formalisation, such as that evident in multiple retail companies, is 
susceptible to employee resistance because it can be viewed as an attempt to remove 
discretionary powers at the operational level (Child 1984). This is particularly 
applicable where control systems are considered to be overtight or misdirected. For 
example, companies that use enhanced methods of surveillance still have employee 
resentment and resistance towards monitoring and enforcement of scripted behaviour
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(Taylor 1998). This is despite some of the literature assuming that there is no 
alternative for people at work, but to offer behavioural compliance with managerial 
dictates, even though such conformity might be resigned (Ogbonna and Wilkinson 
1988). As Berry et al (1995) noted, inventive minds will always manipulate the 
systems designed to control them. Where a top-down approach is adopted, subversion 
of the control system can result, such as undermining the budget and budgeting 
process. The formal power flowing downwards can get displaced by politics and 
senior managers risk receiving a simplified, edited, or wholly untrue version of what is 
happening (Mintzberg 1983; Stewart 1999). Organisations with centralised decision- 
making and with the centre remote from the operational level are particularly 
vulnerable.
"centralised decision-making can be remote from the operationalised levels at 
which rules and decisions apply. It may be based on information which, on its 
journey up the hierarchy, becomes out of date, over-processed, over- 
generalised and sanitised. Furthermore, policy and rules follow the same path 
downward through the hierarchical thicket, incurring delays, distortions, 
misinterpretations or failures to implement." (Hales 1993: 104)
Mintzberg (1983) described how formal power can get displaced in organisations and 
replaced with politics. This can take the form of distortions in objectives, group 
pressures, the intrinsic needs of employees, the insurgency game, and the manipulation 
of budgets. The use of politics overcomes the problem of resolving situations where 
different organisational members bring different values to their work (Kakabadse 
1983). However, while politics and resistance is applicable to all organisational levels, 
it is not always constant, visible or obvious (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999; Edwards 
1979; Huczynski and Buchanan 2001; Mullins 1999). As Ackroyd and Thompson
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(1999) noted, there is often a gap between managerial expectations of'ideal 
behaviour' and the reality of misbehaviour.
While employee resistance to control systems has been acknowledged in the literature, 
much of the research adopts a mass employee approach, with little empirical evidence 
from a management perspective. While some of the literature outlining resistance to 
control systems has made mention of management resistance, little empirical evidence 
has been collected, particularly in the retail industry. This research study aims to 
address this imbalance by examining the influence of junior managers' choices and 
constraints on the management of human resources, particularly the extent of their 
autonomy and its impact on the deployment and management of labour.
Mintzberg (1983) outlined how managers frequently play insurgency games against 
their own superiors, whereby control is achieved by "circumventing, sabotaging and 
manipulating" (p. 188) the role structure of the organisation. Berry et al (1995) 
acknowledged that managers can take actions that may advance their own personal 
self-interest because they "are individuals with their own goals and needs" (p.80). This 
can detract from overall organisational goal achievement. Mintzberg (1989) referred 
to middle and junior managers 'balkanising' the structure of diversified organisations, 
to maintain their autonomy and discretionary powers. The main disadvantage of a 
divisionalised structure, such as that of multiple store retailers, is that decisions may be 
adopted by line managers, which are optimal for that particular store, but may be 
suboptimal for the organisation as a whole (Berry et al 1995).
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Punch (1996) reported that managerial misbehaviour is a significant problem in 
organisations because managers are the people responsible for defining and policing 
the formal or informal rules governing behaviour. Yet managerial politics has been 
described as "endemic" in organisations (Watson and Harris 1999:82). Sayles 
(1999:600) believed that middle managers often have to "massage and re-jiggle" 
company policies in order to make systems work. Operating between workers and 
more senior managers they are responsible for implementing policies and decisions that 
have been decided at a more senior level. While they have responsibility for making 
the organisation more efficient and profitable, they may have little to gain personally, 
particularly in the de-layered structures of today's organisation. As Mintzberg (1989) 
and Child (1984) pointed out, the expressed intentions of strategies will not necessarily 
be shared by others in the organisation. Such characteristics of management mediate 
the notion of managerial autonomy, power and control.
The rationale for resistance to control systems by managers is said to stem from the 
pursuit of autonomy (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999; Hales 1993; Mintzberg 1989). 
Argryis (1985, 1990) felt that organisational defensive routines are patterns of 
behaviour deployed by people to protect themselves from embarrassment or anxiety. 
Threats to job security can generate defensive responses by employees at all 
hierarchical levels (Huczynski and Buchanan 2001). Watson and Harris (1999) 
concluded, that the way in which organisations are structured, especially the way they 
encourage managers themselves to become rivals for both resources and career 
advancement, makes managerial politics inevitable and endemic in bureaucratised 
enterprises. The consequence of this is an undiscussed game of pretence, in which all
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participants indulge and are knowledgeable of its existence. Yet as Ackroyd and 
Thompson (1999) point out, misbehaviour cannot be allowed to become too visible up 
the line of command: "the fruits of fiddling must not be too visible" (p. 3 7). This means 
that any oppositional misbehaviour is often covert and difficult to detect.
The literature points towards a need to examine the formal and informal elements of 
managers' discretionary powers at different levels of organisations. This has important 
implications for the management of human resources, particularly as responsibility for 
HRM is being increasingly devolved down the line, with a possible emphasis on 'hard' 
HRM practices.
This chapter has sought to examine the constraints and autonomy of line management 
in the retail industry with a particular focus on store management. It has identified that 
retail managers' decision-making powers stem from a number of factors, including 
corporate strategy, organisational structure, budgetary controls, technology, and the 
level of management concerned.
Through an examination of relevant literature, multiple store retailers have been 
identified as a combination of Mintzberg's (1989) machine bureaucracy and diversified 
organisational typology. A key trend in multiple store retailing organisations is the 
increasing centralisation of store level functions and responsibilities. This is combined 
with an increasing onus on the use of budgets and performance targets to achieve a 
competitive advantage. Meanwhile, multiple store retailers also operate along
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Mintzberg's diversified typology due to their size, the geographical dispersion of 
stores, and a reliance on the standardisation of outputs as a control system.
Through reviewing the literature it is apparent that retail store level managers maintain 
some elements of autonomy, with a prime responsibility for HRM (see also section 
4.4). The remainder of their autonomy can be gained through their resistance to 
control systems, and is somewhat dependent on the strength of the informal 
organisation. However, this needs to be more critically tested through in-depth 
empirical research.
This aims of this research study are to establish the role of store level managers in the 
management of human resources, and assess how their choices and constraints impact 
on the employee resourcing decision-making process. This literature review has 
revealed a trend of devolving responsibility for HRM down to junior managers at store 
level, with a concurrent centralisation of other functional areas. However, many gaps 
have been identified in existing knowledge, including:
the employment implications of organisational change in multiple store retailing has 
been under-researched (Dawson et al 1987; Doogan 1992; Shackleton 1998; Sparks 
1983, 1987, 1991);
previous research on HRM in the retail industry has neglected to take the holistic 
approach necessary to develop a broad theory true to organisational reality 
(Marchington 1995a);
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a neglect of management as an important retail labour issue (Freathy and Sparks
1996), particularly junior management, and in terms of HRM (Kinnie 1989; Lowe
1992);
the difficulties previous research has found in differentiating between the formulation
of strategy, its implementation, and the impact of employee resistance, needs to be
addressed (Child 1984; Marchington and Parker 1990; Mintzberg 1983);
a neglect of management when considering employee resistance to control systems
(Ackroyd and Thompson 1999).
The following two chapters will outline the research process. Chapter Six describes 
the research design and methodology, while Chapter Seven reports on the fieldwork 
stage and process of data analysis. The remainder of the thesis will then present the 
findings and analysis of the study's empirical research.
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The previous chapters sought to provide an examination of the areas of literature 
relevant to this research study. This chapter begins by seeking to review the 
conceptual foundations of the research. The definition and study population are 
clarified, the research design outlined, and the process of data analysis identified.
Epistemology is the study of the foundations of knowledge (Nachmias and Nachmias 
1992). Different epistemological perspectives have different views on what counts as 
knowledge. Bryman (1988) suggests that the choice of a particular epistemological 
base leads to a preference for a particular method of research on the grounds of its 
greater appropriateness. Two views about the research process dominate the 
literature: positivism and phenomenology (Saunders et al 2000), and these will be 
discussed in the following sections.
The positivist approach is grounded in scientific principles with an emphasis on highly 
structured methodology to facilitate replication (Gill and Johnson 1997). It uses 
models and methods of natural science to study human affairs, with quantitative 
observations that lend themselves to statistical analysis (Burrell and Morgan 1979). 
Theories tend to arise from natural observations tested by deduction of hypotheses, 
which are then investigated by research. There is an assumption in the positivist
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approach that the researcher is independent of what is being observed, and does not 
affect, nor is affected by, the subject of the research (Remenyi et al 1998). This 
approach lends itself to the deductive approach, where theory and hypothesis are 
developed, and a research strategy is designed to test the hypothesis (Saunders et al 
2000).
A quantitative approach assumes that the researcher can develop objective, precise 
measures with numbers, that capture important features of the social world. Broadly, 
the positivist approach lends itself to quantitative methodologies (Bryman 1988). 
Quantitative research brings other advantages such as some reassurance about the 
validity and reliability of findings (Ryan 1995). Statements about quantitative research 
are likely to be grounded in reconstructed logic, in that the logic of how to do research 
is highly organised and restated in an idealised, formal and systematic form (Neuman 
1997),
Researchers critical of the positivist philosophy argue that the complexities of the 
world are missed if their constructs are reduced to a series of law-like generalisations. 
This line of argument is particularly persuasive in the case of business and management 
research (Saunders et al 2000). Research methods rooted in the philosophy of 
phenomenology have been said to offer the opportunity of discovering "the reality 
behind the reality" (Saunders et al 2000:86). The research task in the 
phenomenological approach is not to simply gather facts and measurements to prove
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or disprove theories, but to capture the different constructions and meanings people 
place on their experience.
While the phenomenological perspective has been criticised because of the problems of 
generalisation, Saunders et al (2000) believe that in today's fast-changing business 
world, "if we accept the circumstances of today may not apply in three months time, 
then some of the value of generalisation is lost" (p. 86). The phenomenological 
philosophy is more likely to involve inductively going from the empirical to the 
theoretical level. Data is collected, and theory is developed as a result of data analysis, 
and hence theory would follow data, rather than vice versa, as in the deductive 
approach. This approach would be particularly concerned with the context in which 
events take place, and criticises the deductive approach for its inflexibility to pursue 
alternative explanations of what is going on.
A non-positivist perspective relies largely on interpretative and critical approaches to 
social science. As a result a qualitative researcher attempts to capture aspects of the 
social world for which it is difficult to develop precise measures expressed as numbers. 
The phenomenological approach tends to dictate a qualitative approach (Bryman 
1988). Qualitative research tends to arise more "in practice" and is "relatively messy, 
with more ambiguity and ..... has fewer set rules" (Neuman 1997:330).
The generation of theory from data, that is often associated with the phenomenological 
approach, means that the theory is 'grounded in data', hence the term 'grounded 
theory' originally conceived by Glaser and Strauss (1967):
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"Grounded theory is a qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of 
procedures to develop an inductively derived theory about a phenomenon." 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990:24) 
In grounded theory the data collection starts without the formation of an initial
theoretical framework. Instead theory is developed from the data, which is generated 
from a series of observations. Conceptualisation and operalisationalisation occur 
simultaneously with data collection and preliminary data analysis. This enables the 
researcher to be more flexible and allows data and theory to interact. Inductive 
researchers have to remain open to the unexpected and willing to change the direction 
and focus of their research project, even abandoning their research question in the 
middle of a project should the data dictate this (Neuman 1997). It enables the 
researcher to develop theory that is faithful to the data, and is often thought of as the 
best example of the inductive approach (Saunders 1997). Theory being grounded in a 
continual reference to the data, has led to grounded theory being viewed as a 
combination of the inductive and deductive approaches (Hussey and Hussey 1997). 
Table one outlines comparisons between the two dominant paradigms of positivist and 
phenomenological. 
Table 1: Key Features of Positivist and Phenomenological Paradigms__________
Positivist Paradigm Phenomenological Paradigm
Basic beliefs   The world is external and objective
  Observer is independent
  Science is value-free
  The world is socially constructed and 
subjective
  Observer is part of what is being 
observed 
Science is driven by human interests
Researcher should:   Focus on facts
  Look for causality and fundamental 
laws
  Reduce phenomena to simplest 
elements
  Formulate hypotheses and then test 
them
Focus on meanings 
Try to understand what is happening 
Look at the totality of each situation 
Develop ideas through induction 
from data
Preferred methods 
include:
  Operationalising concepts so that 
they can be measured
Taking large samples
Using multiple methods to establish 
different views of phenomena 
Small sample investigated in depth 
or over time
Source: Easterby-Smith et al (1991:27)
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Qualitative and quantitative styles of research differ in several ways, but in other ways 
they can be complementary. Both methodological approaches are seen to have 
different strengths and weaknesses, as are individual methods within these wider 
approach perspectives.
A research design can be defined as a plan that:
"guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analysing and interpreting 
observations. It is a logical model of proof that allows the researcher to draw 
inferences concerning causal relationships among the variables under 
investigation." (Nachmias & Nachmias 92:77-8). 
This research design can follow two formats: a linear path which follows a fixed
sequence of steps; or a non-linear, cyclical path. In general, qualitative researchers 
tend to follow a more cyclical path, rather than the linear path of quantitative 
researchers:
"Rather than moving in a straight line, a cyclical research path makes 
successive paths through steps.....with each cycle or repetition a researcher 
collects new data and gains new insights" (Neuman 1997:331). 
As a result, qualitative research reports may not discuss method, and often have a
personal autobiography tailored to a particular study. Few procedures or terms are 
standardised, and "there is debate among qualitative researchers about whether there 
ever should be" (Neuman 1997:330).
The design of a research problem centres on the purpose of the study - it could be 
exploratory, descriptive or explanatory. Exploratory research may be the first in a 
series of studies, with the goal of formulating more precise questions that future 
research can answer. This would require a non-positivist approach, with researchers 
asking creative questions and taking advantage of serendipity. Researchers conducting
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exploratory research frequently use an inductive approach and qualitative data 
(Neuman 1997; Yin 1994). Descriptive studies aim to "portray an accurate profile of 
persons, events or situations" (Robson 1993:4), tending to concentrate on 'how' and 
'who' questions. Descriptive researchers use most data-gathering techniques. 
Explanatory research seeks to establish causal relationships between variables. The 
emphasis is on studying a situation, or a problem, in order to explain the relationship 
between variables (Saunders et al 2000), and the desire to know "why" (Neuman 
1997:20). It is vital to consider the aim of the research study, the underlying 
philosophical approach of the researcher, and the most appropriate research methods 
which can be deployed to address the purpose of the project.
Denzin (1989) advocated the use of triangulation, which he described as:
"directing the observer to combine multiple data sources, research methods, 
theoretical perspectives, and observers in the collection, inspection, and 
analysis of behaviour specimens." (p. 92) 
Examining the data using as many different strategies as possible helps to verify and
strengthen the validity of the research results (Kane 1990). Yet triangulation is not 
without its problems for a number of reasons (Bryman 1992). The use of multiple- 
strategies may prove to be inappropriate because the underlying philosophies of 
quantitative and qualitative research, the positivist and phenomenological perspectives, 
are so very different. This could result in the data from each different approach being 
difficult to compare. Secondly, the results from different data sources frequently do 
not confirm one another, as is hoped for in triangulation, which makes it unclear which 
data set is to be preferred (Hall and Hall 1996; Hammersley 1992). Bryman (1992) 
suggests in such a situation the qualitative data may be more reliable, due to the
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proximity of the researcher to their subject. It may also be difficult to know what such 
a conflict in results actually means. Therefore, it is important to carefully consider the 
design of any research project to ensure the most appropriate philosophy and methods 
are adopted, and that their incumbent weaknesses are addressed as fully as possible.
The discussion so far has outlined the conceptual foundations and broad research 
methodologies available to conduct a research project. The original aim of this 
research study was to identify the factors prompting the trend towards increasing 
numerical flexibility practices in the retail industry. The objectives of this were to: 
investigate changes in the working practices and nature of employment in the retail 
industry;
investigate how, why, and at what levels retail managers make employee resourcing 
decisions, and the relationship of these decisions to corporate strategy; 
determine the degree to which the following influences have prompted the use of 
numerical flexibility working practices in the retail industry: nature of the industry; 
economic climate; feminisation of the workforce; technology; employment legislation; 
skill requirements; supply side preferences.
These research objectives were driven by the results of a literature review undertaken 
by the researcher. Therefore, the research question and accompanying objectives 
derived from existing theory and knowledge, adopting a deductive approach. The 
research objectives of this study are of an explanatory nature, seeking to establish the 
links between employee resourcing decisions and a number of multiple variables.
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These variables have been deduced from current knowledge and theory, thus assuming 
the deductive approach to research and data analysis.
The research strategy decided upon was a series of case studies. The case study is but 
one of several ways of conducting social research. Other methods include 
experiments, surveys, histories, and the analysis of archival information. Each strategy 
has particular advantages and disadvantages, depending upon three conditions: (1) the 
type of research question; (2) the control a researcher has over actual behavioural 
events; (3) the focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena (Yin 1994). 
A case study can be defined as:
"an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomena within its
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomena and
context are not clearly evident." (Yin 1994:13)
or:
"the development of detailed, intensive knowledge about a single 'case', or a
small number of related 'cases'." (Robson 1993:40)
In general, case studies are the preferred methodological strategy when 'how' and 
'why' questions are being posed. They are often used where the researcher has little 
control over events, and when the focus is on contemporary phenomena within some 
real-life context. This research study demands a need to understand complex social 
events and consequences within an organisational context. This suggests a case study 
approach would be the most appropriate research methodology for conducting the 
research study. The research question is asking both 'how' and 'why', and the 
objectives outline the need to understand both organisational and managerial 
processes. Case studies can be exploratory, descriptive or explanatory, but the case
116
study strategy "should not be confused with qualitative research" (Yin 1994:14) as the 
data collection methods employed with a case study approach may be various 
(Saunders et al 2000).
Case studies help researchers to connect at the micro level and immersion in the data 
gives the researcher a familiarity with organisational and managerial processes 
(Neuman 1997; Yin 1994). It is a research strategy that is used where there is a wish 
to gain a rich understanding of the context of research and the processes being enacted 
(Morris and Wood 1991). It is also an approach which is preferred when examining 
contemporary events, such as those in this research project. The case study method 
has been particularly recommended for the analysis of HRM, since it permits a holistic 
analysis of a set of interrelated phenomena within controlled settings (Boxall 1993; 
Dyer 1984; Truss et al 1997). The aims and objectives of this research project meant 
that fieldwork needed to be focused at the micro level of organisations to establish the 
rationale behind labour use decision-making at operational level.
However, the case study approach to research has been criticised for its lack of rigour 
because of its capacity to allow equivocal or biased views to influence the direction of 
findings and conclusions (Yin 1994). Another concern, also associated with other 
qualitative methods, is the issue of generalisation. While findings and conclusions are 
generisable to theoretical propositions, they cannot be applied to populations or 
universes. As a result, the researcher must be clear that the goal of their research 
study is "to expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation), not to enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalisation)" (Yin 1994:10).
117
As outlined in Section 6.2 a research design provides a:
"blueprint of research dealing with a least four problems: what questions to 
study; what data are relevant; what data to collect; and how to analyse the 
results "(Yin 1994:20) 
As with any other research strategy, case studies are a method of investigating an
empirical topic by following a set of prescribed procedures. This provides logical 
proof that allows a researcher to draw inferences concerning causal relationships 
among the variables under investigation.
When developing a research design the validity and reliability of the design are 
especially important. Validity is concerned with whether the findings are 'true' to 
data, and can be divided into construct, internal, and external. Construct validity in 
case study research can be increased by using multiple sources of evidence, 
establishing a chain of evidence, or having the draft case study report reviewed by key 
informants. Internal validity is a concern only for explanatory case studies, as 
descriptive or exploratory studies are not concerned with making causal statements. 
To ensure internal validity a researcher could use pattern-matching, explanation 
building, or time-series analysis. However, a case study involves an inference every 
time an event cannot be directly observed, which brings into question the internal 
validity of the strategy. External validity is concerned with the extent to which the 
findings are generisable beyond the immediate case study, and can be increased by 
conducting further case study research to introduce replication logic. Another concern 
of any research design must be reliability. To ensure a later researcher following the 
same procedures would arrive at the same conclusions the steps must be as operational 
as possible (Neuman 1997; Saunders et al 2000; Yin 1994).
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Other research design issues pertinent to case study research is the selection and design 
of the case studies themselves. A case study approach can be either single or multiple, 
and holistic or embedded (Yin 1994). Single case studies can be considered where it 
represents a critical case, an extreme or unique case, or a revelatory case (Yin 1994). 
The evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall 
study is therefore regarded as being more robust (Herriott and Firestone 1983). They 
can also be considered as multiple experiments following a logic of 'replication'. The 
case studies should be selected because they will produce literal replication (similar 
results); or they produce contrasting results, but for predictable reasons - theoretical 
replication. Yet, while multiple case study research can improve the validity of 
findings, and be likened to multiple experiments, their conduct requires extensive 
resources and time often beyond the means of a single researcher (Saunders et al 
2000).
A research design must consider whether to adopt a holistic or an embedded case 
study approach. The same case study can involve more than one unit of analysis, and 
these embedded units can be meetings, roles or locations. A danger of this approach is 
a focus on only the sub-unit level, and a failure to return to the large unit of analysis to 
contextualise the findings. Alternatively a holistic design will examine only the global 
nature of an organisation, but is advantageous when no logical sub-units can be 
identified, or where the relevant theory underlying the case study is itself of a holistic 
nature (Yin 1994). However, problems can occur where the research is conducted at a 
very abstract level and avoids examining any specific phenomena in operational detail. 
Therefore, careful consideration needs to be made when drawing up a case study
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research design, and deciding between a holistic or embedded approach. The research 
question, choice of sub-units and resources available to the researcher should all guide 
this decision.
This research study adopted a qualitative approach, which suggests the use of 
qualitative research methods. While qualitative research, unlike quantitative, has no 
standard approach to the reporting of data and procedures (Neuman 1997), it is 
important to ensure that a "transparency" of method is present (Huberman and Miles 
1994:439). This section describes the case study research design, the data collection 
methods and the research process, which together form the research design for this 
study.
For the purpose of this research study a multiple case study design was considered 
more appropriate. The case studies would be drawn from organisations operating in 
the UK multiple retail industry. The rationale for focusing on multiple store retailing 
as the retail sector under study has been justified elsewhere (see Chapters one and 
two). While this delimits the choice of organisations for case studies to multiple store 
retailers, within this sector the researcher had a vast choice of organisations.
Four organisations were selected as the basis for research thus adopting a multiple case 
study approach. In his discussion of sample design, Patton (1990) stressed the 
importance of selecting appropriate 'units of analysis'. In this research the case studies 
were multiple store retailing organisations. The rationale for adopting a multiple case
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study approach was to increase the validity of data collected. This would enable the
research design to resemble a series of experiments to add credibility to the subsequent
research findings and conclusions drawn by the researcher. Within each case study
access to stores was required to fulfil the study's research objectives. This demanded
an embedded approach to the case study design. For each case study it was decided
that two embedded units (i.e. two stores) would be selected. Two embedded units for
each case study were chosen for the following reasons:
to enable comparability between stores within the same case study;
to increase validity by reducing the risk of bias, or 'unique' stores distorting the
research findings;
to increase validity by using 'replication' logic through collecting data from a greater
number of similar sources.
The selection of site and sample are crucial decisions that affect the viability of the 
whole study. Yet, selection must necessarily be undertaken within the constraints of 
access and practical issues (Marshall and Rossman 1989). For this research study, the 
researcher had no prior contacts for access to retail organisations. While it has been 
recommended that inexperienced field researchers should choose an unfamiliar setting 
in which they are strangers (Bodgan and Taylor 1975), this raises issues about access.
The ability to collect data depends heavily on gaining access to appropriate sources 
(Saunders et al 2000), and "awareness of the access problem seems to be low" 
(Gummesson 1991:47). Access is likely to be a problematic area, which suggests that 
the feasibility of a research design has to be a guiding principle, alongside the issue of a
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sound research design. Buchanan et al (1988) acknowledged that feasibility will often 
determine the construction or refinement of a research question and "may sometimes 
lead to a clash with the hallmarks of good research" (p. 54). Given these difficulties in 
gaining access it was decided that a random sampling method would be used to initiate 
access to retail organisations. Multiple retailers operational in the UK would be 
targeted by letter to seek access for this research study. This request for access would 
be directed to the Human Resources (HR) Directors of each company. Addresses, and 
where possible the names, of HR Directors would be gathered through desk research, 
to whom these letters would be sent requesting co-operation with the research study.
The choice of methodological tools as part of the research design has often been 
portrayed as quantitative versus qualitative, while some authors have advocated a 
triangulation of research methods (for example, Denzin 1978). However, one of the 
limitations of combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies in the same 
research project is that the data produced by each is different, and so not easily 
comparable (Bryman 1992) (see Section for further discussion).
The research objectives of this study were originally to establish the nature of 
employment in the case study organisations, and investigate how and why retail 
managers make employee resourcing decisions, and at what level in the organisational 
hierarchy. These 'how' and 'why' questions suggested a case research approach (see 
Section while the researcher's epistemological approach of phenomenology 
dictated the use of field research. This would enable the researcher to gain access and
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observation in the case study organisations for a longer period of time, such as was 
necessary to gain the insight required to fulfil the research question and objectives.
Evidence for case studies can come from six sources: documents, archival records, 
interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artefacts (Yin 
1994). The most appropriate data collection method for this study was deemed to be 
the use of interviews, which are considered to be "one of the most important sources 
of case study information" (Yin 1994:84). Interviews are also a commonly recognised 
qualitative research method (Saunders et al 2000). The research objectives of this 
research study were complex, requiring a depth of understanding which would be 
difficult to reach through deploying only quantitative research methods. The 
epistemological rationale for conducting interviews can be ascribed to the researcher's 
belief that the data needed to satisfy the study's objectives were contextual, situational, 
and interactional. This requirement for in-depth information cannot be simply 
articulated in responses to a short, standardised questionnaire. The use of quantitative 
research methods were rejected for this reason.
An interview has been defined as "a purposeful discussion between two or more 
people" (Kahn and Cannell 1957 in Saunders et al 2000:242). Types of interviewing 
can be distinguished by their degree of format standardisation and the extent to which 
questions are prepared beforehand (Fontana and Frey 1998; Holstein and Gubrium 
1997; Maykut and Morehouse 1994; Patton 1990). Interviews can be highly 
formalised and structured, semi-structured, or informal and unstructured. Patton
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(1990) classified these three basic approaches as: the informal conversational 
interview; the general interview; and the standardised open-ended interview. The 
researcher's epistemology is grounded in a phenomenological paradigm. 
Consequently, the qualitative interviewing of managers formed the key basis of the 
research design. The goal of a qualitative research interview is to view the research 
topic from the viewpoint and in the language of the interviewee (King 1994; Patton 
1990; Walker 1985). Valentine (1997) summarised the key advantage of the 
qualitative interview as:
"...it is sensitive and people-oriented, allowing interviewees to construct their 
own accounts of the experiences by describing their lives in their own words." 
(p. Ill)
The interview type adopted was the general interview guide, also known as the in- 
depth, or semi-structured interview (Jones 1985; Patton 1990). Using this approach 
the researcher prepares a list of themes and questions to be covered beforehand, 
although these can vary from interview to interview. This interview format was 
adopted to enable comparability between managers at different levels within the same 
embedded unit, as well as the more holistic case study, and also between the four case 
study organisations. Such interviews are commonly used in qualitative research to 
reveal and understand the 'what' and 'how', as well as placing a greater emphasis on 
the 'why' (Robson 1993; Saunders et al 2000). They provide the opportunity for 
researchers to 'probe' answers by getting interviewees to explain and build on their 
answers. The semi-structured interview allows respondents to raise issues that the 
interviewer may not have considered (Maykut and Morehouse 1994; Silverman 1993). 
This helps to minimise Patton's (1990) concern that if these issues are omitted from 
the interview guide under the formal approach, important topics may be missed.
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While it has been found that participants prefer to be interviewed than fill in a 
questionnaire (Healey 1991), and "well informed respondents can provide important 
insights into a situation" (Yin 1994:85), the interview research methodology is not 
without its critics. The lack of standardisation can lead to concerns about reliability 
(Robson 1993). Bias can take the form of either interviewer or response bias, which 
could mean that alternative interviewers draw different findings and conclusions 
(Easterby-Smith et al 1991; Healey and Rawlinson 1994). A research study's validity 
could also be threatened by either interviewer or interviewee bias. Interviewees may 
choose not to reveal and discuss all aspects of a topic, so that only partial information 
is given as the interviewee casts themselves, or their employer, in a 'socially desirable' 
role (Saunders et al 2000). As with all qualitative research, generalisations about the 
entire population cannot not be made from interviews, particularly when using semi- 
structured, or open-ended interviews. This is the situation in a case study research 
design (Yin 1994).
The interview questions for this research study covered a number of topic areas, 
relative to the original research aims. The structure of the interviews was designed 
using Hart's (1989) suggestion for three stages to interviews. After a brief 
introduction about the study, the interviewer would begin with questions about the 
respondent, such as job title and responsibilities, organisational context, length of 
employment with the company, career development, store structure and workforce 
composition. These would guide the respondent into the interview with non- 
threatening and easy to answer questions encouraging them to talk descriptively about 
themselves and their role (King 1994; Patton 1990). Following on from this, questions
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were asked about specific areas, as dictated by the research objectives, such as the 
impact of corporate strategy and company policies, the management of working hours, 
the role of technology, and the recruitment, selection, and training of employees. 
Further details of the interview structure and questions can be found in Appendices six 
to eight.
A key aspect of any research design is outlining those individuals within the case study 
who the researcher wishes to interview. This is important both for research design 
purposes, as well as for negotiating successful, and useful, access to organisations. 
Given that the research objectives required a focus on the operational level of retail 
organisations, managers at the embedded sub-units became the main focus of the 
fieldwork research process. However, the second objective of the research, 
"investigate how, why, and at what levels managers...make employee resourcing 
decisions, and the relationship of these to corporate strategy", necessitated interviews 
with senior managers at head office or regional office level. Consequently the research 
objectives placed the focus of the data collection around two key parties: managers at 
head office, and managers at store level. An interview with all managers at the sub- 
units, together with supporting interviews with appropriate managers at head office or 
regional office was considered a suitable research sample. An initial data-gathering 
interview with 'gatekeepers' of each case study would enable the researcher to become 
familiar with the organisational structure and identify those individuals required for 
interview.
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This interview sample translated to a cross-section of each case study organisation's 
management hierarchy. This was envisaged by the researcher as enriching the data 
collected in a number of ways to:
  enable a comparison of the choices and constraints of managers at different levels of an 
organisation;
  facilitate an examination of where in an organisation's structure employee resourcing 
decisions are taken and executed;
  allow a comparison of local managers' interpretations of organisational strategy and 
policies.
Access to each case study was requested for a maximum of one year. Research visits 
to stores were scheduled for once a month, with the purpose of interviewing store 
level managers. An interview schedule for the fieldwork period would be devised to 
ensure that at each visit different managers were interviewed. The rationale of this 
approach was to ensure all managers at store level were interviewed, without making 
excessive demands on the sub-units during each research visit. It would also allow the 
researcher to gain an impression of changes occurring in the case studies from a 
longer-term prospect.
Documents of various types can also be used to triangulate the findings of other data 
collection techniques (Shipman 1988). They can take the form of letters, 
memorandums, and other communiques, agendas, announcements and minutes of
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meetings, administrative documents, and media reports (Yin 1994). Documents are a 
form of secondary, as opposed to primary data. For the purpose of this study, 
documentation would be requested on corporate strategy and policies (particularly 
regarding the management of human resources) and employment statistics. Other 
publications such as annual reports, promotional literature, and media reports would 
also be collected to develop a fuller understanding of the organisational context of 
each case study.
As raised by Yin (1994), the process of data analysis is a very important, but often 
neglected, aspect of research design. The central research tools of this research study 
were qualitative, and so this section begins by outlining the process of qualitative 
analysis to be undertaken. There is not a standardised approach to analysing 
qualitative data (Patton 1990; Saunders 1997; Saunders et al 2000), yet data analysis is 
an integral part of the research design:
"The process of qualitative data analysis takes many forms, but it is 
fundamentally a non-mathematical, analytical procedure that involves 
examining the meaning of people's words and actions. Qualitative research 
findings are inductively derived from this data." (Maykut and Morehouse 
1994:121)
Saunders (1997) recommends desegregating qualitative data into categories, the 
identification of which are guided by the research question and objectives. The 
identification of these categories for this research study derived from the research 
objectives. These were ascertained from an extensive literature review to determine 
which factors needed to be considered when examining the potential circumstances 
that could influence employee resourcing in multiple store retailing. Yin (1994)
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recommends this approach, particularly for inexperienced researchers, to help organise
and direct data analysis. It enables the research study to be linked to existing
knowledge and provides an initial analytical framework for the researcher to work
from. Using the project's original research objectives the following classifications
were identified for the purpose of data analysis:
Case study background information
Embedded unit (store) background information
Interviewee characteristics and background information
Employee resourcing decision making responsibilities and processes
The influence of corporate strategy on the use of flexible employment
The influence of the nature of the retail industry on the use of flexible employment
The influence of gender on the use of flexible employment
The influence of technology on the use of flexible employment
The influence of skill levels and requirements on the use of flexible employment
The influence of supply side preferences on the use of flexible employment
Once categories have been formed for the purpose of organising and reducing 
qualitative data, the next step is 'unitising' the data (Saunders et al 2000:383). This 
refers to attaching the relevant parts of the data to an appropriate category. At this 
stage a computer can be used to process the data, or the researcher can adopt a manual 
approach. The basic characteristics of qualitative data lie behind the key advantages 
for using computers in qualitative data: it is usually textual, voluminous and 
analytically demanding (Lee and Fielding 1991). Those in favour of using computer- 
assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) argue that it can more easily,
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quickly, and efficiently do anything that is possible on paper (Lee and Fielding 1991; 
Richards 1995); and can help facilitate the mechanical and clerical tasks involved in 
coding qualitative data (Lee and Fielding 1991). These advantages enable the 
researcher to 'play' with the data which further encourages analytical insight (Tesch 
1991). However, there have been a number of problems with the use of CAQDAS. 
The range of programs available can mean that the researcher may end up using a 
program that is unsuitable for the analytical procedures they wish to perform (Lee and 
Fielding 1991). It can reduce the data analysis to 'word crunching' (Saunders et al 
2000:401) where the researcher is more concerned with analysis based on 
quantification than exploration of meaning (Fisher 1997). Other issues include the 
need to learn both how to analyse qualitative data, as well as choosing and using 
appropriate software for the problem (Lee and Fielding 1991); and many of the 
programs may not be available for the researcher to explore and evaluate within their 
institution.
Considering these debates, it was decided that a manual approach to data analysis 
would be employed for the purposes of this research study. The rationale for this was 
predominately the lack of facilities within the researcher's institution, as well as a need 
for the less experienced researcher to learn and understand the actual process of 
qualitative data analysis as part of the research process. Consequently, interview 
transcripts were to be coded manually, and then using the 'Cut and Paste' mechanism 
on a word processing computer package, unitised onto a computer file for each 
category. This would enable relationships between data and categories to be
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established; as well as developing any new categories which might arise during the 
data-analysis process.
Figure three illustrates the final research design process, which mirrors the research 
process model suggested by Saunders (1997). It should be noted that while the model 
is largely linear in format, the processes of both forward planning, and reflection and 
revisions, were central to the research process.
This chapter has sought to introduce and discuss the research design and 
methodological aspects of this study. A case study approach was adopted, with the 
research design focusing on four units of analysis, and two embedded units within each 
of these. These case studies were UK multiple store retailers, and the embedded units 
were stores within these organisations.
The researcher's epistemology was grounded in a phenomenological paradigm and so 
qualitative face-to-face interviews were the central research tool adopted. The chapter 
then discussed the approach to data analysis, outlining the rationale for adopting a 
manual approach, and the categories to be used for the data analysis process.
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The previous chapter set out the conceptual foundations for this study, narrowed the 
focus of the research to four case studies, and detailed the research design and 
methodology. The research strategy consisted of multiple embedded case studies. 
This involved a series of face-to-face qualitative interviews with managers in retail 
organisations at both head office and store level, documentation collected during field 
visits, and fieldnote observations. The data collected was then manually analysed using 
the inductive method, with a subsequent refinement of the original research objectives.
As Neuman (1997) outlined, qualitative research tends to be cyclical, rather than 
moving in a straight line. Gummesson (1991) criticised what he termed "the taboos of 
the research process" (p. 98), where the traditional model of the research process is an 
idealised model. When confronted with reality, the research process is often 
characterised by complexity and intractability because "there is no such thing as 
flawless research" (McGrath 1982:76). Consequently qualitative research reports 
often have a "personal autobiography tailored to a particular study" (Neuman 
1997:330), which is most common for field research. This chapter takes the approach 
of a "personal autobiography" and outlines the research process during both the 
fieldwork and data analysis stages.
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7.2 
Access to a site is a key factor in determining success (Hammersley and Atkinson 
1983). With no personal contacts for the researcher to gain access, the names and 
addresses of the HR Directors of UK multiple store retail organisations were sought 
through desk research. An initial contact letter was sent to HR Directors in October 
1995 (see appendix one). After a poor response a second letter and further details of 
the research project were sent in November 1995 (see appendix two). As a result 
seven retailers expressed an interest in the research project. Five of these operated in 
the superstore sector, whilst the other two were high street retailers. Given the 
research design's requirement of four retailers it was decided to concentrate the 
research on the superstore sector of multiple store retailing using those retail 
organisations who had expressed an interest in co-operating with the research study.
Meetings were arranged with each of these organisations to discuss the research study 
in more detail and determine whether the requisite access could be provided. These 
meetings were held at head office or regional level. After this initial meeting one 
organisation decided it could not provide the level of access and commitment required 
for the study. Consequently, the remaining four superstore retailers were selected as 
the organisations under study.
In each of the four organisations an initial interview was conducted with a member of 
the Personnel department at head office or regional level. The aim of this interview 
was to provide further details about the research project, and to outline the information 
required from the organisation. As highlighted by Saunders et al (2000), one area of
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concern for organisations can be sensitivity and confidentiality, with anonymity of 
organisations and individual participants often necessary. The four retail organisations 
agreed to provide access for the research study on the proviso that they were granted 
anonymity in the research report. To achieve this pseudonyms were used in place of 
the organisation's name (see Table two).
ORGANISATION
A
B
C
D
SECTOR
Grocery
Grocery
Home Improvement and Gardening
Electrical
PSEUDONYM
Superco
Groceryco
Homeco
Electrico
In three of the four companies access to two of their stores was granted immediately, 
with contact names and details provided. This fulfilled the original research design 
objective of securing two embedded units for each case study. Electrico initially 
provided only one store for access, but promised to provide contact details of another 
soon after. The selection of the stores for each organisation varied for numerous 
reasons, as outlined in Table three. (Further details about the characteristics of each 
store can be found in Chapters 8 to 10).
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ORGANISATION CONTACT RATIONALE FOR CHOICE OF STORES
Superco General Manager Surrey Quays - top store in region 
Lewisham - General Manager likely to 
be co-operative with the research.
A comparison between an older, smaller 
store (Blackfen), and a newly opened 
large store (Camden).
Groceryco HR Manager
Homeco Store Manager An older, unrefurbished store with a new 
manager (West Thurrock); compared to 
a newly refurbished store (Oxford).
Electrico Store Manager A successful manager considered likely to 
be co-operative. The store was one of the 
top performing stores in its region.
Gummesson (1991) outlined three levels of access which need to be negotiated for any 
research study to succeed. These include physical access or initial entry into the 
organisation; continuing access where the access required is not limited to a single 
event; and cognitive access. This entails gaining access to the data required from the 
research participants in order for the researcher to understand their social reality and to 
enable the research question and objectives to be addressed. While physical access had 
been gained to the four case study organisations, there was also a need to ensure both 
continuing and cognitive access. As Saunders et al (2000) expressed:
"simply obtaining physical access is inadequate unless you can also negotiate 
yourself into a position where you can reveal the identity of what is occurring 
in relation to your research question." (p. 115)
The research design required continuing research access, particularly to the stores 
designated as sub-units. The design designated the need for monthly visits over a 
twelve-month period. A longitudinal study, where access to the organisation and
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research participants is required on more than one occasion, can make obtaining access 
more difficult because of the intrusive methods and greater demands on the 
organisation (Buchanan et al 1988; Johnson 1975; Raimond 1993). There was also the 
added difficulty of operating as an external researcher where "gaining physical access 
is a major issue to overcome; and will remain in relation to negotiating continued and 
cognitive research" (Saunders et al 2000:116).
The requirements of the research design placed a heavy emphasis on the role of the 
gatekeeper, particularly at store level where the research demands were considerably 
more onerous. Gatekeepers can be defined as:
"those individuals in an organisation that have the power to grant or withhold 
access to people or situations for the purposes of research." (Burgess 1984:48) 
At each store the person with responsibility for arranging the researcher's access to
managers for the purposes of interview was identified. Table four outlines the 
designated gatekeepers for each store. These individuals were important because they 
not only formed one of the interview groups, but also controlled access to the other 
managers at store level. Appendix four outlines the negotiation process to the level of 
store gatekeepers in more detail for each case study organisation.
Regular communication was maintained with the gatekeepers to ensure that access to 
managers for the purpose of interviews was granted. A schedule of planned interviews 
was agreed with these gatekeepers at the outset of the fieldwork (as discussed in 
Section 7.3.1). The gatekeepers at head office or regional level (see Appendix Three) 
were also kept updated about the research progress, and arrangements for any flirther 
interviews with senior management were made through these individuals.
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COMPANY
Superco
Superco
Groceryco
Groceryco
Homeco
Homeco
Electrico
STORE
Lewisham
Surrey Quays
Blackfen
Camden
Oxford
West Thurrock
Orpington
GATEKEEPER
General Manager
Personnel Manager
Human Resources Manager
Human Resources Manager
Assistant Store Manager
Store Manager
Store Manager
The original aim of the research design was to interview all managers at store level in 
each of the seven stores where access had been granted, which would then be 
supplemented by interviews with senior managers at head office or regional level. This 
provides the rationale for the greater number of interviews conducted at Superco then 
the other three case study companies. The embedded units of Superco were larger, 
and hence employed a larger number of managers. Table five outlines the number of 
interviews conducted within each case study.
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COMPANY
Superco
Groceryco
Homeco
Electrico
TOTAL
NUMBER OF HEAD 
OFFICE/ REGIONAL 
LEVEL INTERVIEWS
3
2
3
1
9
NUMBER OF STORE 
LEVEL INTERVIEWS
24 
(Lewisham - 1 2 
Surrey Quays - 12)
19 
(Blackfen - 9 
Camden- 10)
11 
(Oxford - 5 
W. Thurrock - 6)
5
59
TOTAL NUMBER 
OF INTERVIEWS
27
21
14
6
68
Where research objectives require semi-structured in-depth interviews, the logistics of 
scheduling interviews must be carefully considered. To overcome this a proposed 
schedule of interviews was provided to the gatekeeper of each store at the very 
beginning of the fieldwork. This clearly demonstrated the commitment and resources 
required to co-operate with the research study, as well as allowing the gatekeeper time 
to arrange the interviews. As Saunders et al (2000) expressed, where a research 
design involves a study of one establishment over a period of time it may be more 
practical to undertake a number of interviews in one day. Up to three interviews were 
arranged on a single monthly visit to the stores. This figure was dependent upon the 
size of the store and subsequent total number of managers to be interviewed at each 
embedded site.
The interviews were scheduled on a hierarchical basis so that senior store managers 
were interviewed initially, followed by junior managers. This enabled responses from 
senior managers to be compared to junior managers later responses. It also provided
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some logic to the interview schedule for the benefit of the gatekeepers arranging the 
interviews. As with most qualitative research, the actual dates of the interviews did 
not exactly correspond with the proposed schedule set out at the beginning of the 
fieldwork. The actual schedule of interviews can be found in Appendix five, which 
outlines the dates on which each interview was conducted, and with whom, for each 
case study and embedded unit.
Interviews were planned to take 45 to 60 minutes; in practice the interviews ranged 
from 40 to 105 minutes. In every interview the researcher was able to cover all the 
planned topics in the time allowed, and in the majority of cases other areas were also 
explored. The use of a tape-recorder can increase the accuracy of data collection 
(Dolan 1985; Ely et al 1991; Saunders et al 2000), as well as allowing the interviewer 
to concentrate more fully on the interviewee (Patton 1990; Saunders et al 2000; 
Valentine 1997). However, there are disadvantages to tape recording interviews 
including situations where it might adversely affect the relationship between 
interviewer and interviewee, or where it could inhibit the interviewee responses and 
thus reduce validity. There are also technical considerations to be made and the time 
required to transcribe tapes (Saunders et al 2000). For the purpose of this research 
study it was decided not to tape record the interviews, but to rely instead on taking 
notes during the interviews themselves. Immediately after the interview the researcher 
typed up the interview notes in full detail, to be kept on computer file. Interviews 
were not tape recorded because of the threat it posed to the validity of responses given 
by the interviewees. It was feared that the methodology of taking a cross section of 
managers through the organisational hierarchy might rouse suspicions amongst the
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respondents, particularly those at junior management level. Despite promises of 
confidentiality, the researcher felt managers would be more inhibited by the presence 
of a tape recorder, and therefore less likely to reveal "the reality behind the reality" 
(Saunders et al 2000:86). In making careful notes of potentially quotable material 
during the interviews, and immediately writing these notes up afterwards, the data and 
direct quotes were still available for use by the researcher.
The location in which the interviews were conducted varied according to each case 
study, and within each embedded unit. Interviews with senior management at head 
office and regional level generally took place in the interviewee's office. At store level, 
where a senior manager had an office, the interview would take place there. However, 
this was generally only applicable to the Store Managers and Personnel Managers. 
Interviews with other managers took place in a variety of settings including meeting 
rooms, offices 'borrowed' from senior management, or the staff canteen. The 
locations were determined by a combination of the gatekeeper and the interviewee. 
Most commonly the staff canteen was used, which meant the researcher became a 
'familiar face' within the stores concerned. This enabled the researcher to build a 
rapport within the case studies by "getting along with members in the field" (Neuman 
1997:335). This helped to eradicate suspicions the respondents may have held over 
the researcher's presence. This was particularly applicable at store level where the 
researcher visited every month. As Saunders et al (2000:116) noted, "researchers rely 
heavily on goodwill from the organisation at every level of access", and "gaining co- 
operation from intended participants is about developing relationships". This was 
facilitated by the frequent presence of the researcher and informal setting of the staff
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canteen for many of the interviews. Through building relationships with members in 
the field, whilst also demonstrating integrity, the role of the researcher as an external 
proved to be beneficial. Participants in the research were willing to accept the 
researcher as objective and without a covert agenda (Saunders et al 2000), and thus 
were more likely to answer the interview questions honestly and completely, increasing 
the validity of the data collected.
All interviews were one-to-one with no other people but the researcher and respondent 
present. The interviews were conducted with minimal interruptions, even when they 
were held in a 'public' place, such as the staff canteen. This meant that interviewees 
were not influenced by the presence of others, which can distort their responses to 
questions, and negatively impact on the validity of the data (Puwar 1997).
Another issue to consider when conducting research interviews is that of shared 
identities because "all interviews are interactional" (Silverman 1997:113) with a 
relationship of some kind formed between the interviewer and interviewee. Qualitative 
researchers believe there can never be a 'relationship-free' interview (King 1994). 
Oakley (1981) stressed the importance of the researcher interacting and sharing 
information with respondents rather than simply treating them as subjects from which 
to extract information. This principle of reciprocity in research is often viewed as 
good practice (Valentine 1997).
The presence (or absence) of shared identities and links can influence the rapport 
between researcher and participants. Factors which can increase, or reduce the rapport
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with participants through shared identities include gender, age, ethnicity, and common 
backgrounds such as locations, families, education and occupation (Chandler 1990; 
Hammersley and Atkinson 1983; Oakley 1981; Scott 1994; Valentine 1997). The 
author was the sole researcher and interviewer and, for background information, is a 
white female, who was aged twenty-four when the interviews took place. The gender 
of interviewee and respondent "does make a difference" (Fontana and Frey 1998:64), 
and the role of women researchers and their interaction with both male and female 
participants has been well documented (see, for example, Chandler 1990; Finch 1984). 
This led Hammersley and Atkinson (1983:84) to conclude that a position of 
"genderless neutrality" can never be achieved.
The majority of managers with whom interviews were conducted tended to be male 
due to the male domination of management roles in the retail industry, particularly at 
senior levels. This meant that the researcher often did not have a shared gender 
identity with the interviewee, and so had to build a rapport in other ways. At store 
level management this was often achieved through age as many of the store level 
managers were young, in their late twenties and early thirties. Some had also 
graduated from university and so had an empathy with the researcher as a higher 
education student. However, this is not to say that the researcher failed to establish a 
rapport with other respondents. The external nature of the researcher helped to 
establish trust between the respondents and herself, as did the frequent visits to the 
stores, which made the researcher a 'familiar face'(as previously discussed). This 
neutrality and the researcher's professionalism and integrity, together with a tape 
recorder not being used, led the researcher to believe that the interviewees felt
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comfortable answering the interview questions fully and honestly. Indeed, even where 
questions were related to gender and equal opportunities, respondents did not seem 
deterred by the gender of the researcher in giving honest answers to the questions, 
although this conclusion is based only on the researcher's interpretation of the answers 
given.
7.3.2 
As discussed in Section 7.3.1, during and immediately after each field visit the 
researcher made detailed written notes of the interviews, and any relevant 
observations. These were subsequently filed and used as the main source of data for 
the purpose of analysis.
7.3.3 
Documents were collected in each case study to try and triangulate the findings of the 
interviews and any observations. Such 'public documents' (Maykut and Morehouse 
1994) can help put the fieldwork into context and a range of documents were gathered 
wherever possible, and where provided by the case study organisation. These included 
annual reports, recruitment literature, and training guides.
7.4 
The approach of this research study and subsequent research design was qualitative, 
with an underlying phenomenological philosophy using a multiple embedded case study 
methodology. This required an aspect of longitudinal access to the case studies, in
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particular to the embedded units of the retail stores. As summarised by Saunders et al 
(2000):
"Fieldwork is permeated with the conflict between what is theoretically 
desirable on the one hand and what is practically possible on the other. It is 
desirable to ensure representativeness in the sample, uniformity of interview 
procedures, adequate data collection across the range of topics to be explored, 
and so on. But the members of the organisation block access to information, 
constrain the time allowed on interviews, lose your questionnaires, go on 
holiday, and join other organisations in the middle of your unfinished study. In 
the conflict between the desirable and the possible, the possible always wins." 
(P-115)
Such difficulties were particularly applicable to this fieldwork, and the problems of 
conducting case study research in the retail industry are outlined below. For ease of 
clarity the problems faced are discussed for each case study company individually.
The problems encountered at Superco were caused principally by the movement of 
staff between stores. These issues only occurred at the Lewisham store. The 
gatekeeper and General Manager at the Surrey Quays store remained in their positions 
for the duration of the fieldwork. This enabled relationships to be built up to ensure the 
continuation of access and support for the research study.
At the Lewisham store the General Manager was moved on secondment to an internal 
company project, four months into the fieldwork. This left the store without a General 
Manager. The manager of the Surrey Quays store (the other store under research) 
took dual responsibility for both stores. The loss of the General Manager from the 
Lewisham store meant that the researcher was without a gatekeeper for arranging 
future interviews and research access. This was compounded by the researcher not
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being informed by Lewisham's General Manager of his imminent departure. The 
researcher instead asked the Personnel Manager of the Lewisham store to act as the 
gatekeeper (as in the Surrey Quays store). This was agreed and interviews were 
arranged for the following monthly research visit. However, this gatekeeper shortly 
left on maternity leave. The gatekeeper role was then transferred to the store's 
Training Manager who arranged the remaining interviews, which enabled the 
successful completion of all required interviews at both Superco stores. Nevertheless, 
this staff mobility provided a potential threat to the completion of the fieldwork at the 
Lewisham store. It required careful management and diplomacy to successfully re- 
negotiate new gatekeepers.
7.4.2 
The problems encountered during the fieldwork stage occurred at the Camden store, 
and were again due to staff turnover and movement between stores. At the Blackfen 
store the gatekeeper remained constant throughout the research period, and arranged 
all the interviews requested by the researcher.
At the Camden store problems occurred with the gatekeeper. During the second 
month of the fieldwork the gatekeeper was absent for four weeks due to illness. This 
delayed the proposed interview schedule, which was then revised to accommodate the 
gatekeeper's absence. The gatekeeper returned for two weeks before being absent 
again on compassionate leave from which she never returned to the store. 
Unsuccessful attempts were made to secure the new HR manager as a gatekeeper to 
arrange interviews with the requisite managers. Consequently, interviews had to be
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arranged directly with the managers concerned, rather than through a gatekeeper. This 
proved difficult, and combined with many of the management positions being vacant, 
led to a low success rate in securing access to managers for the purpose of 
interviewing. However, interviews were secured with ten managers at the Camden 
store, which was considered a viable sample to continue the inclusion of this store as 
an embedded unit in the Groceryco case study.
During the initial meeting the HR Controller of Operations at Head Office only 
identified one store for research access. The researcher was assured that a second 
store for access purposes would be provided shortly. Despite various attempts by the 
researcher via letter and telephone communication a second store was never provided. 
This limited the number of interviews that could be conducted to one store. Access to 
the store was provided by the Store Manager, who acted as the gatekeeper for the 
research. However, after two months of the fieldwork period he was promoted to 
another role at a different location. The gatekeeper role was transferred to the new 
Store Manager (who had previously been the Assistant Store Manager). This transfer 
was arranged by the previous Store Manager and proved very successful until 
September 1996 (8 months into the research project) when this second gatekeeper was 
also transferred to another store. The researcher was telephoned by the second 
gatekeeper to inform her of the name of the new Store Manager at Orpington. He 
however warned the researcher that he doubted the new manager would be very 
supportive of the research. This proved correct, as the new manager did not respond 
to any of the communication from the researcher. While all the interviews had been
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completed at this point, the researcher wished to conduct some follow-up work to 
assess the impact of the managerial changes that had occurred at the store, but was 
unsuccessful in doing so due to the lack of co-operation from the new Store Manager.
7.4.4 
A number of barriers and problems occurred during the fieldwork stage of the Homeco 
case study. Physical access was initially granted by the Personnel Manager of 
Renewals stores, based at Head Office. Homeco was embarking on a project 
considering labour flexibility and productivity issues at the time of the researcher's 
request for access (see appendix four). This was the second occasion that the 
company had attempted to introduce flexibility initiatives - the first attempt had failed 
at the project stage.
The point of contact at head office was designated as a graduate trainee who was also 
working on the flexibility project. She required a monthly summary of the research 
findings to date and regular meetings for updating purposes. Research access was 
agreed for two stores, Fareham and West Thurrock, and the contact details provided. 
However, the contact details of the Store Managers provided by head office were 
incorrect, with the wrong telephone number for the Fareham store, and the wrong 
name of the store manager at the West Thurrock store. This caused problems in 
making initial contact with these managers to discuss the research requirements. Six 
weeks into the fieldwork, the Store Manager at Fareham was seconded to an internal 
company project. The researcher was given the two assistant managers as the point of 
contact for arranging future interviews. However, these managers were reluctant to
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grant research access, despite head office's support of the fieldwork. Subsequently it 
was decided that an alternative store would be advisable and the Personnel Manager 
(Renewals) selected the Oxford store for this purpose. The research process began 
again, with interviews successfully arranged in this store with the requisite managers.
In June 1996 Homeco's flexibility project had internal problems. Due to a lack of 
progress by the company's project team there were moves to abandon the project 
again. The researcher was required to give a presentation outlining her contributions 
to the project, and the findings to date. The purpose of this presentation was to 
persuade the senior managers responsible for the flexibility project to allow continued 
research access, but the researcher's supervisor was refused permission to attend the 
presentation. The researcher secured continued research access to the stores as a 
result of this presentation and remained on site for a further six months. At the point 
of exiting the case study, plans were being made at head office to resurrect the 
company's flexibility project. However, it was considered by the researcher that the 
required data had been collated by this point, and hence was a suitable time for exiting 
the site.
7.5 DATA ANALYSIS
As described in Section 6.5, data analysis was conducted manually using categories 
determined by the research question and objectives derived from an extensive review 
of relevant literature. This 'unitisation' of the data was completed, which resulted in a 
reduction and rearrangement of the data into a more manageable and comprehensive 
form. As stated by Saunders et al (2000):
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"Data collection, data analysis and the development and verification of 
relationships and conclusions are very much an interrelated and interactive set 
of processes. This analysis helps to shape the direction of data collection, 
especially where you are following a grounded theory approach." (p.387)
During the period of data collection and analysis, the research design of this study 
adopted a deductive approach, using a pre-defmed theoretical framework. However, 
during the data analysis stage the researcher found that this did not yield a sufficiently 
convincing answer to the research question and objectives. There were doubts placed 
on the extent to which the findings would make an original contribution to knowledge 
- a key purpose of the research study. As Bryman (1988) argued, the deductive 
approach to research design and data analysis limits the nature of the issues under 
investigation, "as well as the possibility of the theoretical constructs departing 
excessively from the views of the participants in a social setting" (p. 88). Therefore an 
inductive approach to data analysis was considered as an option. This interaction 
allows themes, patterns and relationships to emerge as the data is collected and 
analysed. This enables a flexibility of process, which means data can be re-categorised 
or new categories developed.
During the data collection period, the researcher noted that interviewees provided 
information that had not been categorised within the original deductive approach to the 
research design and analysis. By re-analysing the data inductively themes that had not 
figured prominently in the deductive analysis were revealed as being important issues 
for the interviewees. This analytical strategy was more typical of the grounded 
approach to research where the themes and subsequent theory or explanation emerges 
as a result of the research process (see Section 6.1 for further discussion of the
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grounded theory approach). While Yin (1994) maintained that such an approach was 
a difficult strategy to follow, it was decided that, for the purpose of this research study, 
the data should be re-analysed inductively to give those themes and issues, not 
identified through the deductive approach, the opportunity to emerge. By using the 
grounded approach this would also provided more opportunity to develop sound 
explanations or theory from the fieldwork data.
Strauss and Corbin (1998) outline three steps to analysing qualitative data using the 
grounded theory approach. Open coding refers to the categorisation of data into 
conceptual units. They suggested three main sources to derive names for these 
categories:
1. utilise terms that emerge from the data;
2. utilise terms that are used by the actual research participants;
3. utilise terms used in existing theory and literature.
It is through this process that a narrower focus to an initially broad research question is 
developed (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Using this approach, different issues emerged 
as being of greater importance to the interviewees than those originally defined using 
the deductive approach. The focus of the research study appeared to rest in the role of 
line managers in the management and deployment of human resources, with the 
influence of their choices and constraints emerging as an important issue. This 
included the role of corporate strategy and company policy in determining their 
deployment of human resources; the differences between managers at different levels 
of the case study; and the impact of store level managers' choices and constraints on
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their employee resourcing decisions. As a result a different set of categories emerged 
from the data, as outlined below:
  Case study background information
  Store level management and progression
  Embedded unit (store) background information
  Interviewee characteristics and background information
  Labour use decision making responsibilities and processes
  The influence of corporate strategy on labour use decision making
  The influence of head office over store operations and employee resourcing
  The influence of store level managers on local employee resourcing
Within these categories a number of sub-sections emerged, which came through the 
process of axial coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998). This involved looking for 
relationships between the categories of data that emerged from the open coding. 
Relationships between the management of human resources and the choices and 
constraints of store level managers were developed. This involved the consideration of 
head office control through budgets, technology, strategy and policies. It also 
considered the extent of line managers' autonomy resulting from decentralisation and 
managers' strategies of independence.
The final stage of data analysis is termed 'selective coding' (Strauss and Corbin 1998), 
where:
"the emphasis is placed on recognising the relationships between the principal 
categories which have emerged from this grounded approach in order to 
develop an explanatory theory." (Saunders et al 2000:398)
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The principle theme emerged as the tensions that exist between the centralisation and 
decentralisation of store level managers' responsibilities, and the subsequent impact of 
this on the employee resourcing decision-making process. The relationship between 
this and the sub-categories was then established.
The inductive approach adopted for the data analysis stage meant that the research
study's aims and objectives needed to be re-considered. Consequently the research
question became:
and the original aims of the study redefined as:
  identify the role of local managers in the management of human resources in multiple 
store retailing;
  assess how the choices and constraints of these managers impact on local employee 
resourcing decisions in multiple store retailing.
During this inductive process the weakness of the data collected from the Electrico 
case study was exposed. This could be attributed to two factors, access was only 
granted to one store (despite the researcher's request for two embedded sites); the 
store itself was disproportionately smaller than the stores in the other three case 
studies, which led to only six managers being interviewed. It was decided to omit 
Electrico from the final data analysis stage and writing up of the case studies, because
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the number of interviews conducted in this organisation were too few to enable a 
viable comparison with the other three organisations to take place.
The change in focus of the research as a result of the inductive approach to data 
analysis also necessitated a second literature review. This was to incorporate the new 
focus of the research study and assess where gaps in current knowledge existed to 
ensure the study met its main purpose of making an original contribution to the body 
of knowledge. A full assessment of the literature pertaining to this research has been 
provided in chapters two and five. This section presents a review of the main areas of 
literature, identifying gaps in the literature, and detailing how this study contributes to 
current knowledge.
Employment in retailing has historically been one of the least considered aspects of the 
distributive trades (Doogan 1992; Lowe and Wrigley 1996; Sparks 1987). Yet the 
pivotal role of retailing in today's UK service economy (Rajan 1987), and the scale of 
the sector (Lowe and Crewe 1991), makes understanding retail employment relations 
vital (Freathy and Sparks 1996). Recent research interests in different aspects of retail 
employment is emerging, and many disciplines & approaches need to be incorporated 
into any assessment (Freathy & Sparks 1994, 1995). However, the employment and 
training implications of the changes in the retail industry have been less than well 
documented (Dawson et al 1987; Doogan 1992; Sparks 1983, 1987, 1991). Very little 
research has addressed how changes in the retail industry have impacted upon the 
people most likely to be affected by the changes made to corporate culture and
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strategy (Shackleton 1998). As a result, calls have been made to ensure that further 
analyses of corporate restructuring within UK food retailing should incorporate 
human, as well as economic factors in order to generate an holistic picture of the 
complex processes involved (Shackleton 1998). This research study aims to take that 
more holistic approach to the management of human resources through assessing the 
role of local managers and the factors that influence their HR decision making 
processes.
Marchington (1995a) maintained that one of the major problems with current research 
examining HRM in the retail industry is its tendency to focus on very specific issues, 
rather than adopting a more holistic approach. He argued that a broad theory needed 
to be developed that was capable of analysing corporate strategies and practices, 
employee strategies and practices, the relationship between employers and employees, 
as well as the interaction between managers, employees and the political, social, and 
economic context within which organisations operate. Freathy and Sparks (1995) 
suggested that the most important retail labour issue may not be one of shop-floor 
staff, but one of managerial concerns. Yet "this is a topic that has not received as 
much attention as it deserves" (Freathy and Sparks 1996:182). Therefore the inclusion 
of junior management in this research design facilitates a more in-depth study of 
managerial processes. This is particularly important as junior managers have been 
largely ignored in the literature, especially in terms of HRM (Lowe 1992). This is in 
spite of empirical evidence of the increasing devolution of HRM to line management 
(Armstrong 1989; Bevan and Hayday 1994; Guest 1982; Hill and Pickering 1986;
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Hutchinson 1995; Kinnie 1989; Maund 2001; Sisson and Scullion 1985; Tamkin et al 
1997; Tyson and Fell 1995).
This research study and its accompanying research design aimed to establish the impact 
of head office control over local managers, on the employee resourcing decisions taken 
at store level. This would involve examining both the formation of strategy and policy 
at head office level, as well as implementation at store level. As Marchington and 
Parker (1990) pointed out, research must differentiate between the formulation of 
strategy and its implementation, as well as resistance to management actions. By 
describing strategies without assessing whether or not these operate on the shop floor, 
is "only presenting a partial picture" (p. 74). The methodology of this research study 
examines management decision making at different levels of an organisation, so filling 
the 'partial picture' presented by existing research findings focused at only one level of 
organisations.
To summarise, this research study contributes to the body of knowledge on the 
management of employee resourcing in the retail industry; the role of line managers in 
the management of employee resourcing; and the influence of choices and constraints 
of line managers in their employee resourcing decisions.
7.7 
This section provides an assessment of the research and acknowledges the limitations 
of the data gathered. The selection of site and sample are crucial decisions that can 
affect the viability of the whole study (Marshall and Rossman 1989). However, as
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acknowledged in the research methodology literature, fieldwork is permeated with the 
conflict between what is theoretically desirable and what is practically possible. It has 
even been suggested that researchers should recognise that the reality of undertaking a 
research project may be to consider where access is likely to be gained and to develop 
a topic to fit the nature of that access (Johnson 1975). There is also the recognition 
that requests for access are more likely to be accepted if the amount of time and 
resources required are kept to a minimum (Easterby-Smith et al 1991). The research 
design of this study was ambitious, requesting access over the period of one year to 
embedded sites that operate under very competitive and demanding conditions. While 
this may have deterred some organisations from becoming involved with the study, 
access to four national multiple store retailers was secured. However, these retail 
organisations 'self-selected' to co-operate with the research, and were all concentrated 
in the superstore sector of multiple store retailing. They may not therefore be a 
representative sample of UK multiple store retailers. Further research would need to 
be conducted to enable generalisability of the research findings to the retail industry as 
a whole. However, because this research was grounded in a phenomenological 
approach using qualitative and case study methodology, generalisability was not the 
aim of the thesis.
Working on a longer term project within the retail industry proved difficult because of 
the frequency with which 'gatekeepers' were lost through staff moving to other stores, 
or being seconded onto in-company projects. This had the potential to threaten the 
research study on a number of occasions and the researcher had to rely heavily on the
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relationships established prior to the gatekeeper leaving, or the support of head office, 
to secure continuing access.
Through the case study stores being selected by head office or regional level managers, 
there is the possibility of bias in their choice. Head office may have selected 
'exemplar' stores to cast their organisation in a 'socially desirable' role (Saunders et al 
2000). The researcher was aware of the possible bias that organisational gatekeepers 
could exert in their selection of embedded units, and took the methodological step of 
requesting two stores to minimise these problems.
Through gaining access via head office or regional level, the researcher had to make 
clear to respondents at store level that this was an independent research study. Initially 
the researcher was sometimes greeted with suspicion when first entering the embedded 
sites until relationships and trust between the researcher and the research participants 
had been established. An ideal methodology would have been to relate the results of 
the store level interviews to managers at head office to ascertain their awareness of 
store level managers' activities, and provide a triangulation of results. However, it was 
believed by the researcher that local managers would have been very reluctant to relate 
honestly in the interviews if they were aware that their confidentiality and revelations 
would be revealed to senior management. Therefore, the ideal research design had to 
be compromised in order to ensure maximum validity of the data collected was 
maintained.
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Qualitative research can never be wholly objective, and there can never be a 
'relationship-free' interview (King 1994:15). However, many authors (for example, 
Oakley 1981; Valentine 1997) stress that the value of qualitative research is that the 
researcher can interact and respond with the subject. For the purposes of this study 
the problems of interviews were discussed in Section 6.4.1, and the weaknesses of this 
methodology were minimised as far as possible. The researcher was given full access 
to managers for interviewing purposes, which overcame some elements of bias that 
gatekeepers could exert in their selection of interviewees (Valentine 1997).
Analysing the data using both a deductive and inductive approach proved very time 
consuming, intensive, and reflective. While the results of this process were 
encouraging and worthwhile, it significantly delayed completion of the research study. 
This was particularly so, given that a second literature review had to be conducted at a 
later stage to enable the results of the inductive data analysis process to be linked to 
current knowledge.
This chapter has provided an autobiographical account of the fieldwork conducted for 
this research study. It highlights the practicalities of the research methodologies used, 
and the problems encountered in each of the case study organisations. It takes the 
reader through the process of data analysis and the re-evaluation of the study's 
research aims and objectives. The chapter concluded with an assessment of the 
research, including acknowledgement of the limitations of the data gathered and the 
methodologies employed.
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This chapter presents the findings of the empirical research conducted using the 
embedded case study method. The data gathered provides background information to 
the case study organisation, outlining the nature of store level management and HRM 
in Superco. The chapter examines the choices and constraints of store level managers 
and the consequences of these for the management of human resources.
Superco pic. operates in the multiple grocery retailing sector and was the leading 
supermarket retailer in the UK at the time of this research (1996). It opened its first 
store in 1956, and by 1996 operated 568 branches throughout the UK, employing over 
10,000 people. Superco took over as market leader of the UK grocery retail sector in 
1995, with an annual turnover of £1.2 billion, and profit of £681 million in 1996.
At the time of this empirical research the company was divided into three divisions of 
Head Office, Distribution, and Retail. This research study concentrated on the Retail 
division, which was structured on a regional basis. Twenty four regions in the UK 
were split between eight Regional Directors. Each Regional Director had 
responsibility for up to 24 stores. A Regional Development Manager reported to the 
Regional Director. General Managers of each store reported to the Regional 
Development Manager.
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There were a variety of store formats in operation throughout the Superco branch 
network, which were designed to suit a variety of customer shopping patterns. This 
case study focuses on the superstore format. 'Superstores' are those Superco stores 
over 38,000 square foot representing the company's longest established store format. 
They are generally found in out-of-town locations aimed predominately at customers 
with cars, shopping for their main weekly food and grocery needs. They offer a vast 
range of products, as well as additional services such as pharmacies, dry cleaning and 
petrol garages. The two stores selected for this research study were both of the 
superstore format.
As outlined in Section 6.4 two embedded units were selected for each case study 
organisation. These were stores that were selected by the Regional Development 
Manager on the basis of ease of access and likely co-operation by the General 
Managers (as outlined in Section 7.2).
This store opened in October 1988 and is located in South East London. It was 
viewed as the region's 'flagship' store due to its size and high level of sales. The 
General Manager had been at the store for 8 months having previously managed the 
Lewisham Store. During the period of research (February 1996 to December 1996), 
the store increased its opening hours from 72 to 94 hours per week, opening an hour 
earlier in the morning at 08.00 hours and extending its evening opening from 20.00 to 
21.00 hours. The store had been opening on Sundays since November 1993.
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As can be seen in Table six, the store employed 450 workers, of which over two-thirds 
(71 per cent) worked part time. Just over half (56 per cent) of the workforce were 
female with the majority of part timers being women (65 per cent), and the majority of 
women working part time (83 per cent).
Male
Female
Total
Full time
86 (19.1%)
43 (9.6%)
129(28.7%)
Part time
112 (24.9%)
209 (46.4%)
321 (71.3%)
Total
198 (44.0%)
252 ( 56.0%)
450 (100.0%)
The store had four departments: Customer Services, Trading (Fresh Foods), Trading 
(Ambient), and Personnel, each with a Senior Manager. These managers, together 
with the General Manager, made up the store's senior management team. Under this 
Senior Management Team came responsibility for a number of sections managed by 
Section Managers (see appendix nine for store structure). The largest department in 
the store was Customer Services (because it contained checkouts thus demanding 
highly labour intensive working) with 229 employees. A vast proportion of these were 
female (72 per cent) and part time (89 per cent).
This store was eight years old and also based in South East London. The General 
Manager had been at the store for 7 months having previously managed the Brixton 
store. During the period of research (February 1996 to December 1996), the store
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increased its opening hours from 72 to 100 hours a week through opening an hour 
earlier in the morning at 08.00 hours, and extending its evening opening from 20.00 to 
22.00 hours. The store had been opening on Sundays since November 1993.
As can be seen in Table seven, the store employed 291 workers of which almost two 
thirds (65 per cent) worked part time. Just over half (56 per cent) of the workforce 
were female with the majority of part timers being women (64 per cent), and the 
majority of women working part time (83 per cent).
Male
Female
Total
Full Time
58 (19.9%)
43 (14.8%)
101(34.7%)
Part-time
69 (23.7%)
121 (41.6%)
190(65.3%)
Total
127(43.6%)
164(56.4%)
291 (100.0%)
The store had four departments: Customer Services, Trading (Fresh Foods), Trading 
(Ambient), and Personnel, each with a Senior Manager. These managers, together 
with the General Manager, made up the store's senior management team. Under this 
Senior Management Team came responsibility for a number of sections managed by 
Section Managers (see appendix nine for store structure). As in the Surrey Quays 
store, the largest department was Customer Services with 143 employees, and the 
largest proportion of employees in this department were female and worked part time.
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The chapter from here onwards will be a discussion of the two case stores using 
empirical data gathered between February 1996 and December 1996. This was 
collected via a series of 26 face-to-face semi-structured interviews with managers at 
both head office and store level, and an examination of company documentation (as 
outlined in chapters six and seven).
Superco was committed to creating shareholder value through an innovative customer 
focused strategy. Increased competitive pressures and the economic recession of the 
early 1990s led to Superco reviewing their corporate strategy in 1991. Already 
pursuing a cost minimisation strategy, Superco introduced customer service to the 
heart of their competitive strategy. The revised strategy emphasised both quality 
enhancement and cost reduction, particularly in terms of offering a high standard of 
customer service, as well as low prices.
From 1991 onwards it was the company's plan to achieve a competitive advantage by 
maximising its ability to give customer satisfaction through improved product ranges, 
customer service and store formats, together with the use of loyalty cards. Corporate 
strategy was based on the following principles:
1. A commitment to providing customers with quality products at low prices.
2. An aim to provide first class customer service through a unique package of options.
3. Increasing and maintaining customer loyalty with the continual development and use of 
a loyalty card.
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4. Working closely with suppliers to offer the highest quality products with the widest 
possible range.
5. Investing in existing stores and developing flexible store formats to give customers the 
very best shopping experience. 
(Annual Report 1997:2)
Previous research has also found an association between the rise of customer service as 
an important facet of the retail business, and the competitive edge that can be gained 
(Gardner and Sheppard 1989). Superco's commitment to customer service was a very 
public and consistent strategy supported by an extensive company-wide training 
package, as also found by Legge (1995), which facilitated its clear communication to 
shop-floor staff This new focus meant the company promoted its commitment to 
customers and emphasised that competition with the rest of the grocery retail sector 
was heavily based on the level and quality of customer service:
"The customer service in our stores gives us the edge over our competitors." 
(Annual Report, 1996:10) 
During his interview the Retail Personnel and Training Director at Head Office
revealed the extent of Superco's commitment to its customers:
"We completely changed our attitude towards customers and put them at the 
forefront of everything we do rather than as an afterthought as they were 
previously treated."
Previous research has identified the importance of customer service in retail 
competitive strategies, which gained prevalence during the 1990s (Doogan 1992; 
Freathy and Sparks 2000; Gardner and Sheppard 1989; Ruston 1999; Sparks 1992c). 
Pledges were made to Superco's customers, through the 'First Class Service' initiative, 
and Superco stated that:
''**"-
A ''':''--,
<.' >
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"a key business priority is to provide First Class Service to the customer" 
(Annual Report 1996:3) 
As Sparks (1992c) predicted, customers will increasingly reject inadequate service
provision, which will force multiple store retailers to continue to apply customer 
service as a key strategic tool. In 1995 the company introduced initiatives to reduce 
checkout queues. A promise was made to customers that if more than one person was 
ahead of them at the checkout another till would be opened until all tills were staffed. 
As a result staff from all departments were trained as cashiers to cope with any peaks 
in demand, which amounted to a multi-skilling of the shop-floor workforce.
One method employed by Superco to increase customer service levels and customer 
satisfaction was the introduction of a loyalty card. Superco believed that earning the 
loyalty of customers made a vital contribution to their performance:
"everything we do is aimed at encouraging our customers, new and old, to stay 
with us and maintain their loyalty" (Annual Report, 1995: 10). 
The loyalty card was launched nationwide in February 1995 and Superco claimed it
was a "new and sensitive way of listening to customers and giving them a better 
service" (Annual Report, 1995:2).
At the same time as improving customer service, Superco was also pursuing a cost 
minimisation strategy. Previous research has also found an emphasis on cost 
minimisation in retail strategy, particularly in the food retailing sector (Christopherson 
1996; Freathy and Sparks 1996; Ogbonna and Wilkinson 1988; Ogbonna and Whipp 
1999). As Legge (1995) found, increased cost controls often accompany quality 
initiatives in retailing. Being a publicly quoted company Superco was not owned and 
controlled by those in charge of its day-to-day running (Sparks 1989). Added to the
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highly competitive nature of the retail industry, a strong share price was a key priority 
for Superco (Freathy & Sparks 1996; Legge 1995). Despite Mintzberg's (1989:365) 
dismissal of the notion of "shareholder value", Superco made it clear to shareholders 
that the costs of investment in customer service would be offset by improvements in 
productivity:
"we will ..... continue to improve on our First Class Service..........the cost of
this is some £20m. We have set ourselves the task to offset a large part of this 
by productivity initiatives." (Annual Report, 1996: 23).
Efforts to improve productivity and cut costs throughout the business were reflected in 
a reduction in labour costs between 1995 and 1996, so that wages as a percentage of 
sales reduced by 0.2 per cent to 9.7 per cent. In the same period profits increased by 
14.5 per cent, and dividends per share by 11.6 per cent (Annual Report 1996). This 
highlights the cost minimisation approach adopted by Superco to fund its 'First Class 
Service'. Superco was concerned with efficiency, which Mintzberg (1989) found 
meant favouring tangible measurements at the expense of intangible benefits. Existing 
literature supports Mintzberg, outlining how an emphasis on short-term profitability in 
the UK often equates to managers enforcing quick-fix solutions, ignoring any long 
term and social consequences of their actions (Burnes 2000; Storey and Sisson 1993 a, 
1993b) and producing a focus on 'hard' versions of HRM (Ogbonna and Whipp 1999).
Using Porter's (1985) framework of competitive strategies it can be seen that on the 
one hand Superco was pursuing a 'cost-reduction strategy' through its aim to provide 
customers with competitively priced goods. At the same time Superco was seeking 
Porter's 'quality enhancement strategy' through its aim to provide customers with high 
quality goods from a wide range, first class levels of customer service, and innovative
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store formats. Such a contradiction between strategy and store operations has been 
previously noted (Doogan 1992; Gardner and Sheppard 1989; Lowe and Crewe 1996, 
Ogbonna 1992; Ogbonna and Whipp 1999; Shackleton 1998; Sparks 1992c, 2000a). 
Gardner and Sheppard (1989) concluded that the current strategies of multiple store 
retailers are "at best flawed and at worse suspicious" (p.207). The realities of 
Superco's conflicting corporate strategy at operational level will be examined in 
Section 8.8.
To fulfil this study's research objectives, the nature of store level management at 
Superco was explored during the data-gathering period. A major re-structuring 
process in 1991 altered the nature of all store level managers' roles and responsibilities 
Superco pursued a de-layering exercise of the store management hierarchy that led to 
the deletion of two management levels. This de-layering at store level is a common 
theme across multiple store retailers, particularly in the superstore sector (Sparks 
2000a, 2000b). Assistant Store Managers were replaced by a Senior Store 
Management team, while at the lower level, supervisory roles were removed and their 
responsibilities transferred to newly created 'Section Managers'. This left two 
hierarchical store management levels. This trend of de-layering to two management 
levels in stores was also found by Sparks (2000b).
The creation of a Senior Management Team for each store (see section 8.2) formally 
positioned the General Manager on the same hierarchical level as other senior
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managers in the organisational structure. In practice however, it was assumed 
throughout Superco that the General Manager had overall management control of a 
store. Senior Managers were responsible for their specific departments and Section 
Managers, as well as taking responsibility as Duty Manager (acting as General 
Manager in their absence) when required. In some stores Night Managers would form 
part of the senior management team while in others they had the same status as a 
Section Manager. In the Surrey Quays and Lewisham store the latter applied. In 
smaller stores one individual carried out the dual roles of Customer Services Manager 
and Personnel Manager, although this was not applicable to either the Surrey Quays or 
Lewisham stores due to their large size.
Section Managers formed the junior store management tier. Each member of the 
senior management team was responsible for his or her own department within the 
store. These departments were divided into sections with a manager responsible for 
one or more of these sections. The quantity of section managers in each store was 
determined at head office and based on store size and turnover. Section managers 
were responsible for the day to day management of their section and its employees. 
The de-layering initiative of 1991 effectively increased the span of control for Section 
Managers. This was accompanied by an increase in salary in acknowledgement of this 
job enlargement. This is in conflict with Mintzberg's (1983) conclusions that first-line 
supervisors "cannot really be called managers" (p. 127).
All management positions in the two Superco case study stores were full time, a 
feature of retail employment also found by Freathy and Sparks (2000). Management
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positions had always traditionally been full time and most managers considered part 
timers to be unsuitable for promotion, as also found by Hunter and Maclnnes (1991), 
and Walsh (1990). Robinson (1990) found that retail employers emphasised perceived 
problems of promoting part timers, which had the effect of limiting promotion for part 
timers beyond a certain level (see also Tilly 1992). This was clearly evident at Superco 
where the company generally did not promote part time employees. There was one 
exception to this at the Surrey Quays store where a Checkouts Section Manager, who 
had previously worked full time, had been granted permission to reduce her hours for 
personal reasons.
The majority of managers at the case study stores were male, particularly at the senior 
level. Despite Superco's equal opportunities commitment, there appeared to be 
evidence of a 'glass ceiling' in operation. Although Superco had a predominately 
female workforce, only one third of the store level management positions, in the two 
case study stores, were held by women. Women tended to be in management positions 
in occupations which were gendered female and where a largely female workforce 
reported to them. This supports previous research findings that women are 
disproportionately represented within the lowest management and occupational grades 
in multiple store retailing (Broadbridge 1995, 1996, 1998; Collins 1990; Craig and 
Wilkinson 1985; Dawson et al 1987; Freathy 1993; Freathy and Sparks 2000; Hansard 
Society Commission 1990; Howe 1992; MacEwan Scott 1992; Sparks 1991, 1992a).
Freathy and Sparks (1996) found that senior and middle managers at store level 
generally have relatively secure conditions of employment, with structured career paths
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to pursue. This was patent at Superco where promotion for senior store level 
managers was via a succession of different departments and stores. They were 
required to have a variety of experience at senior management level as a condition of 
becoming a General Manager. As part of management development and career 
progression senior managers were moved from store to store within their region with 
considerable frequency, as also found by Doogan (1992). They were promoted via 
roles in progressively larger stores until being located in one of Superco's 'flagship' 
stores, such as Surrey Quays. This could also explain women's low representation at 
senior store management level, as geographical mobility would prove a difficult criteria 
for many working mothers to fulfil.
The senior managers of both Surrey Quays and Lewisham stores were a combination 
of graduate entry and internally promoted employees. Recruits onto the Graduate 
Trainee Retail Management Scheme began their careers with Superco at Senior Store 
Management level. Four of the ten senior managers in the case study stores were 
graduates, and all were based at Surrey Quays. This store was viewed as one of the 
region's 'flagship' stores and where the company aimed to promote its most successful 
managers. Consequently, graduate trainees who were considered to be of high 
potential, were more likely to be based here. It was a mark of esteem to be promoted 
to this store, as described below by the store's Personnel Manager:
"Both myself and Gareth [the General Manager] find it funny that our ambition 
was to end up at the Quays - and we both achieved it at the same time."
It appeared from the senior management profile that Superco was increasingly looking 
towards graduates to form its senior store management teams, particularly in their
171
'flagship' stores. This accords with previous research, which has noted the increasing 
employment of graduate trainees in multiple store retailing in an effort to 
professionalise the managerial workforce (Hendry and Pettigrew 1987; Ogbonna 1993; 
Freathy and Sparks 2000). As Bell (1973), and Crouch (1997) predicted, the new 
'elite' workforce (Levering 1990) of the retail industry is being increasingly recruited 
from the external labour market, with pre-market education an important qualification.
In contrast to senior store level managers, Section Managers were more likely to join 
Superco as school-leavers, or from other retail organisations, and promoted from the 
level of General Assistant. This supports previous research that has found a social and 
educational gap between qualified middle managers and unqualified supervisors (Child 
and Partridge 1982; Ogbonna 1993). The progression from sales floor to a 
supervisory position has been a traditional promotional path for secondary workers in 
the retail industry (Freathy 1993). However, as Freathy (1993) noted, these more 
junior managers tend to have limited opportunities to progress through the 
management hierarchy. This was evident at Superco where promotional opportunities 
for Section Managers were limited. This was compounded by the increasing 
employment of graduates directly to Senior Management positions, confirming a 
potential polarisation of the retail managerial workforce at store level.
To consider the role of store level managers in the execution of HR policies and 
employee resourcing practices, it is important to examine the nature of HRM at both 
corporate and operational level. Current literature on HRM in multiple store retailing
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points to a number of key trends including a poor regard for the HR profession; a low 
level of trade union membership and recognition; poor training and development of 
hourly paid sales assistants; and strategies aimed at labour efficiency. Consequently, 
much of the literature concludes that multiple store retailers tend to focus on 'hard' 
HRM techniques, although more progressive organisations are beginning to recognise 
the value of a 'softer' HRM approach.
It has been argued that to ensure human resource activities are built into the fabric of 
corporate strategy HRM directors should be on the board, or at least the executive 
committee of the business unit (Walker 1992). The Personnel Director at Superco had 
full director status as a member of Superco's Board. To some extent this should have 
ensured that employment issues were considered as corporate strategy was developed. 
However, Truss et al (1997) found more evidence of'one-way' linkage (Golden and 
Ramanujan 1985) in organisations, where business strategy informs HR strategy, but 
not vice versa.
Superco's company literature emphasised a 'soft' approach to HRM:
"The driving force is our staff, who have done a sterling job in all parts of the 
company. Wherever we go people tell us how brilliant our staff are and how 
well they look after customers. We are determined to improve opportunities 
for their training and development, as well as offer them one of the best pay 
and benefits packages in the retail sector." 
(Superco Chairman in Annual Report, 1996: 3) 
It would appear that senior managers at Superco's head office believed investment in
its workforce was a key contributor to competitive success. This was supported in an 
interview conducted with the Retail Personnel and Training Director (who reported 
directly to the Personnel Director) when he identified a number of employment
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challenges facing Superco. However, these responses presented a greater emphasis on 
cost minimisation than the company literature - a feature characteristic of 'hard' HRM:
1. The issue of increasing productivity levels at minimum cost, particularly as the 
company paid a higher rate of pay than other food retailers.
2. The need to negotiate widely with trade unions as the company had a higher than 
average trade union representation for the food retail sector.
3. The need to balance the ratio of full time and part time employees effectively against 
the company's demands for a high level of customer service.
4. The need to ensure that where job cuts occurred those jobs cuts were legitimate as 
opposed to having the same number of employees undertaking the same or even an 
increased level of workload.
The Retail Personnel and Training Director outlined how Superco believed that a 
greater level of work force stability was needed to enable the company to provide a 
first class service to customers, and effectively manage its employment challenges. As 
a large employer of part timers, head office considered the effective balance between 
the ratio of full time and part time employees to be one of Superco's major challenges. 
The company wanted to increase the number of full time employees, and encourage the 
employment of longer-hour part timers, to create greater workforce stability and meet 
organisational goals. He believed that staff working longer hours would be more 
committed to Superco, and to fulfilling its competitive strategy of improving customer 
service:
"If we employ more full timers, or at least longer hour part timers, we can 
deliver our customer service promises because we will have staff genuinely 
committed to Superco. At the same time we will reduce the costs of high 
labour turnover and poor commitment associated with shorter hour part timers 
and temporary workers."
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He acknowledged there was a conflict between this strategy and consumer shopping 
habits. Customers were demanding longer opening hours, a higher quality of customer 
service, and competitively priced products, that would all potentially add to Superco's 
costs. Superco was therefore pursuing a high quality customer service strategy 
through the employment of full timers while attempting to keep costs to a minimum. 
This could appear superficially at least to generate a conflict of interests for store level 
managers attempting to implement this policy, as will be discussed later.
To satisfy Superco's cost minimisation element of its corporate strategy, head office 
was considering cost effective methods to cover longer store opening hours. It 
developed a 'minimum hours contract' where employees were guaranteed between 10- 
16 core, regular working hours each week, but needed to be available for up to 31 
hours each week. These contracts were made available to stores for deployment in 
May 1996. Neathey and Hurstfield (1995), and Purcell and Purcell (1999) concluded 
that the use of minimum hours contracts would result in further fragmentation of 
working hours with employees on such contracts forming the true 'peripheral' 
workforce of the retail industry. This again highlights a potential incompatibility 
between the company's employment policies. Superco's goal of greater workforce 
stability and commitment through the employment of more full timers, would seem to 
be at odds with the introduction of minimum hours contracts. As Blyton and Morris 
(1992) commented, there is a potential conflict between flexibility and the pursuit of 
'soft' HRM policies. However, Superco's Retail Personnel and Training Director 
believed the minimum hours contracts complemented their goal to increase full time 
and longer hour part time working:
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" We don't want to demand huge amounts of flexibility from all our staff 
because that would be very disruptive and cause feelings of insecurity, which is 
the complete opposite of what we actually want to achieve. However we do 
suffer from peaks and troughs in our trading and some difficulties in predicting 
employment needs. Yet only about 20 per cent of our business falls into this 
category and so we really only need flexibility from 20 per cent of our 
workforce. Therefore while we introduce minimum hour working we are 
actually promoting greater workforce stability for the vast majority of our 
workforce."
(Retail Personnel Director, Head Office) 
However, the impact of these conflicting messages was yet to emerge at operational
level due to their very recent introduction at the time of this research study.
Methods to encourage employee commitment included profit related reward schemes. 
Employees were encouraged to become involved in the financial performance of the 
company to increase the motivation and commitment of employees through a variety 
of schemes. The principle scheme was the employee profit-related scheme, open to 
both full time and part time employees with more than two years' service, who 
received shares worth the equivalent of 4.15 per cent of their salary.
Further attempts to increase employee commitment and participation was an 
improvement in organisational communication to enable employees to feel more 
involved with the company and their jobs. Internal communications were designed to 
ensure that employees were well informed about the company. These included regular 
open forums held within each store where staff were encouraged to question senior 
store management about company issues. Superco also made use of an employee 
attitude survey called "ViewPoint" which sought opinions on such aspects as quality of 
working life, sense of appreciation, satisfaction of training levels, and opinions about
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management style. More traditional forms of employee communication such as regular 
departmental meetings, staff notice boards, and a company magazine were also used.
However, of all these policies and procedures, head office could provide no written 
record of their existence, except in areas such as equal opportunities and Health and 
Safety (i.e. where a legal requirement existed). While the corporate strategy of quality 
enhancement and cost minimisation was widely published, the implications of this on 
Superco's management of its workforce was less prolific. Superco had no formal, 
explicit, written employment strategy. All information for this research study 
regarding employment strategy came from the Retail Personnel and Training Director 
who could offer little written documentation on the subject:
"All we have for our stores is a twelve point guide to best practice in managing 
human resources. We don't like to direct them explicitly because they should 
know how best to manage their employees."
Employment policies were communicated to the workforce using a 'cascade' system 
that began at head office and ran through Superco's management hierarchy until it 
reached operational level. This places in doubt the rational, matching models of 
strategic HRM literature and makes the study of line managers' execution of 
employment policies imperative to understanding the reality of HRM practice at 
operational level.
Previous research (for example Neathey and Hurstfield 1995; Tamkin et al 1997; 
Tomlinson et al 1997) has found that multiple store retailers are most likely to devolve 
responsibility for HRM as far down the line as possible. This would suggest that the 
role of any manager at store level demands significant HR skills, for which specialist
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training would be required (Tomlinson et al 1997). Store level managers at Superco 
did indeed have substantial responsibility for the management of human resources, 
much of which was devolved to the lowest level of management. Section Managers 
were responsible for local employee resourcing decisions, such as recruitment and 
selection, on the job training, staff scheduling, and the delegation of tasks (see also 
Hutchinson 1995; Maund 2001; Mullins 1999). The centralisation of control, evident 
in multiple store retailing, has led to a focus for store level managers on managing the 
store's workforce, and this remains their one area of relative autonomy (Sparks 
2000b).
Section Managers had responsibility for nearly all the recruitment and selection of new 
staff. They determined the vacancy, conducted the short listing, interviewing, and final 
selection of candidates, although confined to head office budgets. Section Managers 
submitted a vacancy request which the General Manager would accept or reject 
according to the budget position. Store level Personnel Managers would assist with 
placing the vacancy advertisement, and the initial shortlisting of candidates via their 
application forms. They would only become involved in interviews for hourly paid 
sales assistants if specifically requested by the requisite Section Manager.
Although each store had a Training Manager, Section Managers had day-to-day 
responsibility for the training and development of new staff. The store's Training 
Manager was responsible for delivering the 'First Class Service' training packages 
devised by head office, as well as conducting a corporate induction programme for all 
new starters. However, once completed all on-the-job training was conducted at
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Section level. Training was an area where tangible measurement and contribution to 
organisational success was difficult to measure. Therefore head office was unable to 
control training through measurement, and conceded responsibility for on-the-job 
training to store level. This is in contrast to Smith's (1988) findings where he found 
the content of training was set centrally to ensure consistency.
Responsibility for scheduling employees' working hours formed a large part of Section 
Managers' role:
"Section managers have responsibility for staff working hours because they are 
the ones who manage the employees." (Training Manager) 
It was here that Section Managers had a higher degree of autonomy being responsible
for deciding staffing hours for all their employees. The organisation of employees' 
working time has been found to have a significant impact on productivity, motivation 
and performance (Arrowsmith and Sisson 2000), thus highlighting the importance of 
this role.
The organisational restructuring in 1991 altered the role of store Personnel Managers. 
As a consequence they formed part of the senior management team, and so were 
required to act as Duty Managers for a significant proportion of their working week. 
Those individuals undertaking the role of Personnel Manager at the two case study 
stores had no personnel specific experience or qualifications. The role was perceived 
no differently to the other senior management roles. This scenario has the potential of 
undermining the importance of personnel-related activities at store level. Such 
demotion of personnel professionals in multiple store retailing is not uncommon (Howe 
1992; Sparks 1992a, 1992b; Tomlinson et al 1997). This would suggest that store
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level managers, particularly section managers, had a wide responsibility for the 
function of HR, particularly employee resourcing. The extent and execution of this 
responsibility will be examined in more detail in Section 8.8.
The objectives of this research study have been to examine the influence of line 
managers' choices and constraints on their management of human resources. As 
Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) pointed out, "making choices within parameters is 
central to the managerial role" (p.86). It is therefore important to consider the 
constraints of store level management in each case study organisation, and assess the 
impact of these limitations on local employee resourcing decisions. This is imperative 
given Kinnie's (1989) criticism that relatively little attention has been paid to changes 
in control systems and the impact of this on HRM.
As outlined in Chapter five, there are many methods of control that can be used to 
restrict the decision making powers of store level managers. These systems of control 
can either direct processes, or dictate output. Ways to achieve this in multiple store 
retailing include the implementation of corporate strategy, the design of the formal 
organisational structure, the setting of performance targets and budgets or the 
deployment of technology. According to Stewart (1982) corporate strategy 
determines the demands of a managers' job. Superco's competitive strategy was 
premised on a combination of cost minimisation and quality enhancement, as outlined 
in Section 8.3. This impacted on store level operations in a number of ways, and 
informed Superco's control systems, as will be described in Sections 8.61 to 8.6.3.
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The size and structure of an organisation can significantly influence the nature of its 
control systems (Child 1984; Mintzberg 1989; Ogbonna and Whipp 1999; Sparks 
2000b; Smith 1988). Superco was a very large organisation, operating both in the UK 
and overseas. Its increase in size and market share was accompanied by a 
centralisation of control, supporting previous research findings (for example, Ogbonna 
and Whipp 1999; Sparks 2000b; Smith 1988). This escalation of centralised control 
was driven by a need to make cost savings and ensure consistency throughout the 
stores:
"Superco has definitely become more professional over recent years. It has a 
clear customer service strategy, which has been effectively communicated to 
employees and customers alike, but is tightly managed by head office." 
(Section Manager) 
This centralisation process is well described in current literature (for example Sparks
2000a), with many store management activities and functions being transferred to head 
office in multiple store retailing organisations.
There was evidence at Superco of a close monitoring and co-ordination of store 
activities, particularly through the use of budgets and technology (as discussed in 
Sections Head office controlled store operations through the 
formulation of strategy, imposing directives and systems that monitored store 
performance, thus defining the limits for store level managers. There were some 
aspects of store operations where head office maintained complete control in the 
decision-making process, such as a stores' opening hours. Another centralised process 
was the management of stock with head office taking control of ordering and pricing. 
The structure of stores was also determined by head office management, including the
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re-structuring initiative of 1991. It became clear that the day-to-day management of 
employees and customer service were the only functional areas in which store level 
managers had some degree of autonomy and could impose their individual 
management styles, with a more significant input into the decision-making processes. 
The reduction in the decision-making responsibilities of store level managers led to 
local managers occupying a low position in the multiple chain of command in multiple 
store retailing organisations (Broadbridge 1998; Doogan 1992; Smith 1988).
Superco demonstrated characteristics of Mintzberg's (1989) 'machine' configuration 
in deploying rational processes of management control over its operations. These 
elements of control emphasise the machine nature of Superco, with cost minimisation, 
and the standardisation of work processes, key features of its control systems. As 
Stewart (1991) commented retail chain stores commonly exercise control by 
standardisation and specialisation. Subsequently, store level managers have a degree 
of autonomy, but within defined limits set by head office. This concurs with Smith's 
(1988) conclusions that the majority of multiple store retailers, particularly in the 
grocery sector, can be described as 'machine bureaucracies', using Mintzberg's (1989) 
organisational typologies. This will be further examined in Sections and 
when the use of budgets and technology, to constrain store level managers' decision 
making powers, is considered.
Managers at head office were very detached from the realities of store operations, and 
so relied on information from management information systems to make decisions, and
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maintain control. This problem of detachment was acknowledged by the Retail 
Personnel and Training Director:
"Head office is very remote and distant from the stores and this link needs to be 
improved." 
Mintzberg (1989) put forward a typology of levels and corresponding management
styles, which closely matched Superco. At the top of Superco's management hierarchy 
the 'thinnest' management approach was evident with managing by information the 
predominant method of control. This passive role of management was criticised by 
Mintzberg as merely a reviewing role with an emphasis on delegation and 
authorisation. This accords with head office managers at Superco who often stayed in 
their offices and used their authority to dictate bottom-line performance. Meanwhile 
Senior Store Management managed both through people and by information. Section 
Managers were both managing action and through people at the 'thickest' point of the 
management hierarchy. They held a leading role for their staff, particularly at group 
and individual level. However, they were also deeply involved in the management of 
their section's activities, continuing to do the regular work of General Assistants. This 
exacerbated the degree of 'thin' management at head office as they were unaware of 
the realities of store operations which provoked a divergence between head office and 
store level managers. Such an absence of mutuality was highlighted by Rawson (1997) 
when he talked of the divide between senior and middle managers.
A dichotomy between management hierarchies was also apparent at store level. There 
appeared to be a higher level of respect and loyalty for head office and their directives 
from Senior Store Managers, than Section Managers. Senior Store Managers saw the 
achievement of head office demands as the key to their own personal career
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progression. As Walters and Hanrahan (2000) found, store managers are often 
measured against budgetary performance despite having very little control over major 
expenses. This accords with Legge's (2000) conclusions that management seek ways 
to demonstrate loyalty and commitment in the hope of "improving their chances of 
achieving the diminished prospect of promotion" (p. 51). Conversely, Section 
Managers were more critical of head office and its lack of understanding of store 
operations. It was at the level of Section Manager where the realities of enhanced 
service and efficiency drives were most acutely felt. They had to transact head office 
customer service and productivity initiatives to their staff on a day-to-day basis while 
faced with the reality of managing their departments for longer opening hours without 
supervisory support. While they held significant responsibilities, particularly regarding 
local employee resourcing, they were not afforded the perks of senior management, 
but worked mainly on the shop-floor alongside the hourly paid sales assistants. They 
seemed to relate more closely with the level of General Assistant than senior store 
management. This was exacerbated by the fact that many were promoted from the 
level of General Assistant, particularly as an increasing number of Senior-Store 
Managers were direct entry graduate trainees.
It can be seen that the formal organisational structure and increasing centralisation of 
control had a significant impact on the constraints of store level managers. This was 
intensified by the divergence between head office and stores, resulting in 'thick' and 
'thin' management styles.
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A key aspect of Superco's corporate strategy was cost minimisation. The company 
promised its customers low prices, and its shareholders high returns on their 
investment. As outlined in the literature (for example Mintzberg 1983, 1989; Mullins 
1999; Piper 1980; Stewart 1999) bureaucratic organisations commonly use accounting 
control systems, setting easily identifiable performance levels such as sales, costs and 
profits. Managers at store level were acutely aware of the cost-cutting mechanisms 
and productivity initiatives imposed by head office.
The biggest constraint placed on store operations by head office was the imposition of 
budgets and performance targets. These were a tangible method of control, and easily 
measurable, publicly defining store level managers' limits (Stewart 1991). Budgets 
allowed head office to maintain a significant element of control over stores. 
Armstrong (1989) and Kinnie (1989) outlined this dominance of accountancy-driven 
managerial control systems in UK businesses, with retail head offices increasingly 
controlling stores through financial management systems. Store level managers were 
responsible for delivering performance targets within the constraints of increasing 
budgetary pressures.
The increasing demands made on the operational level at Superco were attributed to 
the need to maintain the company's position as market leader in the face of ever- 
increasing competition:
"The company has become more ruthless. Their reputation has improved 
dramatically and they are fighting to keep the Number 1 retailer spot. They are 
forever devising new ways to cut costs in order to stay there, although they 
have diverted some of these savings towards improved customer service." 
(Produce Manager)
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One example of this was the management of extended store opening hours. In order to 
make cost-savings the longer opening hours imposed by head office were claimed by 
store level managers to be accompanied by a decrease in budgets for staffing:
"The budget has been cut by 12% this year even though we're opening for 
longer than we ever have before." (General Manager)
Superco appeared to be more concerned with cutting the tangible costs of labour than 
employee welfare, a trend also identified in previous research (for example, Burnes 
2000; Legge 1995; Mintzberg 1989; Sisson 1994). The impact of the productivity 
initiatives described in the company's Annual Report were clearly evident at store 
level. Employees were expected to work at higher rates of efficiency in order for head 
office to continue the trend of reducing wage costs as a percentage of sales. This 
highlights the 'thin' nature of management at head office, detached from the realities of 
store operations, believing that the efficiency drives did not negatively impact on 
employees' working lives. In addition to this, the Retail Personnel and Training 
Director stressed the importance of ensuring any job cuts did not result in an increased 
workload for remaining staff (see Section 8.5). However, this was disputed by 
managers at store level, who believed workloads had increased significantly over 
recent years:
"The company expects more from its employees to improve customer service 
and beat off the competition, but they are confined to the same budgets so we 
just have to work harder." (Provisions Manager)
Marginson et al (1993) found that the increasing emphasis placed on financial 
disciplines, as a form of control, encouraged employees to identify a direct link 
between achieving financial targets and future employment security. This accords with 
Goold and CampbelFs (1987) financial control model of management, in which control
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is exercised through the tight monitoring of performance and achievement of cost 
targets. This was apparent at Superco where the main control system exerted by Head 
office was financial and store level managers placed their priority on keeping within 
budgets, however difficult and constraining this made their management tasks.
Financial control systems were also extended to the management of human resources 
at store level. Where labour could be quantified head office set budgets and targets 
restricting store level managers' autonomy in managing the workforce. The amount of 
labour a store could deploy was determined by head office. A non-conformance team 
from head office visited stores and allocated a staffing allowance to each section. 
Hence, the ability of store level managers to resource their sections was controlled by 
head office. This approach was particularly consistent with 'harder' versions of HRM 
where attempts are made to measure human resources, as also found by Legge (1995) 
and Storey (1992). This led store level managers to place their priorities on achieving 
budgets and performance targets with the consequence of making the management of 
human resources very difficult for store level managers:
"When the department is run so tightly there is no leeway. This makes it really 
tough during the holiday season when people are away and there's little money 
to pay for overtime." (Bakery Manager) 
It is apparent that where human resources were quantifiable head office at Superco
maintained the greatest control. As a result store level managers focused their efforts 
on the achievement of financial targets and an emphasis on 'hard' HRM.
Multiple store retailers have been found to use technology to standardise the retail 
process and make cost savings (Tordjman 1994; Walters and Hanrahan 2000). The
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impact of this new technology has been a further centralisation of control, transferring 
power from stores to head office (Child 1984; Houlton and Thomas 1990; Huczynski 
and Buchanan 2001; Lloyd and Rawlinson 1992; Ogbonna 1992; Smith 1988). The 
consequences of this for store level management at Superco was explored during the 
interviews.
In Superco, advances in technology, especially the Electronic Point of Sale (EPOS), 
enabled head office to increasingly centralise store level functions, as predicted by 
previous research (Child 1984; Houlton and Thomas 1990; Ogbonna 1992; Smith 
1988). Those elements of customer service that were quantifiable, were subject to 
standardisation of output through performance targets, measured using technology. 
The 'First Class Service' initiative placed greater demands on stores particularly the 
'One-in-Front' pledge. This quantification of customer service standards enabled head 
office to exploit technology to measure store performance in achieving this target. 
When prompted by the system, cashiers were expected to manually input the number 
of customers queuing at their checkout. Using this data, regional 'league tables' were 
produced publicising the performance achievements of each store. This use of 
technology to compare performance across organisations was noted by Lusch and 
Dunne (1990). Brockbank and Airey (1994b) argued that this encouraged career- 
conscious retail managers to present only evidence of effective performance to 
managers. Store level managers had to use these 'One-In-Front' league tables to 
adjust staffing schedules, to ensure Superco's commitment to its customers was being 
met. This impacted on employee working hours as stores struggled to meet this 
increased demand for improved customer service:
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"We had to change employees' hours last June and we had a nightmare, an 
absolute nightmare. The store had a very bad history of service levels and it 
involved talking to people to change their hours in order to provide a better 
standard of customer service. All the changes were agreed amicably with the 
changes affecting approximately 120 employees in all." (Customer Service 
Manager) 
This concurs with Mintzberg's (1989) concern that efficiency drives often lead to a
disregard for 'social benefits', such as quality of working life. Here employees' 
working hours were changed in order to provide the tangible features of customer 
service. These performance targets were more readily measurable, via technology, and 
thus of more importance to 'thin' managers at head office.
Much has been written in the literature about the role of EPOS in multiple store 
retailing. Many (for example, Deery and Mahoney 1994; Freathy and Sparks 1994; 
Sparks 1987, 2000b; Tomlinson et al 1997) argue that EPOS enables retailers to match 
working time more closely and produce integrated staff scheduling systems. However, 
at the time of the research (1996) Superco was only beginning to pilot a computerised 
scheduling system for Checkouts. This does however demonstrate further attempts by 
head office to increase its control of store operations, making use of advancements in 
technology. It was an area where 'thin' managers at head office identified an 
opportunity to further centralise store operations, and quantify the use of labour. This 
removal of store level responsibilities to central control, as a result of improved 
technology, was also found by Ogbonna (1992), and supports Braverman's (1974) de- 
skilling thesis.
Superco's head office was primarily concerned with the measurable or 'hard' aspects 
of HRM, namely labour costs. Technology was increasing the ability to regulate the
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use of labour at store level. This adheres to Mintzberg's 'machine' configuration, with 
the technostructure playing an increasingly important role in the organisation's 
structure, and fulfils Gershuny's (1987) and, Rajan's (1987), prediction that demand 
for technology in the retail industry will significantly increase.
8.7 STORE LEVEL MANAGERS' AUTONOMY
Although Superco can be described as a machine bureaucracy, its geographical 
dispersion meant it also displayed characteristics of Mintzberg's (1989) diversified 
organisation. Multiple store retailers necessarily require a degree of decentralisation 
arising from their size and the geographical dispersion of stores (Child 1984; Mullins 
1999; Stewart 1999). This can give rise to areas of autonomy for local managers, 
particularly those at senior store management level. The extent of autonomy for store 
level managers at Superco was dependent upon the degree of formal decentralisation 
within the formal organisational structure. It also became clear that store level 
managers were manipulating their areas of autonomy to try and maintain independence 
from head office control.
A major cause of tension at Superco, between managers at store level and those at 
head office, was the degree of centralisation. This is a typical feature of Mintzberg's 
diversified organisation. Head office exerted a considerable influence on its stores 
through its corporate strategy and resulting policies. It thus conceded to Mintzberg's 
diversified structure by controlling the performance of stores through the 
standardisation of outputs. This corresponds with Freathy and Sparks's (1994) 
conclusions that control in multiple store retailing is maintained at head office, while
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the responsibility for meeting targets rests at store level. The standardisation of 
outputs as a control system at Superco meant that once these targets were met, there 
was less intervention from head office in other aspects of store operations - another 
feature of Mintzberg's diversified configuration.
Store level managers held the greatest degree of autonomy in those components of 
store operations difficult for head office to quantify and measure. As Emmanuel et al 
(1990) highlighted, HRM is very difficult to measure in quantitative terms, which 
negates control using the standardisation of outputs methods. Instead a 
standardisation of work content might be employed as the control system for HRM 
and employee resourcing (Merchant 1985; Mintzberg 1983). Senior store level 
managers considered there to be little interference from head office in the day-to-day 
management of a store, provided the store met its projected targets, within the 
confines of its budget:
"As long as we meet the targets set by head office, and keep within our 
budgets, they don't really bother us too much." (Trading Manager)
It was largely human resource management where store level managers had least 
intervention from head office, namely local employee resourcing decisions, such as 
recruitment and selection, on-the-job training, staff scheduling and the delegation of 
tasks (see Section 8.5). This devolution of human resources to line managers was also 
found by Neathey and Hurstfield (1995), and Tomlinson et al (1997), in their studies of 
the retail industry. However, where human resources were quantifiable head office 
controlled their management via standardisation of outputs. Control was exercised by 
monitoring store results based on clearly defined performance standards. Mintzberg
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(1989) argued that the influence of a head office in a 'diversified' typology eventually 
drives that organisation towards the 'machine' configuration, which results in an 
incomplete form of divisionalisation.
The previous sections of this chapter have described the degree of constraints and 
choices of store level management at Superco, which emanate from the formal 
organisational structure, and the balance between centralisation and decentralisation 
within this structure. During the interviews it became clear that store level managers 
did not always readily accept the increasing centralisation of their responsibilities. 
They also did not necessarily share, nor execute, the goals of Superco's corporate 
strategy. Existing literature already suggests that the formation of strategy and policy 
does not necessarily indicate successful implementation without resistance from 
employees (Marchington and Parker 1990; Mintzberg 1989; Tamkin et al 1997). This 
section will describe the nature of store level management resistance to Superco's 
control systems and centralisation of power.
As found in previous research (Heller 1997; Johnson 1987; Mintzberg 1989) a gap 
existed between Superco's corporate strategy and the reality of store operations. A 
dichotomy between head office managers and store level managers was evident. Not 
only did interpretation of corporate strategy differ between the written, public 
statements and the reality of store operations, but so too did head office expectations 
and understanding of store activities. This corroborates with Mintzberg's model of 
'thick' and 'thin' management. It also supports Johnson's (1987 in Blyton and
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Turnbull 1992:35) claim that "business strategy is not a rational phenomenon", but 
subject to managers' interpretation according to their own frames of reference. This 
often results in changes to strategic intent as it progresses through the organisational 
hierarchy. Examples from the case organisation will illustrate this phenomenon.
The difference between the rhetoric and reality of corporate strategy was visible at 
Superco. This was recognised by Mintzberg (1989) when he spoke of the problems 
implementing strategy where:
"even if expressed intentions exist to what extent do other people in the 
organisation share them?" (p.29) 
Store level managers did not necessarily hold the same strategic vision as head office.
It was at the operational level where the realities of implementing head office directives 
were most acutely felt. This widened the dichotomy between head office and store 
level managers as well as between the rhetoric and reality of corporate strategy.
Despite the commitment of head office to 'First Class Service' the reality at store level 
was sometimes very different. The introduction of Customer Service Assistants in all 
stores to help customers at every point of their shopping trip such as packing bags and 
loading cars, was one example. Head office believed Customer Service Assistants 
enhanced customer service provision, whereas store level managers viewed them as an 
extravagance, to be suspended during peak trading, or staff shortages. Customer 
Service Assistants were often seconded onto other sections, and so did not always 
provide the additional service expected of them. As illustrated by the quote below, 
when a vacancy arose within the store, if the budget position was tight, a Customer
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Service Assistant would cover the vacancy, thus leaving a gap in the customer service 
provision:
"I was given the option of a Customer Service Assistant when a vacancy in my 
department arose. While we're not supposed to use them on Sections, when 
the General Manager is trying to control budgets it happens." (Produce 
Manager) 
Consequently, while head office believed these staff were providing a premium level of
service to customers, the reality at store level was that their deployment to provide this 
service was minimal. This meant that the company was not always delivering its 
promise of 'First Class customer service'. This supports Mintzberg's (1989) 
proposition that initiatives are often formulated by senior managers, with little 
knowledge of operational level pressures, while implementation is left to lower level 
managers, who know the initiatives cannot work. This problem was apparent at 
Superco where the company's customer service promises were not always delivered at 
store level, due to budgetary constraints imposed by head office.
Equal opportunities was one aspect of Superco's employment policy that was clearly 
articulated in written format:
"The group's selection, training, development and promotion policies ensure 
equal opportunities for all employees regardless of gender, marital status, race, 
age or disability. All decisions are based on merit." (Annual Report 1996:33). 
Despite such a commitment to equal opportunities, this was often undermined by store
level managers responsible for local employee resourcing. At local level there was 
evidence of gendered occupational segregation with selection decisions based on 
managers' stereotypes, and the segregation of workers according to personal 
circumstances. Previous research has also found that managers have very distinct 
notions of segmentation in the labour supply (for example, Beechey and Perkins 1987;
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Burchell and Rubery 1990, 1994; Collinson et al 1990; Hunter and Maclnnes 1991, 
Hunter et al 1993).
Gender assumptions played an important role in determining the suitability of 
employees for jobs in the retail industry, as found in previous research (Bradley 1989; 
MacEwan Scott 1994; Tomlinson et al 1997). Store level managers at Superco 
assumed that certain jobs and departments tended to be more suitable for men or 
women. In the Produce Section of both stores the work was perceived as:
"heavy work - carrying sacks of potatoes etc." (Produce Manager) 
This led to it being deemed a 'masculine' department, employing male staff. This was 
despite Lewisham's Fresh Foods Trading Manager acknowledging that the physical 
demands of a job in the produce department were actually minimal:
" While there are heavy pallets of produce to manoeuvre it's not really much 
different to any other shop floor section. We have machinery to help with the 
heavy lifting, which actually makes the physical demands of the job fairly 
insignificant."
Skill requirements of a job linked to the traditional perceptions of male work were also 
evident. The meat and bakery departments were deemed as skilled and traditionally 
male jobs, while sections such as checkouts and delicatessen were viewed as more 
suitable for female employees:
"There is very much a gender bias in the stores, for example meat and bakery 
are skilled and traditionally male jobs and so the idea is that you must employ a 
man." (Fresh Foods Trading Manager)
Store level managers further applied their own stereotypes and perceptions to both 
potential and existing employees. This again had a significant impact on their 
employee resourcing decisions, which often undermined head office policy.
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Distinctions were made between part timers and full timers. A large proportion of 
store level managers regarded part timers as less reliable and committed to their work 
than full timers due to their shorter working hours:
"Part timers are less trustworthy - they have less accountability as they are on 
the tills for shorter periods of time and there are more of them so they can easily 
blame the previous operator for any discrepancies." (Customer Services 
Manager) 
Another problem with commitment and reliability was the notion that part timers had
too many other 'distractions' such as family, study, or second job commitments, which 
meant their work at Superco was not an essential source of income:
"Part timers only work for the money - the majority of part timers are young 
and without much discipline." (Provisions Manager)
Distinctions were also made between the loyalty and value of different types of part 
timers, in terms of 'life-cycle' position. Older part timers were perceived as more 
reliable, offering the company a high level of commitment, and some numerical 
flexibility. The least flexible type of employee was cited as the working mother whose 
family commitments restricted their work life:
"They are constrained by children and husbands so can't give so much to their 
job" (Fresh Foods Manager) 
Younger part timers, usually students, were regarded as offering a high level of
numerical flexibility, through being able to work additional hours and change shifts at 
short notice. However they were perceived as only working for "beer money", which 
was believed to reduce their commitment and reliability. These perceptions were at 
variance with the company's statement on equal opportunities and confirms the 
influence of managers' stereotypes and perceptions. The findings of this research 
study endorse Dickens' (2000) conclusions, that an equal opportunities policy does not 
necessarily alter employees' behaviour and line managers are often the major site of
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resistance. It demonstrates how 'thick' managers at head office, devised equal 
opportunity policy, unaware that many store level managers consistently undermined 
their initiatives.
Knowledge and execution of Superco's employment policies at store level also varied 
in the deployment of labour. The recent head office policy of increasing the number of 
full timers vis a vis part time employees (see Section was scarcely implemented 
by store level managers. Some senior managers at the stores acknowledged the 
changing approach to labour deployment:
"Superco now views employees as a resource to gain commitment from rather 
than as a commodity as they were ten years ago. Then the emphasis was on 
part time employment and cost considerations." (General Manager) 
Conversely, the majority of store level managers seemed unaware of this initiative, and
were continuing to employ large numbers of part timers, believing this to be head 
office policy:
"The company is now looking towards employing more part timers." (Ambient 
Section Manager) 
This again demonstrates a poor execution of Superco's employment goals and
associated policies. This was the result of store level managers consciously, or 
unconsciously, undermining company policy.
Where head office attempted to increase demands and centralise store operations this 
was met with covert opposition from store level managers. This demonstrated further 
characteristics of Mintzberg's diversified organisation with store level managers 
exerting a pull to 'balkanise' the structure and increase their independence from head 
office. They appeared to be opposing the rational, authoritarian management style
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practised by head office. A number of examples of these strategies of independence 
were found at store level.
The main control mechanism in place at Superco was budgetary. However, as was 
noted by Berry et al (1995), accounting systems can be subject to manipulation from 
those whose behaviour it is supposed to control. During 1996 the Surrey Quays store 
was experiencing budgetary problems. Recruitment needs were driven entirely by 
budgets set at head office. The wage budget position was the key indicator at Superco 
as to whether there were the financial resources to recruit. In order to keep the budget 
under control the General Manager at Surrey Quays made a decision to freeze 
recruitment in order to reduce costs:
"Surrey Quays is a strange animal when it comes to recruitment. Recruitment 
is financially controlled so you look at the wages cost and look ahead to the 
budget squeeze and so you don't recruit. Then there is a desperate shortage of 
employees and so there is a mad rush to recruit." (Training Manager, Surrey 
Quays) 
This recruitment freeze meant Section Managers were not granted permission to
recruit new staff and instead had to rely on part timers to work additional hours (hours 
worked over their weekly contracted maximum, but paid at normal rate) to resource 
staff shortages:
"At Surrey Quays there is a budget problem and so we are not replacing 
leavers, but are using part timers' overtime as a short term option, until the 
budget comes back under control." (Ambient Trading Manager, Surrey Quays) 
This ability to increase part timers' weekly hours without incurring premium rate
overtime costs is said to be one of the most attractive features of their deployment 
(Dickens 1992, 1995; Gregory 1991; Robinson 1990; Walsh 1990, 1991).
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The cost minimisation initiatives outlined in Superco's corporate strategy were 
interpreted by many store level managers as a requirement to employ part time 
employees, not full timers. Part timers were considered to be a cheaper form of labour 
and the solution to head office's efforts to reduce labour costs as a percentage of sales:
"More flexibility is now demanded by the company because flexible employees 
are cheaper. We've always had flexible workers, but budgets are becoming 
increasingly important higher up and cuts are occurring throughout the 
company." (Produce Manager) 
Also, neither of the case study stores made use of the minimum hours contract, with
managers seemingly unaware of its existence. Therefore its use and effectiveness 
could not be measured through this research. The ad hoc, operational responses to 
Superco's efficiency initiative witnessed at the two case study stores, concurs with 
previous research, which has found an association between cost minimisation and the 
employment of non-standard workers (Blyton and Morris 1992; Brewster et al 1993; 
Freathy and Sparks 1996; Neathey and Hurstfield 1995; O'Reilly 1994). This is in 
conflict with head office policy to increase the number of full timers to improve 
workforce stability to deliver a high quality of customer service.
Such contradictions between head office and local managers reinforces Mintzberg's 
notions of'thick' and 'thin' management in operation at Superco. 'Thick' 
management at head office, formulated an employee resourcing policy to increase the 
proportion of full timers, when the reality of tight budgets made it impractical to 
implement. As Hunter et al (1993) found, the main explanation for employers' use of 
non-standard contracts was the presence of "immediate business needs" (p. 3 96). With 
budgets and performance targets closely monitored at Superco, store level managers 
placed their priorities here, which equated to the employment of non-standard
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workers. The priority of store level managers was to keep within budgets and targets 
ensuring a picture of competent store management was provided to head office. This 
was despite the impediment it placed on Section Managers, and the work 
intensification it inflicted on employees. This supports Armstrong's (1989) belief that 
when line management performance is evaluated and rewarded in budgetary terms, it 
turns the management of human resources "into an instrument for the achievement of 
short-term accounting targets" (p. 164). The behaviour of store level managers was 
skewed because they emphasised the economic targets set by head office. They 
subsequently placed a lower priority on those management activities not measured by 
head office, as also found by Marginson et al (1993).
The strategies of independence deployed by local managers undermined head office 
policy, but were never questioned by head office because both stores achieved their 
prescribed budgets and targets. It demonstrates the detrimental impact a short-term 
perspective can have on employees, as has been outlined in existing literature (Blyton 
and Morris 1992; Burnes 2000; Mintzberg 1989; Sisson 1994). Store level managers 
at Superco were keen to implement a "quick fix" (Mintzberg 1989:357) to rectify the 
problems meeting budgets, in preference to disclosing the reality to head office. It 
illustrates the problems of 'incomplete divisionalisation' where division managers 
become heavily influenced by head office management's 'thin' directives, to the 
detriment of intangible benefits. This endorses Mintzberg's (1989) criticism of 
"incomplete divisionalisation" where managers "feel the gaze from above; they thus get 
distracted from time to time" (p.355).
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In addition to budget setting, another area where store level managers had less formal 
control was in the organisational structure of stores. Managers at head office believed 
that restructuring was integral to the company's success. As previously discussed, the 
store management hierarchy had been reduced to two layers with the removal of 
Assistant Store Managers and Assistant Section Managers. Section Managers believed 
this caused a direct increase in their workload and responsibility, compounded by 
longer opening hours. Such consequences of de-layering were also identified by 
Gretton (1993), Legge (2000), and Sparrow (1998). Section Managers at Superco 
responded to these pressures by informally appointing a 'deputy' from their staff. This 
'deputy' was usually an experienced, full time employee who would undertake minor 
management responsibilities and supervise the department when the Section Manager 
was absent, although they did not receive any increase in salary or job title to reflect 
these additional responsibilities. It was seen as an informal "developmental 
opportunity" (Ambient Manager) for employees considered by Section Managers to 
have management potential. At the same time Section Managers recognised the 
difficulty of this informal delegation of responsibility, over any long period of time, due 
to the process being unofficial:
"There is no extra money for anyone taking on additional responsibility so 
people are reluctant to do it for any length of time." (Produce Manager)
It was the informality of these 'deputies' that enabled store level managers' personal 
preferences to play an important role in determining which employees were selected. 
With head office unaware of the practice, this had both equal opportunity and staff 
development implications. This illustrates how Section Managers manipulated the
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store structure to alleviate the pressures of managing their staff, at a time of increasing 
workload.
While store level managers manipulated budgets, doubts were also placed on stores' 
genuine achievement of customer service performance targets. The validity of'One- 
in-front' league tables was placed in doubt by staff at the Lewisham store. Their 
region's league table was headed by the Surrey Quays store. Staff at Lewisham 
doubted the honesty with which cashiers at Surrey Quays inputted their queue length 
data:
"The Surrey Quays store must cheat to get a queue length consistently at one 
customer." (Checkouts Manager, Lewisham) 
Although this accusation (not surprisingly) was never confirmed by staff at the Surrey
Quays store, it underlines the competitive nature of Superco, both with other retailers, 
but also between stores and regions within the organisation. Meeting budgets and 
targets was a key performance measurement. Therefore it could be possible that 
managers employed devious methods, to excel in these league tables of performance 
and gain credibility with head office. This was particularly so with the Surrey Quays 
store, considered to be the region's 'flagship' store. At this store there was greater 
pressure to perform well, and so managers could be more likely to "look up" 
(Mintzberg 1989:355) to head office's requirements, and conform to its tangible 
output control systems, by whatever methods were required to do so.
These examples highlight the strategies store level managers deployed to covertly 
contravene head office policy and intentions. Where possible they constructed 
situations which enabled them to best adapt to the constraints being placed on them by
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head office and devised various tactics to ensure a facade of effective store 
management was depicted. Where head office directives were considered to be 
impractical store level managers devised methods to overcome the difficulties 
associated with them, all of which were intentionally unbeknown to head office.
This case study research has demonstrated the realities of local HRM and employee 
resourcing in a multiple retailing organisation. These include a divergence between the 
rhetoric and reality of corporate strategy, the degree of head office control over store 
operations, the increasing centralisation of store level tasks and the strategies of 
independence deployed by operational managers to undermine this control, and make 
the output control systems work.
Using Mintzberg's (1989) classification of organisations, Superco could be defined as 
a predominately 'machine' configuration. Head office made increasing attempts to 
control and centralise store operations making use of output control systems. It was 
the quantifiable components of store management which were subject to increased 
control and monitoring, a focus typical of 'machine' organisations with their emphasis 
on efficiency.
This research found a dichotomy between espoused strategy and the operational 
realities, as identified by Mintzberg (1989) and Heller (1997). The company's 
productivity initiatives and efficiency drive meant the 'needs of the business' took 
priority over the needs of employees. Budgets and targets set by head office guided
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most management decisions taken at store level. The company's claim to provide a 
premium level of customer service was undermined by the actions of store level 
managers. Where budgets had to be met standards of customer service would be 
forfeited, and the quality of employees' working life sacrificed, in order to meet the 
tight financial requirements, without head office's knowledge. This was despite the 
apparent 'soft' HRM approach espoused by head office management and company 
literature. The reality of corporate strategy was work intensification, re-structuring, 
longer opening hours, budget cuts, additional service demands and increasing 
centralisation. This accords with the division of management in organisations referred 
to by Mintzberg (1989). 'Thin' management was in operation at head office where 
strategy was formulated, while 'thick' managers at store level juggled the realities of 
implementing these strategies. Managers and employees at store level did not 
necessarily hold the same strategic vision as head office. These differences between 
senior head office and store level managers were clear, leading to the disparities 
presented in this case study. Superco illustrates the dangers of 'thin' management as 
outlined by Mintzberg (1989), with a widening dichotomy between head office and 
store level managers as well as between the rhetoric and reality of corporate strategy.
Head office at Superco managed principally by information systems (Mintzberg 1999) 
to control store operations. Mintzberg argues that the reliance of 'thin managers' on 
management information systems means that information can be skewed as it is 
channelled through the various organisational level. This provided the opportunity for 
good news to be highlighted while bad news was blocked, in evidence at Superco 
where stores contrived the information, particularly the bad news, that was provided to
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head office. Through detached management, both geographically and hierarchically, 
head office at Superco received an incomplete reality of store operations due to the 
dichotomies between themselves and the operational level.
Another feature of Superco, which was characteristic of Mintzberg's 'machine' 
configuration, was the increased centralisation of store level managers' responsibilities. 
This led to a loss of responsibility for those managers over various areas of work, such 
as stock ordering. Head office were striving towards increasing their control over 
stores using improved technical systems and regulation, as also found by Ogbonna 
(1992). It was those aspects of store operations that were quantifiable, tangible and 
thus measurable where store level managers were subject to greater centralisation and 
constraints in their decision-making powers. This set the boundaries of store level 
managers' autonomy, as discussed by Stewart (1999).
Despite a strong tendency towards the 'machine' configuration, Superco was 
structured along a regional basis which gave rise to some characteristics of 
Mintzberg's divisionalised configuration. Some managerial responsibilities were 
maintained at store level. The majority of local employee resourcing decisions were 
delegated to the lowest management level, with relative degrees of autonomy in this 
area. These were more difficult to quantify and bring under head office control and 
included recruitment and selection of new staff, on-the-job training, staff scheduling, 
employee appraisal and the organisation of tasks and responsibilities.
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While head office made increasing demands on store level managers with 
accompanying centralisation, local managers responded by developing techniques to 
maintain their autonomy and circumvent head office control. This was evident 
throughout the management hierarchy as managers were concerned to ensure an image 
of competent management was displayed to their superiors. Senior store managers, 
particularly General Managers, were keen to adhere to head office's rational model of 
management and be seen to comply with the requirements placed on their store. 
Elaborate efforts were made to maintain independence from head office as well as 
ensuring competent management was exhibited. The information provided to head 
office was manipulated in order to give the impression that the store was operating 
within its prescribed budgets and targets. General Managers were in effect providing a 
facade of meeting head office's demands. This was in contrast to Sayles' (1999) claim 
that middle managers actually play a key role in highlighting problems to senior 
management.
In deploying these strategies of independence, General Managers hoped to assure head 
office that the current autonomy trusted to them was well-founded and no further 
centralisation or interference by head office was necessary. It also enabled them to 
demonstrate effective and competent management skills to head office, who were 
responsible for determining their career advancement. Sayles (1999) found similar 
managers in his research:
"traditional middle managers who managed by results, massaged data..... and
devoted their attention primarily to looking good and pleasing the boss .........
They often appeared to be meeting their budgeted performance requirement". 
(p.602)
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The manipulation of data appeared endemic across Superco, which meant the 
information received by head office was imperfect. This included the manipulation of 
budgets and performance targets, an unofficial recruitment freeze and the re-layering 
of store hierarchy.
The differences between 'thick' and 'thin' (Mintzberg 1989) or 'philosophical' and 
'art' (Duncan 1975) management have been clearly borne out in this research. Head 
office managers devised corporate strategy which store level managers interpreted and 
implemented within the operational context. Having detailed knowledge of store 
operations they were aware that some head office directives were unfeasible, but were 
reluctant to communicate this to head office. Instead they 'rejiggled' (Sayles 1999) the 
systems where possible to fit with the constraints and demands of the shop-floor. 
Therefore it is argued that they predominately acted as "disturbance handlers" 
(Mintzberg 1989: 20) responding to the pressures and demands of head office.
The contradictory nature of Superco's corporate strategy and the focus on quantifiable 
budgets and targets had a significant impact on the local management of human 
resources. With employee resourcing the main area of responsibility for store level 
managers, it was in this function where strategies of independence were more likely to 
be found. The use of output control systems meant a focus on tangible measurements 
throughout Superco. This focus on the measurable, particularly the accounting control 
system, meant that store level managers focused mainly on these issues in order to be 
seen to be satisfying head office demands. It skewed senior store managers' decision- 
making towards the measurable as this was how their management ability was largely
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judged by head office. This encouraged store level managers to focus on the 'hard' 
tangible areas of employee resourcing, often at the expense of company policy and any 
initiatives using 'soft' HRM tools. This resulted in recruitment freezes; the increased 
employment of part timers, particularly students; the alteration of employees' working 
hours to accommodate customer service performance targets; the contravention of 
equal opportunity policy; and informal re-layering of the store management hierarchy 
(without the reward packages that previously existed). These practices were all 
enacted without head office consent or knowledge, but were possible due to the 
autonomy afforded to store level managers in local employee resourcing.
The findings of this research illustrate the dichotomies between the rhetoric and reality 
of organisational life as well as the divergence between managers at different levels in 
the organisation. It can be seen the store level managers acted predominately as 
"disturbance handlers" (Mintzberg 1989:20) adhering to Head Office demands within 
the local context. To achieve this they deployed various strategies of independence to 
ensure they satisfied the demands of Superco's output control systems. These 
strategies of independence were found in the one remaining function yet to be fully 
centralised - employee resourcing. Consequently, employee resources were 
manipulated, sometimes in contravention of company policy, generally resulting in a 
'hard' approach to HRM at store level.
This chapter has presented a discussion and analysis of the empirical data for the 
Superco case study. Background information providing a contextual perspective to 
the case study organisation and stores was given, before an examination of local
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management constraints and autonomy. The existence of various strategies of 
independence were detailed, and subsequent conclusions drawn.
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This chapter presents the findings of the empirical research conducted using the 
embedded case study method. The data gathered provides background information to 
the case study organisation, and outlines the nature of store level management and 
HRM in Groceryco. The chapter examines the choices and constraints of store level 
management, and the consequences of these for the management of human resources 
and employee resourcing.
Groceryco operates in the multiple food retail sector and was one of the leading 
supermarket retailers in the UK at the time of this research (1996). In 1996 it had 370 
stores, an annual turnover of £6.5 billion, and a profit of £401 million. Groceryco held 
the third largest market share of the food retailing sector in 1996.
Each Groceryco store was managed by a Store Manager who was supported by a 
Senior Management Team. Stores had four senior managers responsible for 
Replenishment, Human Resources, Support Services and Customer Services. Under 
this Senior Management Team came responsibility for Sections which were managed 
by Controllers. The quantity of Controllers in each store was determined by store size, 
turnover, number of employees and the variety of services offered. Some stores 
provided additional services such as a petrol station, post office, dry cleaners, a creche, 
and cafe. Dependent upon the size of the store there was a further supervisory level
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termed Assistant Controllers, who would deputise for Controllers (see appendix 10 for 
store structure).
As outlined in Section 6.4, two embedded units were selected for each case study 
organisation. These embedded units took the form of stores which were selected by 
the Regional Human Resources Manager. They were selected to enable a comparison 
between a newly opened superstore (Camden) and an older, smaller store (Blackfen).
This store had been operating for approximately 30 years, and is based in North West 
Kent. The Store Manager had been at the store for six years, having previously 
managed the Gravesend store. In 1995 the store's opening hours were increased from 
67 to 78 hours a week, from 08.00 to 20.00 hours, Monday to Saturday, and 10.00 to 
16.00 hours, on Sundays.
As can be seen from Table eight, the store employed 117 employees of which 79 (68 
per cent) worked part time. Just over half (51 per cent) of the workforce were female, 
with the majority of part timers (63 per cent) being female, and the majority of women 
(83 per cent) working part time.
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Male
Female
Total
Full time
28 (23.9%)
10(8.6%)
38 (32.5%)
Part time
29 (24.8%)
50 (42.7%)
79 (67.5%)
Total
57 (48.7%)
60 (51.3%)
117(100.0%)
The store had four departments and six sections. This equated to five Senior 
Managers (including the Store Manager), and seven Controllers. The largest 
department was Checkouts with 48 employees, and the highest proportion of female 
and part time employees.
This store was opened in February 1995 and based in Camden, North London. The 
Store Manager had been at the store since its opening, having previously managed the 
Wood Green store. The store opened for 88.5 hours a week from 08.30 to 22.00 
hours Monday to Wednesday; 08.00 to 22.00 hours Thursday to Saturday; and 10.00 
to 16.00 on Sundays. There had been no change to the store's operating hours since 
its opening in 1995.
As can be seen from Table nine the store employed 260 workers of which 185 (71 per 
cent) worked part time. Just over half (57 per cent) of the workforce were female, 
with the majority of part timers being female (69 per cent), and the majority of women 
(88 per cent) working part time.
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Male
Female
Total
Full time
57(21.9%)
18(6.9%)
75 (28.8%)
Part time
57 (21.9%)
128 (49.3%)
185(71.2%)
Total
114(43.8%)
146 (56.2%)
260(100%)
The Camden store had four Departments and eight Sections. This equated to five 
Senior Managers (including the Store Manager), and ten Controllers (The Checkouts 
Section had three full time and 1 part time Controller). As the Camden store was 
larger than Blackfen it had a greater number of Sections and Controllers. As in the 
Blackfen store, the largest Department was Customer Services accounting for 146 
workers, with the largest proportion of female and part time employees.
The chapter from here onwards will be a comparison of the two case study stores, 
using the empirical data gathered between March 1996 and November 1996. This 
information was collected through a series of semi-structured interviews with 
managers, at both head office and store level, and an examination of company 
literature, as outlined in chapter seven.
The main objective of Groceryco's corporate strategy was to create a distinct culture 
that differentiated the company from its competitors. Its aims were to be the first 
choice retailers for everyday food and household needs for the family, as well as being 
the most dynamic and innovative retailer in the food retailing sector. With this strategy
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Groceryco anticipated it would increase shareholder value faster than its competitors 
through increased profits.
In 1993 a review of store operations was undertaken entitled 'Groceryco 2000'. The 
twin objectives of this review were to improve Groceryco's operating efficiency and 
marketing effectiveness. The retailing strategy of creating a culture to differentiate 
Groceryco from its competitors involved an apparent 'value-added' approach. This 
consisted of added service provisions in-store including a bakery, post office, dry 
cleaners, cafe, creche, and petrol station in some stores, with a strong own-label 
presence and an attractive display of fresh produce. Groceryco also introduced 
customer panels to bring its links with customers closer to significantly improve its 
provision of high quality customer service - a key focus of its competitive strategy. 
Previous research has identified the importance of customer service in retail 
competitive strategies, which particularly gained prevalence during the 1990s (Doogan 
1992; Freathy and Sparks 2000; Gardner and Sheppard 1989; Ruston 1999; Sparks 
1992c). As Sparks (1992) predicted, customers will increasingly reject inadequate 
service provision, which will enforce multiple store retailers to continue to apply 
customer service as a key strategic tool.
Completion of the review and implementation of its recommendations were undertaken 
in 1994. The 'Groceryco 2000' project had a two year timetable and was completed 
late summer 1996. The programme consisted of three phases commencing with an 
initial examination of the strengths and weaknesses of Groceryco's business. Phase 
Two involved the implementation of 'Groceryco 2000', while Phase Three undertook
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the change process necessary to ensure the new strategies were adopted and 
understood by the workforce. A key goal of 'Groceryco 2000' was improved sales 
performance, with a target to increase the company's average sales per square foot 
from £12.86 to £15.00 per week, within three years. In conjunction with this, a target 
of making £60 million cost savings was also made. Previous research confirms this 
emphasis on cost minimisation prevalent in retail strategy, particularly in the food 
retailing sector (Christopherson 1996; Freathy and Sparks 1997; Ogbonna and 
Wilkinson 1988; Ogbonna and Whipp 1999).
The new strategy for Groceryco became a focus on family shoppers. The rationale 
being that opportunities lay in meeting the needs of younger people as they begin to 
have families to give Groceryco access to a larger proportion of high spending 
customers, whilst concurrently instilling brand loyalty amongst the younger members 
of the family. This strategy involved a range of changes which were introduced 
progressively across the business to ensure that product ranges, price, customer 
service, store layout and design and marketing were accurately targeted at family 
shoppers.
The implementation stage of'Groceryco 2000' involved a number of key focus areas 
including a review of the range and services offered. This was together with a more 
aggressive pricing policy, which included the introduction of a range of economy 
brands. More resources were devoted to marketing and the function was given a more 
prominent strategic role in the business, together with a review of promotional 
policies. Additions to the range of customer services provided were made, including
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bag packers. Store design and layout was also improved through widening aisles, 
lowering shelving and making signage clearer. The entire business was re-designed to 
simplify decision making, improve cross-functional team working and introduce new 
technology. This involved the re-structuring of the store organisation structure and 
resulted in a significant reduction in numbers of management and staff in almost every 
area of the business in 1994. The re-organisation resulted in 3,500 employees leaving 
the company through redundancy or early retirement, and 9,500 employees having a 
different job by the end of 1994.
A review of the company's store and asset profile concluded that financial and 
management resources would be concentrated on only those stores which could fully 
deliver the new strategy, and that all non-core assets and business should be divested. 
In May 1995 twenty Groceryco stores were closed with an aggregate sales area of 
285,000 square feet and the loss of a further 1,800 jobs, 270 of which were store 
managers taking early retirement.
Groceryco also introduced new forms of shopping including customer self-scanning in 
over 100 stores in the first year of'Groceryco 2000's' implementation. This allowed 
customers to conduct the scanning of goods themselves whilst they were shopping and 
paying for the total at specially designated checkouts. Sales assistants were trained as 
'QueueBusters' to help customers at peak shopping times. It was hoped that as 
customers made use of self-scanning so manpower from the checkouts would be freed 
up and deployed to wherever in the stores queues may be building up. Groceryco was
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also the first supermarket chain to offer creche facilities with 36 in operation by the 
end of 1996.
In 1996 Groceryco introduced a customer loyalty card with which shoppers could earn 
points to redeem against either cash discounts or to buy products in store. By the end 
of 1996 almost 4 million Groceryco customers owned a loyalty card. In 1997 the 
company moved into financial services with the launch of a household management 
account in a strategic alliance with a leading bank. This was subsequently extended to 
offer customers a broad range of financial services.
However the major problem about devising innovative strategy in the retail industry is 
the ease with which competitors can replicate strategy (Christopherson 1996; Doogan 
1992; Freathy and Sparks 1996; Gardner and Sheppard 1989; Walker 1992).
"In the food retailing sector, most attempts by any of the major players to gain 
a competitive advantage over the others are quickly copied or bettered." 
(Annual Report 1996:13) 
This meant that the strategies of 'Groceryco 2000' were very similar to other
initiatives in the food retailing sector. This ability to easily replicate competitors' 
strategy is said to be perpetuated by the need for openness on issues of strategy and 
performance demanded of multiple retailers by their investors (Dawson 2000). This is 
evident when comparing Groceryco's competitive strategy with that of Superco (see 
chapter eight), where cost minimisation, quality enhancement and innovation are all 
key features for both organisations' strategic goals. This results in similar problems at 
Groceryco of apparently contradictory strategies in place at the same time (as in the 
Superco case study). The emphasis on cost minimisation and quality enhancement in 
multiple retailers' strategies has been noted in the literature (Doogan 1992; Gardner
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and Sheppard 1989; Lowe and Crewe 1996; Ogbonna 1992; Ogbonna and Whipp 
1999; Shackleton 1998; Sparks 1996), with Gardner and Sheppard (1989) concluding 
that the current strategies of multiple store retailers are "at best flawed and at worse 
suspicious" (p. 207). The consequences of these strategies for store level managers and 
local employee resourcing will be examined in Section 9.8.
9.4 THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF STORE LEVEL 
MANAGEMENT
To fulfil this study's research objectives the nature and characteristics of store level 
management at Groceryco was researched during the data-gathering period.
All management positions in the two Groceryco case study stores were full time, a 
feature of retail employment also found by Freathy and Sparks (2000). Management 
positions had always traditionally been full time and most managers considered part 
timers to be unsuitable for promotion, as also found by Hunter and Maclnnes (1991) 
and Walsh (1990). Robinson (1990) revealed that retail employers emphasise 
perceived problems of promoting part timers, which has the affect of limiting 
promotion for part timers beyond a certain level (see also Tilly 1992). This was clear 
at Groceryco, where the company generally did not promote part time employees. The 
only exception to this was at Assistant Controller level where part timers were found 
to be working. However a part time supervisory position was only found at the 
Camden store and only in the Checkouts section, the largest section in the store. 
Promotion beyond the level of Assistant Checkout Controller generally required 
individuals to switch to full time employment. As the majority of the part time
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workforce in both stores was women, their opportunities for progression through the 
company were severely hampered by the number of hours they worked.
The majority of management positions in both Groceryco case study stores were held 
by men. Defining a management position as any role between Store Manager and 
Assistant Controller 77 per cent of management positions in the Blackfen store, and 57 
per cent in the Camden store were held by men. This was despite the majority of the 
workforce in both stores being female. Of the nine female managers in the Camden 
store six were located in the Customer Services Department. At senior management 
level the positions held by women included the Human Resources Manager in both 
stores and the Customer Services Manager in the Camden store. Women were 
therefore only in senior store management positions in occupations which were 
traditionally seen as 'female1 and where a largely female workforce reported to them. 
This supports previous research findings that women are disproportionately 
represented within the lowest management and occupational grades in multiple store 
retailing (Broadbridge 1995, 1996, 1998; Collins 1990; Craig and Wilkinson 1985; 
Dawson et al 1987; Freathy 1993; Freathy and Sparks 2000; Hansard Society 
Commission 1990; Howe 1992; MacEwan Scott 1994; Sparks 1991, 1992a).
Store level managers at Groceryco had experienced significant change in the period 
prior to this research study as a result of organisational re-structuring. Stores became 
organised on a functional or process basis, rather than by product type as had 
happened prior to 1994:
"There are now process areas as opposed to section areas. It gives the skill in 
one process rather than just being multi-skilled in vegetables or dairy 
products." (Replenishment Manager)
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The roles of assistant manager, department manager and supervisors were removed as 
part of a new strategy to improve efficiency. This de-layering at store level is a 
common theme across multiple store retailers, particularly in the superstore sector 
(Sparks 2000a, 2000b). Instead came the designation of a senior management team 
who supported the store manager in each of the following departments: replenishment, 
human resources, support services and customer services. The role of Department 
Manager was replaced with Controller and the role of Supervisor was either abolished 
completely or replaced with Assistant Controller, dependent upon the size of a store 
and its departments.
As part of the re-structuring process all store level managers (except Store Managers) 
and supervisors were required to apply for the newly created management positions. It 
was clear that the changes in store structure had implications for work responsibilities, 
and quality of working life, with many jobs completely changing as a result. The 
criteria on which employees had been traditionally promoted also changed:
"Stores are now structured on a functional basis and controllers are managers 
just as much as being good at the role. Previously the best baker was made 
manager; now it's the person with the best management skills." (Human 
Resources Manager)
The changes instigated by 'Groceryco 2000' led to low morale amongst store level 
managers who were expected to re-apply for the newly created management jobs. 
Many former Assistant Managers felt they had been demoted in terms of job status. 
Under the new structure they often worked alongside employees whom they had 
previously managed:
"I used to be an Assistant Manager, but am now on the same level as old 
Department Managers. I have more experience than them and so they tend to 
lean on me a little bit more." (Customer Services Manager)
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This accords with previous research (Dopson and Stewart 1993; Holbeche 1994, 1995; 
Kettley 1995; Legge 2000) that has found employees often report reduced morale after 
de-layering and down-sizing, the major reason being reduced career development 
opportunities, and the downgrading of an employee's job (Ezzamel et al 1996; 
Holbeche 1995; Inkson and Cole 1994). At Groceryco the down-sizing and de- 
layering occurred at store level which, as Cameron et al (1991) also found, only 
exacerbated employees' perception that the situation was handled unfairly (see also 
Guest and Peccei 1992; Holbeche 1994, 1995; Kinnie et al 1996).
Promotion and progression at store level was through the hierarchy of management 
and via a succession of different stores. All store level managers were required to have 
a variety of experience at Senior Management level before they could become a Store 
Manager. As part of management development and career progression senior 
managers were moved from store to store within their region (as also found by 
Doogan 1992). Promotion was via a management role in a larger store, until being 
located in one of Groceryco's larger stores, such as the newly opened Camden store.
The majority of managers at both stores were a combination of internally promoted 
employees with a significant length of service, or older employees recruited from the 
external labour market, often with previous retailing experience. Although Groceryco 
ran a graduate management scheme, it was not considered successful by store level 
managers:
"The company has tried to attract graduates, but it didn't work. They were 
either very good and only doing it as a stop-gap, whereas others had no 
comprehension of what retail involved - the hours just killed them. As a result 
the company seems to have gone away from this idea." 
(Support Services Manager)
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This is in contrast to the increased of graduate trainees in multiple store retailing, 
identified in previous research (Freathy and Sparks 2000; Hendry and Pettigrew 1987). 
It would appear that the polarisation of the workforce, discussed by Bell (1973), and 
Crouch (1997), and the creation of an 'elite' workforce (Lovering 1990), had not 
taken place to any degree at Groceryco. Store level managers were instead commonly 
promoted via in the internal labour market. However, the insecurity caused by the 
changes instigated by Groceryco 2000 meant they did not necessarily have the secure 
conditions of employment found in other multiple store retailers (Freathy and Sparks 
1996).
To consider the role of store level managers in the execution of HR policies and 
employee resourcing practices, it is important to examine the nature of HRM at both 
corporate and operational level. Current literature on HRM in multiple store retailing 
points to a number of key trends including a poor regard for the HR profession; a low 
level of trade union membership and recognition; poor training and development of 
hourly paid sales assistants; and, strategies aimed at labour efficiency. Consequently, 
much of the literature concludes that multiple store retailers tend to focus on 'hard' 
HRM techniques, although more progressive organisations are beginning to recognise 
the value of a 'softer' HRM approach (Truss et al 1997).
It has been argued that, to ensure human resource activities are built into the fabric of 
the corporate strategy, HRM directors should be on the board, or at least the executive 
committee of the business unit. The Human Resources Director at Groceryco was not
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represented at the strategic level of the organisation, which according to Walker 
(1992) places doubt over the extent to which employment strategy was developed 
alongside corporate strategy. Truss et al (1997) found more evidence of'one-way' 
linkage (Golden and Ramanujan 1985) in organisations, where business strategy 
informs HR strategy, but not vice versa.
Phase three of the 'Groceryco 2000' programme was to "invigorate" the business to 
ensure the principles and strategies which guided the new strategy were accepted by 
employees. The aim was to achieve this through employment strategy which resulted 
in the 'Make a Difference! 1 programme launched in 1995. This was a response to the 
problems caused by the immense changes brought about by 'Groceryco 2000':
"This review....... has resulted in staff uncertainty and substantial short term
disruption to the business." (Annual Report 1995:14)
The purpose of the 'Make a Difference! 1 programme was to "re-energise" people after 
the disruption, which led to the development of a 'People Strategy1 . It involved the 
implementation of employment policies to support the changes initiated by the new 
strategy. Its aim was to build the commitment and performance of employees to 
achieve the corporate strategy, suggesting a 'soft' HRM approach to the employment 
of human resources:
"The key task in phase three will be to motivate and reinvigorate the business 
to ensure that the new priorities and principles, which guide our new strategy, 
are adopted enthusiastically and understood by everyone in Groceryco." 
(Annual Report 1995: 7)
The 'People Strategy' had six key elements:
1. A resourcing strategy to reduce the number of vacancies in the business at any given
time and to ensure that the selection process was reliable.
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2. A long term strategy for pay and benefits to attract and retain good quality staff.
3. A more professional induction to aid the retention of new employees.
4. A programme of staff development to help Store Managers and Human Resources 
Managers to lead, coach and develop staff.
5. A training programme for senior managers to develop the style of leadership and 
culture which would help Groceryco achieve the required level of performance.
6. An active communication programme to engage all employees in achieving 
Groceryco's goals.
The success for the 'People Strategy' was seen to lie in measurable improvements in 
customer service, reduced staff turnover and external recognition through the 
Investors in People programme.
At the same time as launching their employment strategy, Groceryco changed the role 
of store level Human Resources (HR) Managers, by significantly reducing their HR 
responsibilities. As part of the new organisational structure, HR Managers were 
required to act as Duty Managers, which equated to 25 hours each week deputising for 
the Store Manager. This involved working on the shop-floor and managing store 
operations. This left only 14 of their 39 weekly contracted hours to devote to HRM. 
It prompted many store level HR Managers to leave the company:
"Those who were doing the job because they wanted to progress specifically in 
personnel weren't happy when the re-structuring happened. What it meant was 
that the job became more retail orientated which included having to work shifts. 
We lost a lot of HR Managers who left for personnel-specific jobs, often with 
non-retail companies." (Store HR Manager)
As a result a greater number of managers without personnel experience were filling the 
role of store level HR Manager. This was compounded by head office policy
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introduced in 1996, which required all Senior Managers, who wanted promotion to 
Store Manager level, to undertake the role of either HR Manager or Customer 
Services Manager, as part of their training. Therefore, a greater number of individuals 
were working as store level HR Managers with no experience, or qualifications, 
relating to the personnel profession. Such demotion of personnel professionals in 
multiple store retailing is not uncommon (Howe 1992; Sparks 1992a, 1992b; 
Tomlinson et al 1997).
This change in the role of store level Human Resource Manager tended to undermine 
the intentions of the 'People Strategy'. At a time when the employees' psychological 
contract needed to be restored, HR Managers were given minimal opportunities to do 
so. Much of their time devoted to HR tasks was spent allocating the store's labour 
allowances to departments, and managing the recruitment and selection process to 
ensure budgets were adhered to. This supports the findings of Freathy and Sparks 
(2000) where HR store managers held chief responsibility for recruitment and 
selection, training and disciplinary, with junior managers accountable for staff 
scheduling and day-to-day management. This restricted their ability to successfully 
implement the 'Make a Difference' programme, which ironically was espousing 'soft' 
HRM practices. This supports previous research which has found personnel to often 
be marginalised (Legge 1995; Kinnie et al 1996; Rees et al 1996; Storey 1992), and 
Legge's (2000) observations that often when organisations need expert attention to 
employees' psychological contract, the personnel role is "one of reacting to and 
patching up problems" (p.58). Consequently, while Groceryco's corporate rhetoric
225
espoused 'soft' HRM practices, the reality at store level involved a reduction in the 
resources available to implement these strategies.
The consequences of this reduction in HR managers devolution to HRM was the 
further devolution of HR to line managers. They became responsibility for the 
recruitment and selection of new employees, training and development, staff 
scheduling and day-to-day management including the delegation of tasks and 
responsibilities, as also found by Hutchinson 1995, Maund 2001, Mullins 1999, Sparks 
2000b. The centralisation of control evident in multiple store retailing has led to a 
focus for store level managers on managing the store's workforce, as this remains their 
one area of relative autonomy (Sparks 2000b).
This would suggest that store level managers had a wide responsibility for the function 
of HR, particularly employee resourcing. The extent and execution of this 
responsibility will be examined in more detail in Section 9.7.
The objectives of this research study have been to examine the influence of line 
managers' choices and constraints on their management of human resources. As 
Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) pointed out, "making choices within parameters is 
central to the managerial role" (p.86). It is therefore important to consider the 
constraints of store level management in each case study organisation and assess the 
impact of these limitations on local employee resourcing decisions. This is imperative
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given Kinnie's (1989) criticism that relatively little attention has been paid to changes 
in control systems and the impact of this on HRM.
As outlined in chapter five, there are many methods of control that can be used to 
restrict the decision making powers of store level managers. These systems of control 
can either direct processes, or dictate output. Ways to achieve this in multiple store 
retailing include the implementation of corporate strategy, the design of the formal 
organisational structure and budgets or the deployment of technology. Senior 
managers at Groceryco's head office formulated strategy and policies, as well as 
designing the organisational structure, the use of technology, and the setting of 
performance targets and budgets. These defined the limits of decision-making power 
for store level managers, through standardisation, as was also observed by Stewart 
(1991).
The size and structure of an organisation can significantly influence the nature of its 
control systems (Child 1984; Mintzberg 1989; Ogbonna and Whipp 1999; Sparks 
2000b; Smith 1988). 'Groceryco 2000' placed an emphasis on the standardisation of 
processes and outputs, achieved through an increase in centralised control:
"The work is much more standardised now with the re-structuring whereas it 
wasn't so much before." (Fresh Food Controller)
There were some aspects of a stores' operations where head office maintained 
complete control in the decision-making process, including store opening hours, stock 
management and store structure. The company was increasingly centralising store 
level managers' decision-making powers. This centralisation process is well described
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in current literature (for example Sparks 2000a), with many store management 
activities and functions being transferred to head office in multiple store retailing 
organisations. The reduction in the decision-making responsibilities of store level 
managers led to local managers occupying a low position in the multiple chain of 
command in multiple store retailing organisations (Broadbridge 1998; Doogan 1992; 
Smith 1988). Managers at store level attributed the increasing centralisation of store 
operations to the changes introduced via 'Groceryco 2000', which they believed 
reduced their decision-making powers, producing greater uniformity between stores:
"The stores are all very uniform now as there's little room for individualism. 
They only really differ in size." (Replenishment Manager)
Howe (1992) drew a similar conclusion that multiple store retailers were increasingly 
centralising their management structures to satisfy the trend towards adopting an 
organisational-wide national image.
Senior managers at Groceryco were based at head office and very distant from store 
operations. They therefore had to 'manage by information' (Mintzberg 1999), and 
tended to adopt Mintzberg's (1999) 'controlling' role. Relying on data to make 
strategic decisions they developed systems, structures, and implemented policies, to 
maintain control of store operations. These features suggest that Groceryco was 
characteristic of Mintzberg's (1989) 'machine' configuration, through the attempts by 
'thin' managers at head office to control store operations. Rationalising, such as 
budget cutting, re-structuring and redundancies, became the solution to organisational 
problems. Therefore, Groceryco supported Mintzberg's proposition that the 
countervailing power, which drives organisations towards a machine bureaucracy, is an 
obsession with control. This will be further examined in Sections 
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when the use of budgets and technology, to constrain the decision making powers of 
store level managers, is considered.
As a publicly quoted company a high share price was essential to Groceryco (Freathy 
and Sparks 1996), which has been found to lead to a focus on the maintenance of 
dividends and short-term results (Legge 1995; Sisson 1994). This translated into low 
product prices for customers, and high share prices for shareholders:
"We are committed to reassuring our customers that Groceryco provides 
excellent value for money week-in, week-out. We have adopted a more 
aggressive pricing policy." (Annual Report 1995:7)
Efforts to cut costs were reflected in the target of making cost savings of £60 million, 
and improving average sales per square foot per week, from £12.86 to £15.00, within 
three years (see also section 9.3). This emphasis on efficiency and short-term needs 
has been much criticised in the literature (see, Blyton and Morris 1992; Burnes 2000; 
Mintzberg 1979, 1989; Storey and Sisson 1993a) for ignoring long term social 
consequences. This was exemplified by the pressures on store level managers to 
maximise the efficiency of labour, particularly in labour-intensive departments, such as 
checkouts, at the expense of employees' quality of work life:
"The number of hours given to each section were cut which meant greater use 
of flexibility was needed. The store had too many cashiers working during the 
day and not enough in the evening which we couldn't get away with when the 
section's hours were reduced. When we told them we had to change their hours 
for a business reason there was a lot of opposition from them. After 
holding individual meetings with the staff, and the Region's Personnel 
Manager, we had to give 12 employees notice of change of hours when they 
refused to change voluntarily." (Store HR Manager)
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Store level managers were acutely aware of the efficiency initiatives imposed by head 
office at the time of the research. All aspects of store level operations were subject to 
cost minimisation strategies. Although opening hours at the Blackfen store had been 
increased, this was not accompanied by any increase in budgets. Instead managers 
claimed that the number of staffing hours available to them by head office had actually 
been reduced:
"The company is now more demanding. There are less hours for each 
department, so greater efficiencies need to be achieved." (Stock Management 
Controller)
Store level managers also alleged that efforts had been made by head office to reduce 
the cost of labour, particularly in the area of unsociable pay, paid in recognition of late 
evening work:
"The company has cut back on wage costs by trying to cut back payment for 
unsociable hours even though there are more of them now with longer opening 
hours." (Fresh Food Controller)
Interviews with store level managers revealed the impact of the efficiencies demanded 
of them. As Groceryco made greater demands on stores this resulted in work 
intensification and multi-skilling for shop-floor employees:
"The company now expects a lot more in terms of job content." 
(Administration Controller)
The increasing pressure on store level employees was compounded by the changes in 
store structure. One consequence of de-layering and re-structuring was a belief 
amongst store level managers that the level of responsibility, and accountability, had 
increased for all staff:
"There are higher demands on the whole team now. Previously it was the 
manager and supervisor who were accountable, but now criticism is aimed at 
the team as a whole." (Fresh Food Controller)
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This trend has also been observed in previous research (for example, Gretton 1993; 
Legge 2000; Sparrow 1998), and again highlights the negative impact that a cost 
minimisation approach can have on employees. The predominance of control by 
budgets and targets, together with the large changes imposed by 'Groceryco 2000' had 
resulted in a demoralised, disconcerted work force, with store level managers losing 
components of their jobs to centralised systems:
"It's all changed so much. Everything has changed, particularly with the 
automated ordering and the re-structuring. There are now less hours for each 
section, with greater efficiency achieved, and both the work and company are 
more demanding." (Stock Management Controller)
The main focus of'Groceryco 2000' was enhanced sales and cost minimisation. The 
key objectives of the strategy was "to increase its value to shareholders" (Annual 
Report 1995:1), and increase shareholder value faster than competitors, despite 
Mintzberg's (1989) rejection of this notion of 'shareholder value'. This led to a 
reliance on budgetary control systems. As outlined in the literature (for example 
Mintzberg 1983, 1989; Mullins 1999; Piper 1980; Stewart 1999) bureaucratic 
organisations commonly use accounting control systems, setting easily identifiable 
performance levels such as sales, costs and profits.
The main control system exerted by head office was financial and keeping within 
budgets was vital. These easily measurable costs allowed head office to maintain a 
significant element of control over stores, and publicly defined the limits of store level 
managers (Stewart 1991). It also enabled head office managers to enforce the 
efficiency drives it had promised its shareholders. This dominance of budgets and
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shareholder priority was outlined by both Armstrong (1989) and Kinnie (1989), as 
retail head offices increasingly control stores through financial management systems.
The cost minimisation approach of 'Groceryco 2000' also impacted on the deployment 
of labour at store level. The amount of labour a store could deploy was determined by 
head office, guided by cost considerations on the basis of a store's forecast sales. 
Head office allocated the store's labour allowance to the HR Manager, who then 
distributed the allowances between the Departments. The ability to resource stores 
was largely controlled by head office and accords with Goold and CampbelFs (1987) 
financial control mode of management.
There was no explicit policy from head office regarding the company's preferred ratio 
of full time to part time staff. This resulted in store level managers deploying labour 
using the budgets as a guideline, rather than any detailed operational prescription from 
head office. Many store level managers interpreted the cost minimisation initiatives as 
a requirement to employ more part timers. :
"There is no explicit direction that the company has indicated it wants to take, 
or that it wants a majority of part timers, but there is a general feeling that the 
company prefers part timers. The business is more feasible for part timers." 
(Replenishment Manager)
"Head office doesn't officially indicate whether they would prefer us to recruit 
full timers or part timers, but it's probably part timers because they're 
cheaper." (Administration Controller)
"It's also cheaper to employ part timers in terms of overtime costs, benefits and 
national insurance." (Customer Service Manager)
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This supports the conclusions of Brewster et al (1993), and Blyton and Morris (1992), 
that a focus on cost reduction often means an increased employment of non-standard 
labour. Neathey and Hurstfield (1995), and O'Reilly (1994), found retail managers 
commonly employ non-standard employees to reduce costs. Store level managers at 
Groceryco claimed the budget reductions, imposed by head office, restricted the 
employment of full timers:
"Now the company are cutting down on the hours you can't afford full timers 
any more." (Stock Management Controller)
"There are not enough hours given by head office to run the department 
properly. In 1995 we had 425 hours a week to schedule for, but in 1996 it's 
down to 335. The business is only feasible for part timers now." (Fresh Food 
Controller)
A further implication of these cost-cutting initiatives was a change in the nature of part 
time shift patterns. Traditionally, part timers worked at week-ends, and in the 
evenings, to resource peaks in trading and cover the higher number of unsociable hours 
- a consequence of longer store opening hours. Cost reduction initiatives had 
necessitated a variety of part time shifts in an effort to make more effective use of 
labour, again reflecting the tight constraints under which store level managers had to 
operate:
"Since there has been a cutback in hours there are more part timers than ever 
before, but they are not all doing the same hours. There are now part timers 
who work during the week as well as the more traditional shifts at weekends 
and evenings." (Support Services Manager)
These ad hoc, operational responses to head office demands reflect UK employers' 
typical use of non-standard labour to fulfil short-term business needs (Blyton and 
Morris 1992; Freathy and Sparks 1996; Hunter et al 1993; Marginson et al 1993; 
Neathey and Hurstfield 1995; O'Reilly 1994).
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It was where human resources were quantifiable that head office maintained the 
greatest control. Therefore, it was the 'harder', measurable aspects of HRM where 
head office took control, as also found by Storey (1987; 1995) and Legge (1995). 
This highlights the machine nature of Groceryco, with head office using financial 
control systems and performance targets to exert control over local stores.
As a result store level managers made a link between adhering to financial budgets and 
their future employment security, as also observed by Marginson et al (1993). With 
the employment security of store level managers at Groceryco threatened by recent 
redundancies and re-structuring, many saw the achievement of financial targets as even 
more essential to their future careers at Groceryco:
"We all lost our jobs and had to re-apply for the new ones. Can you imagine 
after working for Groceryco for so many years, they literally sack you and tell 
you to re-apply with no guarantee of getting a job at the same level, or one that 
you actually want? There's no guarantee it won't happen again either." 
(Replenishment Manager)
Multiple store retailers have been found to use technology to standardise the retail 
process and make cost savings (Tordjman 1994; Walters and Hanrahan 2000). The 
impact of this on the roles and responsibilities of store level managers at Groceryco 
will be detailed in this section.
Groceryco also matched Mintzberg's machine configuration through their use of 
technology. The role of technology has, according to previous research (for example, 
Deery and Mahoney 1994; Freathy and Sparks 1994; Houlton and Thomas 1990; 
Martin 1987; Sparks 1987; Tomlinson et al 1997), enabled retailers to further
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centralise store level functions. Head office managers at Groceryco recognised this 
opportunity:
"With routine but time consuming tasks such as product ordering being 
performed increasingly by technology we have been able to re-think radically 
store management structures......Substantial cost savings have also been
achieved as an important by-product of these changes." (Annual Report 
1995:14)
This accords with Ogbonna's (1992) conclusions that technology frees store level 
management from routine tasks, to enable them to concentrate on HRM.
One function which had been centralised, as a result of increasing technology, was 
stock management. A computerised system, introduced in 1994, centrally placed 
orders for stock, relying on store sales data from the EPOS system. The removal of 
store level management discretion left managers frustrated, believing head office 
management was deliberately removing the remaining skill and discretion from their 
roles, in order to extend their control over store operations:
"I think it's what head office want as they are the ones directing this loss of skill 
at store level - they just want to control us as much as possible. Take the stock 
ordering, for example - we moved from a completely manual system to a 
combination of manual and automatic through to completely computerised in 
the space of just four years with no consultation with store level staff. Now 
we don't even get the chance to predict customer demands. I'm just a 
glorified shelf-filler now." (Replenishment Manager)
This standardisation of the labour process concurs with Braverman's de-skilling theory 
and the 'Fordist' approach to management.
EPOS was used to measure cashier performance. Head office set cashiers a target of 
scanning 23 items per minute, who were measured via the EPOS system. Such 
monitoring of cashier throughput was also noted by Ogbonna and Whipp (1999).
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Cashiers at the Blackfen store averaged only 19 items per minute, which was attributed 
to the higher age profile of the cashiers:
"They are going as fast as they physically can, although they do tend to stop 
and chat to the customers a lot, which slows them down. But then you are 
asking them to sacrifice customer service for speed. The system and the target 
set by head office takes no account of age." (Customer Service Manager)
This concurs with Mintzberg's (1989) machine configuration and its emphasis on 
efficiency leading to a preoccupation with the 'measurable', rather then social, 
intangible benefits.
While at the time of this research study EPOS was not directly deployed for staff 
scheduling purposes, its development was underway. The company aimed to 
introduce an automated labour scheduling system for all retail employees. The system 
would use store data on employees, sales forecast, the number, and throughput of 
checkouts producing a staff schedule for each department, with no store level 
management input. This demonstrated further attempts by head office to centralise 
store operations through technology. This was denied by head office managers who 
insisted it would 'liberate' store level managers to pursue customer service objectives:
"We want to continue to remove the more mundane tasks from managers so 
they can concentrate on customer service. We're hoping the computerised 
scheduling system will help achieve this. The main benefit of these changes is 
the ability of our retail managers to place a greater emphasis on customer 
service when their time isn't taken up with the more routine tasks such as staff 
scheduling." (HR Manager, Head Office)
This demonstrated the extent to which managers at head office managed from a 
distance, or practised 'thin' management. They seemed unaware of the social 
consequences of their policies. The de-motivation and frustration of store level 
managers, caused by the re-structuring, would only be exacerbated by this
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computerised staff scheduling system. Yet head office managers legitimised their 
increased control as liberalisation for store level managers - the antithesis of store level 
managers' views and experiences.
It can be seen how improved technology facilitated the quantification of labour, which 
enabled head office to further standardise processes, increasing its control over store 
operations. This supports Ogbonna's (1992) findings of increased centralisation as a 
result of improved technology. It also accords with Mintzberg's machine organisation 
where "the techno structure....... emerges as the key part of the structure" (Mintzberg
1989:134), fulfilling Gershuny's (1987), and Rajan's (1987), prediction about the 
increased demand for technology in multiple store retailing.
9.7 STORE LEVEL MANAGERS' AUTONOMY
Although much of the data supports the notion of Groceryco operating as Mintzberg's 
(1989) machine configuration, at the same time, there were also features of his 
diversified typology in existence. Multiple store retailers necessarily require a degree 
of decentralisation arising from their size and the geographical dispersion of stores 
(Child 1984; Mullins 1999; Stewart 1999). This can give rise to areas of autonomy for 
local managers, particularly those at senior store management level.
As found by Freathy and Sparks (1994), head office managers at Groceryco set 
performance targets for store level mangers to achieve. This standardisation of 
outputs meant that if these targets were achieved by store level managers, there was 
less intervention in other aspects of store operations - a feature of Mintzberg's
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diversified configuration. Store level managers at Groceryco were resentful of the 
increasing centralisation of tasks and decisions, which had previously been theirs, 
tensions typical of Mintzberg's diversified organisation.
Store level managers felt there was less involvement from head office in those 
management tasks that were difficult to quantify. This was predominately in local 
employee resourcing, such as recruitment and selection, on-the-job training, staff 
scheduling and delegation of tasks. As Emmanuel et al (1990) highlighted, HRM is 
very difficult to measure in quantitative terms, which negates control using the 
standardisation of outputs methods. Instead a standardisation of work content might 
be employed as the control system for HRM and employee resourcing (Merchant 
1985; Mintzberg 1983). Thus, the day-to-day management of employees was left to 
local discretion:
"There really isn't much involvement with managers at a higher level. They act 
as merely an advisory service, but may give a gentle nudge when they realise 
something is wrong." (Store HR Manager)
"We're allowed a relatively high level of autonomy in the store's day to day 
running. They may have audits, and there is the ethnic monitoring form, but as 
long as best practice is followed and consistency maintained then the store is 
left alone." (Store Manager)
This devolution of HR activities to retail line managers was also found by Neathey and 
Hurstfield (1995), and Tomlinson et al (1997). While head office maintained control 
of staffing budgets there was little intervention in a store's management of its human 
resources, if budgets and targets were met:
"I have a fair bit of autonomy managing the checkouts as long as the queues 
and wage bills are low." (Checkout Controller)
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The recruitment and selection of new employees was the responsibility of store level 
managers. While head office produced a company-wide recruitment process, store 
level managers conducted that process. They determined the vacancy, albeit within 
head office budgets, and made the final decision who to recruit:
"I'll decide whether to replace the member of staff who has left and then what 
flexibility is required from that position. I'll go to Jean who 
tells me whether I can afford those hours or not. If I can then we'll go ahead 
with advertising the vacancy. If I can't then it's back to the drawing board." 
(Support Services Manager)
"The interview is with the Controller who makes the final decision who to 
recruit. It is a devolved decision to the person who will ultimately have to 
manage that employee (Store HR Manager)
Although each store had a HR Manager, Controllers held responsibility for the training 
and development of new staff. An induction training programme was centrally 
designed, but once completed all on-the-job training was conducted at Section level:
"Individual sections are responsible for training which is overseen by me as the 
HR Manager." (Store HR Manager)
Training is an aspect of management, notoriously difficult to quantify, and thus head 
office managers at Groceryco conceded responsibility for on-the-job training to store 
level. This is in contrast to Smith's (1988) findings where he found the content of 
training was set centrally to ensure consistency.
As mentioned in Section responsibility for scheduling employees' working hours 
was at store level, with the activity forming a large part of a manager's job. The 
importance of this task was highlighted by Arrowsmith and Sisson (2000), and 
demonstrates the control store level managers held over employees' quality of work 
life. While this role was an important area of autonomy for store level managers, it 
must be remembered that head office planned to centralise this function using
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technology. This adds support for Mintzberg's (1989) belief that head office control in 
a diversified organisation eventually drives it to a 'machine' configuration.
9.8 STRATEGIES OF INDEPENDENCE
This chapter so far has described the degree of choices and constraints of store level 
management at Groceryco. This emanates from Groceryco's corporate strategy, and 
the balance between centralisation and decentralisation in the formal organisational 
structure. During the interviews with Groceryco managers it became clear that 
discrepancies existed between the rhetoric and reality of corporate strategy and 
policies. This was caused by a combination of store level managers resisting the 
increasing centralisation and transfer of power to head office, and their manipulation of 
the remaining areas of autonomy available to them.
As previous research has identified (Heller 1997; Johnson 1987; Mintzberg 1989), 
there is often a gap between organisational strategy and what actually happens in large 
organisations. This has been attributed to the differences between managers at senior 
level, who devise the strategies, and those at operational level, who are the 
implementors. Due to the size and geographical dispersion of Groceryco and its 
stores, managers at head office were very distant from store operations. They relied 
heavily on formal information to formulate strategy. Mintzberg (1989) defined this 
detached management approach as 'thin' management. Meanwhile store level 
managers at Groceryco, were highly involved in operational issues, and could be 
defined as Mintzberg's (1989) 'thick' managers. Using Duncan's (1975) model, head
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office managers operated at the 'philosophical' level, while store level managers 
worked at the 'art' level.
Existing literature already suggests that the formation of strategy and policy does not 
necessarily indicate successful implementation without resistance from employees 
(Marchington and Parker 1990; Mintzberg 1989; Tamkin et al 1997). This was 
evident at Groceryco and manifested itself in a variety of ways, as the following 
examples will illustrate.
A key goal of the 'Groceryco 2000' strategy was the improvement of customer 
service:
"Customer service is the key priority." (Annual Report 1995:14) 
Such a link between the improvement of customer service and the competitive 
advantage it can provide, was identified by Gardner and Sheppard (1989). However, 
Groceryco's competitors also made customer service a priority. This ability to easily 
replicate strategy (see Christopherson 1996; Doogan 1992; Freathy and Sparks 1996; 
Gardner and Sheppard 1989; Walker 1992) reflects the 'thin' nature of strategy 
formulation at Groceryco, despite their claims of innovation.
Part of Groceryco's customer service strategy included additions to the customer 
service provision. Bag packers were introduced, to help customers at the checkouts, 
as well as 'Queuebusters', who were existing members of staff, from across the store, 
till-trained to work on checkouts during peak shopping periods. The intentions of 
these initiatives were to improve the level of customer service, and fulfil the company's
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internal target of queues length. While head office believed these initiatives 
significantly improved Groceryco's standard of customer service, store level managers 
held a very different perspective. They maintained that the deployment of bag packers 
was not feasible because of the budgetary pressures. Staff officially designated as bag 
packers were often deployed on checkouts to reduce the length of queues. As a result, 
the customer service initiatives introduced by head office were not always providing 
the anticipated premium level of service. The introduction of'Queuebusters' was also 
negatively received by store level managers. They complained about the extent to 
which staff were taken from their shop-floor duties to work on the checkouts:
" I lose about 5 hours a week to the tills, which is a lot of hours when you are 
running a tight ship." (Support Services Manager)
Store level managers argued that Queuebusters did not improve the standard of 
customer service, because staff were taken away from their departments, which left 
shelves without stock and service counters under-staffed:
"When my staff are away manning the checkouts [sic] the department is left 
with no one to fill the shelves. It has to be done, so we end up doing it at the 
end of the shift, when there are hardly any customers in the store. Meanwhile 
the cashiers go home as soon as their shift ends which causes a lot of 
resentment amongst my staff, who are only having to work late because they 
helped out on checkouts earlier in the day." (Replenishment Manager)
This highlights the differences between levels of management at Groceryco. 'Thin' 
managers at head office believed the new customer service initiatives were a success. 
Meanwhile store level managers, with a 'thick' management perspective, knew these 
initiatives were impractical in the climate of cost minimisation, so failed to support 
them.
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With the 'Groceryco 2000' strategy came a new organisational structure for stores. 
The creation of a Customer Service Manager was hailed as an important part of 
Groceryco's strategy to build a "true customer service culture throughout Groceryco" 
(Annual Report 1996: 9):
"The Customer Service Manager is there to ensure we deliver our promises to 
customers and use this to our competitive advantage." (HR Manager, Head 
Office)
The emphasis placed on the new role of Customer Service Manager in delivering the 
Groceryco 2000 strategy was reiterated in the company's Annual Report:
"Responsibility for service at store level now clearly rests with a Customer 
Service Manager, second in seniority only to the Store Manager, whose main 
task is to ensure customer satisfaction." (Annual Report 1996: 9)
Despite these claims, the reality of the Customer Service Manager at store level was 
revealed during the interviews. The Customer Service Manager position at the 
Camden store was vacant throughout the period of research, despite the high profile 
nature of this store. This undermined Groceryco's commitment to customer service, 
with its inability to resource the Customer Service Manager position in one of its key 
stores. It also demonstrated the implications of'thick' and 'thin' management. 
Managers at head office were keen to publicise the role of Customer Service Manager, 
where the reality was a difficulty recruiting to this position.
Meanwhile, store level managers were juggling the consequences of Groceryco's 
conflicting strategies of customer service and cost reduction. The cost minimisation 
approach adopted by Groceryco meant store level managers were confronted with the 
reality of trying to deliver higher standards of customer service whilst making cost 
savings. The reality of these two conflicting strategies was exposed
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during interviews with store level managers:
"Flexibility may be the key to success, but only to a certain extent. You have 
to balance flexibility and efficiency with customer service. You can't ask 
everyone to work as quickly as possible without taking any time out to actually 
talk to the customers." (Customer Services Manager)
The research has revealed that the rhetoric and reality of customer service levels was 
often very different at Groceryco. The budget restrictions meant that customer service 
initiatives were often not implemented by store level managers. They operated as 
'thick' managers, and hence were aware of operational realities, which meant many of 
the customer service initiatives were not feasible in the day-to-day operations of a 
store. As a result there was a gap between head office managers' perceptions, of the 
standard of service provided at Groceryco stores, and the reality of the operational 
level itself.
Further examples of the variance between the rhetoric and reality of organisational life 
were seen in the implementation of employment policies. The third, and final, phase of 
'Groceryco 2000', was the introduction of the 'Make a Difference' programme, and 
the development of a 'People Strategy'. Managers at head office believed Phase three 
of'Groceryco 2000' had been successful in achieving its aims:
"Our 'Make a Difference' programme has enabled us to strengthen our 
relationship with our employees. This long term strategy has manifested into 
the 'People Strategy' which builds on the commitment and performance of our 
employees." (HR Manager, Head Office)
The 'People Strategy' aimed to improve the recruitment and retention of retail staff. 
Head office believed the quality of staff recruited to store level would improve, and as 
a result labour turnover would reduce. However, the reality at store level was 
continuing difficulties recruiting and retaining quality employees:
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"The calibre of staff who we attract is low. The good staff are only there as a 
stop gap or that's all they want to do and they don't want to progress." 
(Support Services Manager)
Part of the 'People Strategy' was to encourage employees to take responsibility for 
their own training and development. To achieve this all employees were provided with 
Personal Development Planners:
"All staff now have their own Personal Development Planner which is to make 
the individual as responsible for their development as much as the company. 
This encourages suggestions from the employees themselves so they have some 
input and control over their development and training." (HR Manager, Head 
Office)
Yet the reality of this training initiative was very different with few store level 
managers citing the use of these planners. Many dismissed the initiative as too 
idealistic:
"All staff now have Personal Development Planners, but we don't really have 
the time to sit down with staff and work through them." (Support Services 
Manager)
This again highlights the 'thin' nature of management at head office, who developed 
such 'soft' HRM initiatives. They were unaware that increasing head office demands 
on stores rendered these policies superfluous, because 'thick' managers at store level 
were without adequate resources to implement them.
While the impact of Phases 1 and 2 of'Groceryco 2000' had been fully experienced by 
all staff, the impact of the third phase, focusing on communicating the new 
employment strategy, appeared to be minimal. Many store level managers instead 
condemned the company for its lack of support for employees during the 
implementation of'Groceryco 2000':
"The changes in store structure meant that morale went down with the feelings 
of uncertainty. The training and support was practically non-existent." (Fresh 
Food Controller)
245
This contradicts the rhetoric of Groceryco's 'People Strategy' and head office 
managers' perceived success of the initiative. It highlights the difference between thick 
and thin (Mintzberg 1989) management at Groceryco, and exposes the mismatch of 
central policy and its actual implementation at operational level.
As Legge (1995) found, the rhetoric and reality of employment strategy tended to 
match where business strategy corresponded with 'hard' model HRM. In the 'hard' 
aspects of employment, where adherence to company policy tended to be more easily 
measured and monitored, the views of head office and store level managers were more 
likely to correlate. One example was the use of premium rate overtime. Company 
policy stated that full time employees were not permitted to work overtime (due to the 
additional costs). All managers at store level were aware of this policy and generally 
adhered to it:
"Full-timers work overtime very, very rarely - it's a taboo." 
(Stock Control Manager)
Thus, where the management of human resources could be measured, store level 
managers adhered to policy, as divergence was much more easily spotted by head 
office.
Groceryco had in place an equal opportunities policy that promoted equality beyond 
the requirements of the law. Together with Groceryco being a founding member of 
Opportunity 2000, this emphasises the company's strong commitment to equal 
opportunities:
"We are committed to promoting policies to ensure that employees and those 
who seek to work for us are treated equally regardless of sex, marital status, 
age, creed, colour, race or ethnic origin." (Annual Report 1995:27)
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However, the reality at shop-floor level was one of occupational segregation, selection 
decisions based on managers' stereotypes, and the segregation of workers according to 
personal circumstances. This accords with previous research, (for example, Beechey 
and Perkins 1987; Burchell and Rubery 1990, 1994; Collinson et al 1991; Hunter and 
Maclnnes 1991), which found that managers have very distinct notions of 
segmentation in the labour supply, which influence their employment decisions.
Gender assumptions played an important role in determining the suitability of 
employees for jobs, as found in previous research (Beechey and Perkins 1987; Bradley 
1989; Burchell and Rubery 1990, 1994; Collinson et al 1991; Hunter and Maclnnes 
1991; Hunter et al 1993; MacEwan Scott 1994; Milkman 1983; Tomlinson et al 1997). 
Skill requirements of a job linked to the traditional perceptions of male and female 
work was evident. Women at Groceryco were more highly represented in Customer 
Service and Support Service departments. Here traditionally female jobs were found, 
such as cashiers and administration assistants, utilising feminine skills.
Notwithstanding their equal opportunities statement there appeared to be evidence of a 
'glass ceiling' in operation at Groceryco. Despite being a predominately female 
workforce at store level, almost three-quarters (73 per cent) of management positions, 
in the two case study stores, were held by men. Women tended to be involved in 
management positions where their staff were predominately female, and the role was 
gendered female. This underlines both the horizontal and vertical segregation of the 
Groceryco retail workforce.
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The employee resourcing decisions taken by store level managers were heavily 
influenced by their personal attitudes and stereotypes, which often undermined 
Groceryco's equal opportunities policy. Many of these stereotypes were based on the 
number of hours an employee worked. Store level managers were critical of part 
timers on the basis of quality, commitment and reliability. External commitments, such 
as family or study, were viewed by many managers as preventing part timers from 
offering total commitment. The strongest assumptions held by store level managers 
involved the further categorisation of part timers according to their personal 
circumstances. Managers tended to classify part timers into three categories of older 
workers, young student workers, and working mothers. Older workers were 
perceived to offer a high degree of reliability, and quality, but little real numerical 
flexibility:
"Some part timers are very good - those who are a little bit older take a pride in 
their work." (Fresh Food Controller)
"Some cashiers are causing problems - they are the older workers who are very 
inflexible." (Customer Service Manager)
Younger employees were consistently regarded as offering a high degree of numerical 
flexibility (in terms of hours they could cover), whilst not being very committed. It 
appeared that managers at the Blackfen store considered themselves fortunate to have 
good quality part time students due to the proximity of the store to local grammar
schools:
"The students are good for part time work as we have some good schools in 
the local area." (Store HR Manager)
While students were unilaterally cited as the most flexible type of part time employee, 
there was a gender dimension with store level managers perceiving younger male 
workers to be most flexible:
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HT.1.1It's certainly the younger ones who are more flexible - more often males as 
they seem to want the money more." (Support Services Manager)
However, male student workers were often perceived as only working for 'beer 
money', which was believed to have a detrimental impact on their level of 
commitment:
"The young lads don't take such a pride in their work as they only work for 
beer money." (Fresh Food Controller)
Working mothers were consistently viewed as very inflexible due to family 
responsibilities which restricted their numerical flexibility. This led some store level 
managers to question working mothers' level of commitment:
"It is fine line between part timers and their cost, commitment, reliability and 
quality. In the Blackfen area there are a lot of mothers who are looking for 
part time work to fit in with their child care arrangements. But they always put 
their family first so can't be so committed to Groceryco." (Customer Service 
Manager)
As with younger workers, managers perceived working mothers to have little financial 
need for employment, which again was seen to inhibit their commitment:
"Women are only working for pocket money and so won't want the extra shifts 
because they don't need the money so much." (Fresh Foods Controller)
This perception that part timers only worked for 'pin' or 'beer' money had serious 
consequences when managers made decisions as some store level managers indicated 
that part timers" shifts were less secure than full timers.
"I had to change the hours of staff within my department and wrote a business 
case which I presented to the staff. I concentrated on cutting and changing the 
part timers' hours because full-timers need the money more than part timers." 
(Replenishment Manager)
This supports previous research findings that part timers are often treated as peripheral 
by their employers (Hunter and Maclnnes 1992; Neathey and Hurstfield 1995; 
Robinson 1990).
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These findings illustrate the importance of managers' perceptions and their 
contradiction with Groceryco's equal opportunities policy. These findings add 
credence to Dickens' (2000) conclusions, that equal opportunities policies do not 
necessarily indicate a change in employee behaviour. 'Thin' managers at head office 
were unaware of the impact stereotypes held by store level managers had on local 
employee resourcing. Budgetary pressures increased the employment of part timers, 
which only exacerbated the prevalence of this stereo-typing.
Interviews with store level managers exposed the extent to which they deployed 
various strategies of independence to circumvent head office control. They made 
attempts to maintain some independence from head office in spite of their feelings of 
low morale, job insecurity, and the increasing centralisation of their tasks. This adds 
further support to Mintzberg's 'diversified' organisation, where lower order managers 
exert a pull to 'balkanise' the structure and minimise centralisation. Some examples of 
these strategies of independence were found at store level.
Store level managers held the greatest degree of autonomy in the scheduling of staffing 
hours, which provided the opportunity to deploy strategies of independence. For 
example, company policy required staff schedules to be written four weeks in advance. 
However the reality at shop floor was very different, and the schedules only written 
two weeks in advance:
"We write the schedules two weeks in advance, but the company wants us to 
increase this to four weeks. The reality is that it's easier to write the schedules 
every fortnight as you have more of an idea of the absences you've got to work 
around." (Replenishment Manager)
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Official company policy allowed store level managers to change an employee's shift up 
to 48 hours prior to its commencement, but no later, and employees were entitled to 
refuse to work the altered shift. In reality store level managers demanded greater 
flexibility from their staff:
"Official company policy is 48 hours notice of any change and then the 
employees don't have to work it. Unofficially they change their hours or work 
extra at much less notice. It's about give and take." (Ambient Controller)
Head office policy demanded that all employees work flexible shifts (i.e. different shift 
patterns each week). However store level managers maintained that this was not 
feasible if certain segments of the labour market were to be recruited, and retained. As 
a result many working mothers effectively worked fixed hours due to their inability to 
offer numerical flexibility:
"We get flexibility from everyone except for the mums who tend to work 10.30 
a.m. - 2.30 p.m. or 11.00 a.m. to 3.00 p.m. which is okay because they cover 
the lunch breaks and lunchtime rush." (Store HR Manager)
These examples show that, despite the insecurity caused by 'Groceryco 2000', store 
level managers made efforts to maintain their independence from head office. Where 
head office control remained minimal, predominately in some aspects of employee 
resourcing, store level managers were able to adapt company policy to best deal with 
the increasing demands and constraints placed on them. Where company policy was 
perceived by store level managers as impractical, and where limited head office control 
existed, strategies of independence were deployed, which were intentionally 
unbeknown to head office. However, the extent of these strategies of independence 
was minimal, exemplifying the increasing control exercised by head office over store 
operations.
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This case study research has demonstrated the realities of local HRM and employee 
resourcing in a multiple store retail organisation. This includes a divergence between 
corporate strategy and operational reality, the degree of head office control over store 
operations, and strategies of independence deployed by operational managers to 
undermine this control, in order to make the systems work.
Groceryco demonstrated many of Mintzberg's (1989) 'machine' configuration 
characteristics. Corporate strategy and policies focused on efficiency, while efforts 
were made by head office to increasingly control and centralise store operations. Use 
of financial management control systems were made, which enabled head office to set 
quantifiable performance targets for store level managers to achieve. This focus on 
output control, with an emphasis on efficiency, is typical of 'machine' organisations.
This research found differences between the formulation of corporate strategy at senior 
management level and the implementation at store level as also identified by Mintzberg 
(1989) and Heller (1997). This again highlights the machine nature of Groceryco, with 
'thick' and 'thin' management (Mintzberg 1989) in operation at different levels of the 
organisation. It was evident that managers at head office and store level at Groceryco 
did not always hold the same strategic vision, with store level managers juggling the 
realities of strategy implementation.
One key trend at Groceryco was the increasing centralisation of store level managers' 
tasks and responsibilities. Improved technology enabled head office to centralise many
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operational functions, including stock management, cashier performance, and 
ultimately staff scheduling, as also found by Ogbonna (1992).
Despite strong evidence of Mintzberg's 'machine' configuration predominating at 
Groceryco, there was also support for a 'diversified' configuration. The regional 
structure and large size of the organisation meant that some aspects of operational 
management had to be devolved to store level. It was those aspects of management 
that were difficult for head office to quantify, and thus control, where store level 
management autonomy was witnessed. This was primarily local employee resourcing 
including recruitment and selection, on-the-job training, staff scheduling and the 
organisation of tasks and responsibilities.
As head office increasingly centralised operational decision-making, and imposed 
greater demands, store level managers made some attempts to circumvent head office 
control and policies. Where store level managers believed company policies and 
systems to be unworkable, they deployed strategies of independence to manage the 
system and its constraints. The contradictory nature of Groceryco's corporate 
strategy, demanding both cost minimisation and enhancement of customer service, 
actually encouraged these strategies of independence. With fewer resources available 
to store level managers to implement the quality initiatives, they 'juggled' and 
'manipulated' organisational policy to try and deliver the company's strategic goals.
The predominance of quantifiable budgets and targets as a means of controlling store 
level operations impacted on the management of local HRM. As a consequence, store
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level managers directed their efforts towards that which was measured as this was the 
main criteria by which head office judged their management capabilities. With 
employee resourcing the main area of responsibility for store level managers, it was in 
this function where strategies of independence prevailed. The focus on tangible 
measurements, encouraged by the organisational control systems, led to an emphasis 
on 'hard' HRM at store level. This was regardless of any 'soft' HR company policies 
that existed, such as the 'Training and Development Planner' initiative. It also resulted 
in an increased employment of part timers (considered cheaper to employ), particularly 
students; the alteration of employees' working hours to meet customer service 
performance targets; and contravention of the equal opportunity policy.
'Groceryco 2000' posed enormous threats to job security through redundancies, de- 
layering and re-organisation. This partly affected store level managers who generated 
defensive policies to protect their jobs and career prospects. As Legge (2000) found, 
managers hoped to safeguard their jobs, and enhance their career opportunities by 
portraying an image of competent management to head office. This was in contrast to 
Sayles' (1999: 600) claim that middle managers actually play a key role in highlighting 
problems to senior management. Consequently, store level managers masked any 
problems they experienced trying to meet head office demands. Yet these efforts were 
somewhat restricted by the increased centralisation of store level tasks through the 
sophisticated use of technology.
To summarise, the major source of head office control over store operations was 
through output control systems with improved technology providing the opportunity
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for increased centralisation. Store level managers were the implementors of 
'Groceryco 2000' and, as Sayles (1999) found, they often 'massaged' senior 
management demands to accommodate the operational context. Acting predominately 
as 'disturbance handlers' (Mintzberg 1989: 20) they adhered to the demands of'thin' 
managers at head office within the constraints of operational level. Store level 
managers had greater autonomy over employee resourcing decisions, typically 
intangible aspects of management, difficult for head office to quantify, and thus 
control. Strategies of independence were deployed to counter the impact of increasing 
demands and centralisation of tasks by head office, mainly in local employee resourcing 
decisions.
This chapter has presented a discussion and analysis of the empirical data for the 
Groceryco case study. Background information providing a contextual perspective to 
the case study organisation and stores was given, before an examination of local 
management constraints and autonomy. The existence of various strategies of 
independence was detailed, and subsequent conclusions drawn.
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This chapter presents the findings of the empirical research conducted using the 
embedded case study method. The data gathered provides background information to 
the case study organisation, and outlines the nature of store level management and 
HRM in Homeco. The chapter examines the choices and constraints of store level 
managers, and the consequences of these for the management of human resources and 
employee resourcing.
Homeco pic. is a major DIY and garden multiple retailer both in the UK and overseas. 
The company began as a small DIY store in Southern England first offering shares for 
sale to the public in 1979 with 26 retail stores in operation. Homeco quickly expanded 
through the acquisition of other D.I.Y. companies and became market leader of the 
home improvement sector in 1986. In 1996 Homeco had 280 stores, an annual UK 
turnover of £1.5 billion and a profit of £97m.
Homeco operated two types of store formats called Supercentres and Warehouses, 
which were managed as separate divisions. This case study concentrates on the 
Supercentre Division in which Homeco's superstores were based. This division was 
structured on a regional basis. Nine districts in the UK split were between three 
Regional Directors. Each district was managed by a District Manager, with 
responsibility for approximately 12 stores, and to whom Store Managers reported (see
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appendix eleven for store structure). Different styles of refurbishment were in 
operation. Stores which had been refurbished were referred to as 'Renewal1 stores 
while those that had not undergone any refurbishment were known as Traditional' 
stores.
Each Supercentre, whether 'Traditional' or 'Renewal', had a Store Manager who held 
overall responsibility for the store's operations. Two assistant managers - a Sales 
Manager and Service Manager, assisted the Store Manager. Stores were split into 
departments with a manager assigned to each department. 'Traditional' stores had a 
further layer of management called 'Supervisors', who deputised for Department 
Managers.
As outlined in Section 6.4, two embedded units were selected for each case study 
organisation. These embedded units took the form of stores, chosen to enable a 
comparison between a newly refurbished 'Traditional' store (West Thurrock) and a 
'Renewal' store (Oxford).
This 'Traditional' store was eight years old at the time of the investigation, and based 
in a large out-of-town retail park, South Essex. The Store Manager had been at the 
store for one year having previously been a Store Manager with Homeco's main 
competitor. The store opened for 78 hours a week, 08.00 to 20.00 from Monday to 
Saturday and 10.00 to 16.00 on Sundays.
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As can be seen from Table ten the store employed 70 workers, of which 49 (70 per 
cent) worked part-time. Eleven employees (16 per cent) were temporary, five of these 
from a local employment agency. Over half (60 per cent) of the work force were 
female, with the majority (81 per cent) of women working part-time
Male
Female
Total
Full time
13(18.6%)
8 (11.4%)
21 (30.0%)
Part time
15(21.4%)
34 (48.6%)
49 (70%)
Total
28 (40.0%)
42 (60.0%)
70 (100.0%)
As was usual for a 'Traditional' store, West Thurrock had two assistant store 
managers and three departments (Hardside, Softside and Administration). The three 
departments each had a manager responsible for various sections. Sections were then 
managed by supervisors who deputised for department managers in their absence. The 
largest department within the store was Administration, with 44 (63 per cent) 
employees, which included the staffing of checkouts (demanding more intensive 
labour).
The Oxford store was ten years old and based in an out-of-town retail park. It was 
classified as a 'Renewals' store having undergone major refurbishment in 1994. The 
store manager had been at the store for 8 months, having previously managed the
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Banbury store. The store opened for 78 hours from 08.00 to 20.00 Monday to 
Saturdays and 10.00 to 16.00 on Sundays.
As can be seen in Table eleven the store employed 62 employees, of which only 9(15 
per cent) worked part-time. Managers attributed the unusually low percentage of part- 
timers to the local labour market, as discussed in Section 10.8. Just over half (52 per 
cent) of the work force were female, with 5(15 per cent) of women working part- 
time.
Male
Female
Total
Full time
26 (41.9%)
27 (43.5%)
53 (85.4%)
Part time
4 (6.5%)
5 (8.1%)
9 (14.6%)
Total
30 (48.4%)
32 (51.6%)
62 (100%)
As a 'Renewal' store there were two assistant store managers, six departments and 
requisite managers, but no supervisory level. The Oxford store had six departments 
with the largest department being Customer Services employing 32 (52 per cent) staff.
The chapter from here onwards will be a discussion of the two case study stores, using 
data gathered from between January 1996 and January 1997. This was collected via 
semi-structured face-to-face interviews conducted with managers at both Head Office 
and store-level, and an examination of company literature, as outlined in chapter seven.
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10.3 CORPORATE STRATEGY: A BRIEF OUTLINE
The corporate strategy of Homeco had as its primary objective:
"to deliver consistent and superior returns to our shareholders by being one of 
Europe's most profitable volume retailers" (Annual report, 1997:1).
The goal of the strategy was to increase growth using the continuous development of 
offers to meet the changing needs and aspirations of customers more effectively than 
competitors. Such an emphasis on performance against specified quantifiable targets is 
the result of multiple store retailing becoming increasingly answerable to the City and 
shareholder pressure (Dawson 2000; Freathy and Sparks 1994; Sparks 1989).
Homeco's corporate strategy at the time of the research (January 1996 to December 
1996) was to restore its profitability, develop plans for profitable growth and improve 
the organisation's infrastructure and processes. This was in response million 
reduction in profit the previous year, resulting from a market downturn on Supercentre 
sales, combined with increased costs arising from the store refurbishment strategy. 
Sales in 'Renewal' stores were ahead of predictions, but the majority of unrerurbished 
Supercentres had ended the same period with a decline in sales. To achieve their 
strategic goals a number of policies were introduced including an expansion of the 
store refurbishment programme, the introduction of a customer loyalty card and efforts 
to improve operational efficiency. In 1995 the company set a target of £20 million 
cost savings, outlining a cost minimisation approach to their corporate strategy. An 
emphasis on shareholder value has been identified in previous research (Legge 1995; 
Sisson 1994) and found to lead to a focus on short-term costs, and the maintenance of 
a high share price, despite Mintzberg's (1989) dismissal of the notion of'shareholder 
value'. Concerns have also been raised about organisations placing a priority on
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efficiency and short-term needs at the neglect of long-term social consequences 
(Blyton and Morris 1992; Burnes 2000; Mintzberg 1979, 1989). Store-level managers 
at Homeco were acutely aware of the cost pressures placed on them and felt the 
company placed too great an emphasis on costs:
"The company focuses too much on money." (Store Manager, West Thurrock) 
Previous research has also found an emphasis on cost minimisation in retail strategy, 
particularly in the food retailing sector (Christopherson 1996; Freathy and Sparks 
1996; Ogbonna and Wilkinson 1988; Ogbonna and Whipp 1999).
A major impetus was placed on a 'twin-track' strategy. One track involved the 
refurbishment of Supercentres, and the other was the progressive roll out of the 
Warehouse format. This strategy was designed to stimulate market expansion and 
ensure growth through taking market share from weaker competitors, particularly in 
the independent and builders merchant sector. The store refurbishment programme 
was launched for existing stores to improve customer service and product ranges. 
Two programmes were in operation from 1994 onwards. The first format was known 
as the 'Fareham' model and 39 stores had been revamped under this programme by the 
end of 1996. Particular features included an orientation towards home decoration and 
significantly improved levels of customer service. Previous research has identified the 
importance of customer service in retail competitive strategies, which particularly 
gained prevalence during the 1990s (Doogan 1992; Freathy and Sparks 2000; Gardner 
and Sheppard 1989; Ruston 1999). As Sparks (1992c) predicted, customers will 
increasingly reject inadequate service provision, which will enforce multiple store 
retailers to continue to apply customer service as a key strategic tool.
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An additional emphasis on service meant that staff levels were approximately 35 per 
cent higher than in a Traditional1 store - staff which ideally included trade experts and 
an interior design team. This re-introduction of skilled personnel on the shop floor is a 
recent trend noted in multiple store retailing (Ruston 1999). A development of this 
was known as the 'Fareham II1 model where improvements to the original 'Fareham' 
design were made.
The second refurbishment programme was called 'Project Wheel1 under which 108 
stores had been revamped. There was less emphasis on customer service under the 
'Project Wheel1 programme, but instead the emphasis was on store design. Stores 
were re-designed to make shopping easier in terms of layout, signage and increased 
product availability. Both programmes proved successful with the increase in sales 
paying back the cost of the 'Project Wheel1 scheme within a year.
In 1993 Homeco introduced a customer loyalty card in collaboration with a major food 
retailer. Points were awarded to customers on their supermarket loyalty card for 
purchases made at Homeco. These points could then be redeemed at the supermarket. 
Concurrently a major advertising campaign was launched to emphasis value for money 
and good customer service - qualities seen as central to Homeco's brand image.
Homeco's strategy aimed to make operational efficiencies to increase profitability. 
This was achieved by concentrating on supply chain management and stock 
management procedures. This strategy successfully reduced discontinued stock whilst 
improving product availability and stock turn, which worked towards achieving the
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£20 million cost-savings target set in 1995. This again emphasises the cost 
minimisation focus of Homeco's corporate strategy. Such a priority in corporate 
strategy can lead to a focus on short-term profitability and 'quick-fix' solutions in 
multiple store retailing (Burnes 2000). The twin goals of quality enhancement, (via 
improved customer service and store design) and cost minimisation could be 
considered contradictory as argued in the literature (for example, Doogan 1992; 
Gardner and Sheppard 1989; Lowe and Crewe 1996; Ogbonna 1992; Ogbonna and 
Whipp 1999; Shackleton 1998; Sparks 1996). The consequences of this will be 
examined in Section 10.8 when the realities of Homeco's strategies at store level will 
be discussed.
10.4 THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF STORE LEVEL 
MANAGEMENT
To fulfil this study's research objectives the nature of store level management at 
Homeco was explored during the data gathering period. A re-structuring exercise in 
Renewal stores had removed the lower tier of management, as also noted by Sparks 
(2000b), whilst the organisational structure in 'Traditional' stores remained 
unchanged. In 'Renewal' stores the restructuring had led to an increase in 
responsibilities and span of control for Department Managers, reflected in an official 
change of title to Team Leader. For the purpose of this research study the term 
Department Manager will be used for this level of store management for clarification 
purposes.
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Management and supervisory positions in the Homeco case study stores were 
organised, without exception, on a full-time basis, a feature of retail employment also 
found by Freathy and Sparks (2000). The company did not promote part-time 
employees unless they were prepared to switch to full-time employment, regardless of 
knowledge and experience gained:
"I have an experienced part-timer - a woman who delegates the work within 
the department when I'm away. But she'll never go any higher in the company 
than General Assistant because she won't work full-time." (Softside Manager)
This reluctance to promote part timers is well documented in the literature (for 
example Hunter and Maclnnes 1991; Robinson 1990; Walsh 1990) and has the affect 
of limiting promotion for part-timers beyond a certain level (see also Tilly 1992). It 
was recognised that an increased use of part-timers made it difficult to maintain the 
internal promotion system:
"By using part-timers you have to go external for department managers - you 
don't get any career development with part-timers." (Assistant Manager)
Over half (56 per cent in West Thurrock, 60 per cent in Oxford) of all management 
positions in case study stores were held by men. Women were represented at senior 
store management level holding, for example, the store management position in Oxford 
and one of the assistant store management positions in West Thurrock. Neither were 
women necessarily in store management positions that were traditionally seen as 
'female' or where a largely female workforce reported to them. Oxford had a female 
Hardside manager, while West Thurrock had a male Checkouts supervisor.
Promotion and progression at store level was through the hierarchy of management 
and via a succession of different stores. Senior store level managers were expected to
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offer the company locational flexibility as part of their management development, as 
also found by Doogan (1992). The majority of managers at both case study stores 
were either internally promoted employees with a significant length of service, or older 
employees who had worked for other organisations, usually other retailers. The 
company was keen to recruit managers from the external labour market with previous 
retail experience. However the quality of these managers was questioned at store 
level:
"The company takes managers from third rate retail companies." (Assistant 
Manager)
Although Homeco ran a graduate management scheme, the majority of graduates 
undertook roles at head office, rather than at store level. It would appear that the 
polarisation of the workforce discussed by Bell (1973) and Crouch (1997) was 
occurring between head office and stores at Homeco, rather than within stores 
themselves. It could therefore be argued that the 'elite' workforce Levering (1990) 
talked of was being created at head office, rather than at store level. This could 
potentially increase any divergence between 'thin' managers at head office, and 'thick' 
managers at store level, as suggested by Mintzberg (1989).
To consider the role of store level managers in the execution of HR policies and 
employee resourcing practices, it is important to examine the nature of HRM at both 
corporate and operational level. Current literature on HRM in multiple store retailing 
points to a number of key trends including a poor regard for the HR profession; a low 
level of trade union membership and recognition; poor training and development of 
hourly paid sales assistants; and strategies aimed at labour efficiency. Consequently,
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much of the literature concludes that multiple store retailers tend to focus on 'hard' 
HRM techniques, although more progressive organisations are beginning to recognise 
the value of a 'softer' HRM approach (Truss et al 1997).
It has been argued that, to ensure human resource activities are built into the fabric of 
the corporate strategy, HRM directors should be on the board, or at least the executive 
committee of the business unit. This was not the case at Homeco which, according to 
Walker (1992), places doubt over the extent to which employment strategy was 
developed alongside corporate strategy. This supports the findings of Truss et al 
(1997) where there was more evidence of'one-way' linkage (Golden and Ramanujan 
1985) in organisations, where business strategy informs HR strategy, but not vice 
versa.
Homeco was facing a number of HR challenges at the time of this research study. 
These were outlined by the Personnel Manager at head office as being the need to 
make more efficient use of store level labour; problems recruiting staff at store level; 
and high labour turnover. The cost minimisation focus of Homeco's corporate 
strategy meant head office placed an increasing emphasis on the efficient use of labour 
in their stores. Homeco had already previously attempted to achieve this strategy of 
increased numerical flexibility at store level in 1994. During the empirical research 
Homeco again made attempts to consider the possibility of reducing labour costs 
through the introduction of greater numerically flexible working practices. The 
increased employment of part timers to achieve economic gains is a common feature of
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multiple retailers' employee resourcing strategies (Gregory 1991; Neathey and 
Hurstfield 1995; Robinson 1990; Walsh 1990).
A project team was set up to consider the feasibility of the strategy during the period 
of the fieldwork for this case study. However in early 1995, the team was again 
disbanded after failing to devise any supporting policies for the strategy. As a result, 
head office intentions to increase flexibility within its stores were never communicated 
to operational level. In early 1996 the strategy was resurrected in response to the HR 
challenges the company was facing Again a project team was set up to consider staff 
flexibility and productivity issues to determine the level of flexibility that was needed 
and how this could be achieved most effectively. Homeco wanted to introduce a 
computerised scheduling system to manage staff scheduling, thus removing the 
responsibility from managers in the stores. Such centralisation was also found by 
Doogan (1992), Smith (1988) and Sparks (2000a, 2000b).
Management consultants were appointed to look at productivity, and trading patterns 
within stores to assess the level of flexibility that was required by the company to 
improve efficiencies and make cost savings. Their role was to develop a 'time and 
motion1 study at store level to determine the level of flexibility that was required. The 
project team was in existence for ten months, but experienced problems with the 
management consultants that it had appointed. The consultant's work was considered 
to be poorly managed and unproductive by the Homeco's project team at head office. 
The consultants were taken off the project which was subsequently abandoned in 
November 1996, and the project team again disbanded. It was resurrected in January
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1997 overseen by a different internal management team who appointed new 
consultants. It was at this point that the fieldwork for this case study was completed. 
In terms of human resources Homeco suffered high labour turnover rates, and 
difficulties attracting new employees to the organisation. Homeco had an average 
annual turnover of labour at 48.5 per cent in 1991. Since 1993 Homeco had 
experienced difficulty recruiting school-leavers - a traditional source of labour for the 
organisation. This was exacerbated by the'demographic time-bomb 1 . In the late 1980s 
the company attempted to address these problems by matching employees and the 
company more closely, using the recruitment and selection process. This involved 
giving job applicants an adaptability test at the interview to assess the candidate's data 
matching abilities (matching descriptions of goods to the goods themselves), 
disposition towards customers and basic numeracy.
These recruitment problems also led managers at head office to devise recruitment 
policies with the context of these demographic trends in mind. As a result a policy was 
adopted in the early 1990s which involved targeting recruitment at the over 50s. 
Homeco decided to test its new strategy by opening a store staffed entirely by older 
workers. It proved a success in lowering labour turnover, improving product 
knowledge amongst sales staff and the general standard of customer service. 
Consequently, Homeco actively encouraged applicants from the over 50s age group on 
a company-wide basis. Freathy and Sparks (1993) noted that superstores which 
focused upon the recruitment of older workers had been more successful in meeting 
their demand for labour.
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Homeco recognised that some employees would benefit from the increased availability 
of flexible jobs that would result from the strategy to increase numerical flexibility. 
This would offer the opportunity to draw upon a wider labour market by offering such 
flexible working arrangements. The ideal solution was seen to be the recruitment of 
more part-time workers to attract 'women returners'. It was felt that the recruitment 
shortages experienced by the company would be eased through opening up 
employment to working mothers via flexible working.
There was no company standard regarding the pattern of working hours for part time 
employees. All employment decisions were taken at store level, including the pattern 
of working hours. The payroll budget was determined at head office and represented 
9-12 per cent of sales, depending on the type of store. Renewals stores were given a 
larger budget due to their commitment to higher levels of customer service. The 
payroll figure was calculated using the previous year's sales figures, thus conforming to 
control via the standardisation of outputs method (Merchant 1985; Mintzberg 1983). 
Part timers tended to work fixed hours, whereas full timers were expected to work 
different hours each week - the organisation of this varied between stores. Part time 
employees were more likely to be used for overtime where a premium rate would not 
be incurred, although in stores where recruitment shortages were critical full timers 
would regularly work overtime. There was no company policy regarding the use of 
premium rate overtime and little consistency between and even within the stores on 
their use of full timers for overtime.
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Homeco made wide and varied use of temporary contracts. The use of temporary staff 
has been identified as an important component of the retail workforce (Sparks 1992a, 
1992b; Walsh 1990, 1991), with the seasonal variation in retail sales the main driving 
force (Hunter and Maclnnes 1991). All new staff were recruited on a temporary 
contract through a 3 month probationary period, on successful completion of which 
employees were given a permanent contract. Homeco's stake in the gardening market 
meant a strongly seasonal trading pattern. Typically, the peak season for the gardening 
department ran from March to August, during which additional staff were recruited on 
fixed term contracts. Some stores making use of recruitment agencies due to 
difficulties recruiting from the local labour market. An analysis shows that in 1995, 
during the peak gardening trading month of May, 14 per cent of staff in Homeco's 
Supercentres were classified as temporary employees, falling to 3 per cent in 
December.
To support the strategy of enhanced levels of customer service Homeco claimed that it 
had "further developed its training for our people on the shop floor" (Annual Report 
1996: 7), whilst insisting that they invested "heavily in recruiting and training all its 
staff' (Annual Report 1996: 3). Homeco also had in place an equal opportunity policy 
that underlined its membership of Opportunity 2000:
"The Group's equal opportunities policy reflects the value that we attach to the 
differences in people and aims to remove the obstacles which stand in the way 
of each individual achieving their full potential". (Annual Report 1996:33)
This commitment was supported by an Equal Opportunities Review Group which had 
been in operation for four years. Such policies suggest a 'soft' HRM approach to the
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management of human resources, in contrast to the 'hard' HRM focus of the cost 
minimisation and numerical flexibility policies.
The role of store level managers was highly significant in terms of the deployment of 
labour at the operational level. Department Managers were responsible for recruitment 
and selection, training and development of the store's workforce, the deployment of 
labour, and staff scheduling. The centralisation of control evident in multiple store 
retailing led to a focus for store level managers on managing the store's workforce, as 
this remained their one area of relative autonomy (Hutchinson 1995; Maund 2001; 
Mullins 1999; Sparks 2000b). It was clear in Homeco that employment issues were 
devolved to store level with very few policies or guidelines from head office. Previous 
research has also found that multiple store retailers are most likely to devolve 
responsibility for HRM as far down the line as possible (for example Neathey and 
Hurstfield 1995; Tamkin et al 1997; Tomlinson et al 1997). The only intervention 
from head office was in the form of legal requirements such as Health and Safety, and 
equal opportunities. Any attempts by head office to intervene in labour decisions at 
store level were on an ad hoc basis. Such employment policies were often poorly 
communicated to managers in the stores which often resulted in confusion and a 
dismissal of the policies. This would suggest that store level managers had a wide 
responsibility for the function of HR, particularly employee resourcing, without much 
guidance from company policy. The extent and execution of this responsibility will be 
examined in more detail in Section 10.7.
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10.6 THE CONSTRAINTS OF STORE LEVEL MANAGEMENT
An objective of this research study has been to examine the influence of line managers' 
choices and constraints on their management of human resources. As Ackroyd and 
Thompson (1999) pointed out, "making choices within parameters is central to the 
managerial role" (p.86). It is therefore important to consider the constraints of store 
level management in each case study organisation, and assess the impact of these 
limitations on local employee resourcing decisions. This is imperative given Kinnie's 
(1989) criticism that relatively little attention has been paid to changes in control 
systems and the impact of this on HRM.
As outlined in chapter five, there are many methods of control that can be used to 
restrict the decision making powers of store level managers. These systems of control 
can either direct processes, or dictate output. Ways to achieve this in multiple store 
retailing include the implementation of corporate strategy, the design of the formal 
organisational structure, the setting of performance targets and budgets, or the 
deployment of technology.
In many ways store level managers at Homeco were afforded much autonomy in their 
management of day-to-day operations which provided evidence for Mintzberg's 
'diversified' configuration. As Child (1984) commented, communication links can 
become more tenuous in large organisations, resulting in a lack of co-ordination. Yet 
head office did make a few attempts to control store operations, and provided evidence 
of'thin' management techniques and Mintzberg's (1989) 'machine' configuration.
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Some aspects of operational management were subject to constraints instigated by 
head office. The centre maintained complete control in the decision-making process 
for store structuring, opening hours, stock management, and the setting of budgets and 
targets. Head office decided which stores would be refurbished, under which format, 
and imposed any accompanying re-structuring. Other evidence of centralisation was in 
the ordering of stock, with head office taking full responsibility for this. However, the 
effectiveness with which this was carried out was questioned by managers at store 
level. Some even held suspicions about the rationale behind the stock ordering 
process:
"Head office judge the levels of stock we need during the year and make the 
orders. There's usually too much of it at the beginning of the season and then 
after a couple of months it dwindles off. Head office must bulk buy all its 
products although I reckon they receive a back hander for all these bulk buys 
because it's rarely the stock we actually need." (Hardside Manager)
This highlights the differences between levels of management, with store level 
managers questioning the abilities, and morals, of head office managers. Such a 
dichotomy corresponds with Mintzberg's (1989) typology of management levels with 
head office operating a 'thin' management style, while store level managers were 
'managing through people' with a 'thick' approach.
The biggest constraint placed on stores by head office was through budgets and 
targets. As outlined by Armstrong (1989), Kinnie (1989) and Stewart (1991), financial 
management control systems enable head office management to publicly define store- 
level managers' limits through easily measurable targets. These accountancy control 
systems were extended to the management of human resources at store level. The 
staffing budget was determined by head office and represented 9 - 12 per cent of sales
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using the previous year's sales figures, and dependent on the store format. 'Renewal' 
stores were given a larger budget due to their commitment to higher levels of customer 
service. The Oxford store had a staffing budget of 11 per cent of sales, compared to 
West Thurrock with a budget of 9 per cent. Head office expected higher levels of 
sales after refurbishment. To compensate for the additional costs the Oxford store was 
set a target of increasing sales by 20 per cent after its refurbishment. The emphasis for 
store level managers was on keeping within the budgets and meeting the sales targets. 
This was one of Homeco's few 'machine' (Mintzberg 1989) characteristics, with head 
office exercising control over store operations, through the use of financial control 
systems and performance targets. However there were few other attempts 
operationalised by head office to extend its control over store operations, suggesting 
that Mintzberg's (1989) 'diversified' typology was the more dominant configuration at 
Homeco.
10.7 STORE LEVEL MANAGERS' AUTONOMY
Beyond the restriction of budgets and performance targets, store level managers at 
Homeco held control over most operational decisions, which was particularly evident 
in the management of human resources, (see Neathey and Hurstfield 1995; Tomlinson 
1997). As Emmanuel et al (1990) highlighted, HRM is very difficult to measure in 
quantitative terms, which negates control using the standardisation of outputs 
methods. Instead a standardisation of work content might be employed as the control 
system for HRM and employee resourcing (Merchant 1985; Mintzberg 1983). 
Managers, at both case study stores, clearly regarded store managers as holding
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greater power at store level than head office management; particularly in determining 
the management style, culture and practices of a store:
"Different management styles have a huge impact on the stores themselves." 
(Assistant Manager)
Despite efforts by head office management to centralise features of employment 
practice through company policy, such as increased numerical flexibility, store level 
managers considered themselves subject to few limitations from head office in terms of 
employment decisions:
"Employment decisions depend very much on the store manager. There is very 
little direction or impact from head office." (Hardside Manager)
This could be attributed to the lack of success at head office level to develop and 
communicate corporate strategies and policies. The culture of the company was 
described by store level managers as "relaxed", "very laid back" and also, significantly, 
"different according to different stores". This makes an examination of the informal 
organisation very important to fully appreciate the reality of control systems at 
Homeco (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999; Mars 1982; Mullins 1999). This informal 
culture contributed to the autonomy of store level managers, and was attributed to the 
lack of central control from head office and the resulting autonomy granted to 
managers at store level:
"The culture of the company is very informal. There are no rigid rules or 
regulations, more guidelines and parameters. A lot of initiative is allowed at 
store level." (Store Manager)
"It's such a laid back approach from the company together with a lack of 
intervention from head office." (Assistant Manager)
"The only interference from head office is via any cost cutting measures they 
impose and making sure you fill out their paperwork. You really just need to 
achieve your job tasks and there's quite a bit of autonomy in how you do it." 
(Assistant Manager)
275
This illustrates Homeco's lack of what Mintzberg (1989) termed 'co-ordinating 
mechanisms'. Few attempts were made by managers at Homeco to introduce 
standardisation between stores, the antithesis of the machine configuration. There 
were considerable differences between the two case study stores in terms of structure, 
procedures, and culture. This went far beyond the differences in store structures 
attributable to the various refurbishment programmes. Despite central control 
exercised by budgets and targets, there was a diversity between store outlets 
attributable to the weakness of head office and its failure to impose its authority on 
other aspects of store operations:
lITtI've worked at Chadwell Heath, Waltham Forest, Tottenham and Thurrock 
stores. Everything is different - it's like working for a different company with 
each new store." (Administration Manager)
"It's very different depending on which store you are in. This is a result of the 
laissez-faire attitude from head office." (Assistant Manager)
As previously noted, the major restriction placed on a store's use of labour was 
through financial control systems. However, as Berry et al (1995) also found, 
accounting systems can be subject to manipulation from those whose behaviour it is 
supposed to control:
"There is an overall staffing budget of 9% of sales. This covers the whole year 
and takes no account of peaks and troughs in trading. During quiet periods 
you can spend all 9% and no one at head office will question it, but then you'll 
only have the same amount to spend when you're busy which doesn't make 
sense." (Store Manager)
As in Mintzberg's 'machine' configuration efforts had been made by head office 
management to rationalise and centralise decision-making, but the informal culture and 
lack of co-ordinating mechanisms at Homeco meant a limited impact. As is typical in
276
the 'divisionalised' structure (Mintzberg 1989), the driving force for Homeco's store 
level managers was their independence and autonomy.
Decisions regarding the basis on which to recruit new staff was the responsibility of the 
senior store level managers. There was no evidence of a formal company employee 
resourcing policy, with store level managers unaware of any company-wide 
recruitment process. This was despite head office claims that a more progressive 
recruitment and selection process was in operation (see Section 10.5). The only 
restrictions placed on the recruitment process by head office related to budgets, equal 
opportunities, and the use of a company standard application form. This led to a very 
informal, and sometimes disorganised recruitment and selection process:
"I don't really know how we reach a recruitment decision." (Assistant 
Manager)
Different recruitment and selection methods were deployed for different types of 
employee. A full time vacancy warranted two interviews, with different managers, 
while a part time vacancy normally justified one interview, with one manager, although 
many variations were found at each of the case study stores. This inconsistency posed 
issues relating to equal opportunities, and effective recruitment and selection.
Training for new and existing staff was also the responsibility of store level managers. 
This is in contrast to Smith's (1988) findings where he found the content of training 
was set centrally to ensure consistency. Conversely at Homeco there was little 
coherence between managers regarding the level and methods of training employees 
received as a result of the lack of central co-ordination. Over half of the managers
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interviewed provided the same level of training for both full-time and part-time 
employees:
"Full timers and part timers get the same training, although for full timers more 
is achieved in a shorter period of time because they are present more often than 
a full timer." (Assistant Manager)
However, the remaining managers conducted training according to whether an 
employee was full time or part time:
"For part timers the training is scaled down. They will only spend a couple of 
hours in each department rather than a whole day like full timers would." 
(Hardside Manager) 
This informality of the training provision meant divergence in the methods used to train
staff, and the level of training individual employees actually received. This underlined 
the inconsistencies which existed between stores in the management of human 
resources, attributable to the lack of central control in this area. This again highlights a 
lack of co-ordinating mechanisms, with little effort made by Homeco's head office to 
standardise skills or norms, as discussed by Mintzberg (1989).
As with other employee resourcing issues, managers had relative autonomy regarding 
the deployment of labour in the store. The store manager at West Thurrock had a 
personal preference for using part-timers and, at the time of the research, was aiming 
to increase the store's proportion of part-timers. Paradoxically, in the Oxford store 
only 15 per cent of the workforce worked part-time, and there were no efforts to 
increase this figure. This highlights the control store level managers held over 
employee resourcing, which resulted in very different work force compositions for the 
two case study stores. However, this deployment of labour was never questioned by 
managers at head office because both stores kept within their staffing budgets. Head 
office seemed only interested in standardising outputs through a financial control
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system specifying store performance targets. Beyond this few efforts were made to 
control store level HR operations.
A large part of a store level managers' role involved staff scheduling, but no training 
was provided.
ccNo training was given and there is no set rota pattern for the company. You 
really learn on the job and through experience." (Gardening Manager) 
With a lack of training and company-wide policy, the methods used to write staffing
schedules were archaic, with no exploitation of EPOS data. Schedules were very 
simply devised using "just pen and paper" (Assistant Manager). Store level managers 
also had the ability to change shift patterns, without requiring permission from head 
office. The importance of staff scheduling was highlighted by Arrowsmith and Sisson 
(2000), who found it significantly impacted on employees' productivity, motivation 
and performance. The autonomy of store level managers was demonstrated at the 
West Thurrock store, when the Store Manager changed the working hours of the 
'twilight1 shift from 18.00 - 20.00 to 20.00 - 22.00. This change was communicated to 
staff via a briefing session, with four weeks notice, as required by their employment 
contract; the only restriction placed on the process by company policy. This was a 
change in working practice initiated at local level, and one that was not found at the 
Oxford store. Not requiring authorisation from head office, it again emphasised the 
high level of autonomy held by store level managers. This demonstrated a lack of 
standardisation of work processes, which left store level managers to control how staff 
conducted their tasks.
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Managers at store level held an extensive degree of autonomy in managing human 
resources, beyond the restrictions of budgets and targets. They were accountable for 
staff scheduling, recruitment and selection, training and development, and the 
organisation of tasks and responsibilities. It was these areas of employee resourcing 
where head office appeared to have less formal control. Poor communication from 
head office regarding their goals and employment policies meant store level managers 
were often unaware of the company's strategic intent. Together with the informal 
culture of the organisation, managers at store level were able to exert much influence. 
It was local employee resourcing, which head office found difficult to quantify, where 
store level managers held the greatest degree of autonomy.
The previous sections of this chapter have described the degree of choices and 
constraints of store level management at Homeco which emanates from Homeco's 
corporate strategy, and the balance between centralisation and decentralisation in the 
formal organisational structure. During the interviews with Homeco managers it 
became clear that discrepancies existed between the rhetoric and reality of company 
strategy and policy. Store level managers resisting the increasing centralisation and 
transfer of power to head office, was combined with store level managers' 
manipulation of the remaining areas of autonomy available to them.
As previous research has identified (Child 1984; Heller 1997; Johnson 1987; 
Mintzberg 1989), there is often a gap between organisational strategy and what 
actually happens in large organisations. This has been attributed to the differences
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between managers at senior level, who devise the strategies, and those at operational 
level, who are the implementors. Due to the size and geographical dispersion of 
Homeco and its stores, managers at head office were very distant from store 
operations. They relied heavily on formal information to formulate strategy, 
confirming their 'thin' management style.
Existing literature already suggests that the formation of strategy and policy does not 
necessarily indicate successful implementation with no resistance from employees 
(Child 1984; Marchington and Parker 1990; Mintzberg 1989; Tamkin et al 1997). 
This manifested itself in a variety of ways at Homeco, as the following examples 
illustrate.
The strategic goal of cost minimisation was reflected in the various attempts by head 
office to assess and improve the productivity and efficiency of their retail work force 
through the flexibility project teams. External consultants were engaged to conduct 
time and motion studies, on various occasions, to address worker productivity issues. 
Despite head office's apparent focus on labour productivity and efficiency, store level 
managers admitted the continuance of an inefficient deployment of retail staff:
"There are times throughout the week when we have too many employees for 
customers, or vice versa, although weekends tend to be busier. It happens 
most when the rota mucks up." (Hardside Manager)
"When checkouts are busy the section is understaffed and vice versa. The rota 
is out of synch with customer shopping patterns." (Store Manager)
Store level managers made few attempts to improve labour efficiency and did not 
normally review staffing schedules in terms of improving efficiency:
"Schedules aren't really reviewed - only in terms of holidays and sickness or if 
there's a visit to be made to the store." (Softside Manager)
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Efficiency drives were advocated by head office management, but did not appear to be 
a management priority at store level. Operational managers ensured budgets and 
targets were adhered to, but did not complain significantly of any cost-cutting
measures.
In line with its 'Renewal' status, the staffing budget for the Oxford store was higher to 
enable the provision of funding for additional labour and deliver an enhanced standard 
of customer service. However, the Oxford store was suffering from under-staffing 
caused by difficulties recruiting from the local labour market, with an inability to 
attract trade experts:
"We haven't got a carpenter or interior designer here because we just can't 
seem to attract them to the store." (Assistant Manager)
This meant in reality that the store was failing to deliver the higher level of customer 
service or expertise, considered to be "an essential feature of the offer" (Annual Report 
1995: 13) of stores refurbished under the 'Fareham' format. Managers at head office 
believed that 'Renewal' stores heralded a new culture and philosophy for the company, 
and were the solution to Homeco's profitability problems. However there was little 
evidence of this at store level. While the Oxford store had a higher staffing budget 
they faced similar problems to the West Thurrock store, including staff shortages. This 
inhibited their ability to provide a premium level of customer service; a key feature of 
the refurbishment strategy.
Homeco claimed to compete with other home improvement retailers on their quality of 
customer service. Company literature made consistent references to the level of 
customer service provided in Homeco stores:
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"At Homeco investment in improved customer service is a key factor in its 
strategy to retain outright market leadership." (1995: 7)
Despite this public commitment, policy implementation on the basis of customer 
service appeared to be unknown at store level, and therefore was not enacted. 
Evidence of improved customer service was never mentioned by head office or store- 
level managers during interviews. When questioned local managers in fact 
acknowledged a lack of consideration for customer service, thus discrediting the 
company's commitment to customer service:
"Head office have to say they're committed to customer service because all our 
competitors do, but really they're just interested in cutting costs and making 
money." (Assistant Manager)
This highlights the difference between the public rhetoric at Homeco and the reality of 
store operations (Heller 1997).
Further examples of the divergence between the rhetoric and reality of corporate 
strategy was seen in the implementation of employment policies. Head office 
management espoused various policies and philosophies regarding human resources, 
which were often contradicted by store level managers. This again underlines the 
disparity between 'thick' management at head office, and 'thin' management at store 
level (Mintzberg 1989).
One area where store-level managers held relative autonomy was in the recruitment 
and selection of new staff. However differences were evident between the policies 
advocated by managers at head office, and the reality of the process at store level. 
Homeco had high labour turnover rates, of up to 48.5 per cent, whilst also 
experiencing difficulty meeting recruitment targets. According to head office
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managers these problems were addressed in the early 1990s via a policy of matching 
employees and the company more closely, through using a variety of tests at the 
selection stage. However, at store level there was no evidence of any test in operation 
Staff shortages and high labour turnover remained a perennial problem. Managers at 
head office did not consider the rate of pay for their employees to be a reason for the 
high rate of labour turnover, despite paying some of the lowest rates in the retail 
sector. Conversely managers at store level regarded the rate of pay to be a major 
reason for the difficulties they experienced in recruiting and retaining staff:
"We are only paying £3.79 an hour which makes it difficult to compete with 
other retailers for staff. Ikea are opening up opposite shortly, and they pay 
£5.05 an hour which means no doubt we'll lose some staff to them, and have 
even greater problems recruiting." (Assistant Manager)
Store level managers believed the local labour market had a greater impact on 
employee resourcing than any head office initiatives, but managers at head office did 
not acknowledge this. The manager of the Oxford store attributed the store's high 
proportion of full time workers, relative to other Homeco stores, to problems 
recruiting from the local labour market. A large proportion of the local community 
was employed at a nearby car manufacturing plant. It was also an area of high 
unemployment and managers felt that, in order to attract employees from the local 
labour market, jobs had to be offered on a full-time basis:
"There is a 'factory mentality1 towards work in this area. You need the 90 per 
cent full time split in this store because people around here won't work for 
anything less. Those looking for work are only interested in full time 
employment because of this 'factory mentality', and it's not worth them coming 
off unemployment benefit for anything less than full time work - especially with 
the level of pay that we offer." (Assistant Manager)
This demonstrates the disparity between head office and operational level in terms of 
resourcing difficulties. There appeared to be minimal communication between stores 
and head office which only exacerbated their different perspectives. These differences 
are again examples of Mintzberg's (1989) 'thick' and 'thin' management. At the two 
different levels of the organisation, managers held almost opposing views on employee 
resourcing.
Due to demographic changes Homeco had problems recruiting staff, aggravated by the 
reduction in the supply of school leavers to the labour market, a traditional source of 
labour for Homeco. Homeco publicly stated it was overcoming this problem through 
targeting recruitment at the over 50s. However, there was little evidence of older 
workers being actively recruited to either case study store, exemplifying the poor 
execution of head office policies. Managers at head office admitted that the 
recruitment of older workers was not a strategy, but had been a result of'serendipity', 
underlining their ad hoc approach to the development of employment strategy:
"It was a complete fluke that we discovered the value of the over 50 employee. 
We didn't strategically develop a policy of recruiting older workers, but sort of 
stumbled onto the value of this age group, and went from there." (Personnel 
Manager, Head Office)
Despite the problems of recruitment and retention, head office management believed 
its retail work force to be very committed. A time and motion study by external 
consultants in 1994 revealed that Homeco retail employees worked additional hours, 
without pay, beyond the requirement of their contracts. This was interpreted by head 
office as a sign of employee loyalty. However, the feelings at store level were very 
different, suggesting head office lacked an understanding of their retail workforce. 
Employees were not motivated to work harder because of their commitment to
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Homeco. Instead store level managers believed employees worked these hours out of 
necessity to cover staff shortages and support colleagues and employee commitment 
was actually decreasing:
"Over the years my opinion of the company has changed where staffing is 
concerned. There's a bad culture now. There is high labour turnover and the 
store is understaffed, which puts pressure on everyone else." (Gardening 
Manager)
This contradiction confirms the 'thin' nature of management at Homeco's head office. 
They managed from a distance, failing to recognise, and address, key employee 
resourcing problems.
Homeco indicated that it had significantly developed its staff training provision. 
However, the reality at store level was very different with managers claiming that 
training, which had been carried out in the past, had been abolished, particularly in the 
area of product training:
"There's no longer a Homeco training package for employees. Head office 
aren't very good at communicating product changes so employees often know 
nothing about it when the customers ask." (Assistant Manager)
"Product training is very poor because head office hasn't taken any responsibility 
for it. They just tell employees to read the labels." (Hardside Manager)
Even at the Oxford store, a 'Renewal' store expected to deliver a premium level of 
customer service, training appeared to be very minimal.
"They're not too hot on training in this company - I've never really had any. 
They just don't give support in that area." (Hardside Manager)
The public employment strategies of Homeco were not evident at store level. Training 
and investment in staff appeared minimal, even at the Oxford store, which was 
considered a 'flagship' store for improved training.
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Efforts to respond to recruitment problems and initiate cost savings were made 
throughout the mid-1990s at Homeco. Head office believed resourcing problems at 
store level could be resolved through increased 'flexible' working. Managers at head 
office decided that by increasing part time working at store level more working 
mothers would be attracted to the organisation. Recruitment shortages experienced by 
the company would then ease, whilst labour costs fall, producing a more 'flexible' 
work force, where demand and supply of labour could be more closely matched. 
While managers at head office wanted to increase part time working, store level 
managers held very different views, highlighting further the lack of communication. 
The majority of store level managers in fact regarded part timers as less reliable and 
committed to their work than full timers, and reported difficulties recruiting 'quality' 
part timers. Many held negative assumptions about part timers relating to their 
commitment, reliability and quality.
"You definitely don't get the same level of commitment from part timers. Full 
timers need the job for their wage; they take pride in what they do and look to 
development and promotion. Part timers only earn pin money - they don't need 
the job so they just do their hours and go." (Hardside Manager)
As a result it was believed that part timers took less pride in their work. They were 
considered to be less committed to their work believed to have higher rates of absence 
and were felt to be unconcerned about the quality of their work:
"Part timers just want to do their hours and go home. If they make a mistake it 
gets sorted out before they're next in so they never know about it or have to 
take responsibility for it. There is also a higher sickness level for part timers." 
(Gardening Manager)
This undermined the attempts by head office to increase part-time working in stores 
with store level managers so very critical of these employees.
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As discussed in section 10.5 a series of project teams were set up by head office to 
implement and oversee the numerical flexibility initiatives and introduction of a 
computerised scheduling system to manage staff scheduling. However, none of the 
three were successful and the failure of these project teams to progress head office 
intention to increase part time employment undermined the control that head office 
could exert on stores. As a result head office failed to implement its 'flexibility' policy, 
and operational management continued to pursue whatever resourcing policy suited 
them:
"There is no pressure from head office to use part timers, to increase the 
number of part timers or to go for more flexibility of employment. It is all down 
to the personal preference of the store manager." (Store Manager)
Another feature of Homeco's employee resourcing practices was the use of temporary 
contracts to cover a store's peak trading periods, which ran from March to August, as 
a result of the seasonality of gardening (see section Head office believed the use 
of temporary contracts was effective, but store level managers were less enthusiastic 
about their use. Managers at store level did not always believe that temporary 
employees were an ideal solution to the changes in trading patterns:
"They should theoretically work, but the problem is they don't coincide with 
students' diaries. We want temporary workers during term time, but students 
aren't available to work many hours at this time, which makes it very difficult 
to recruit anyone. We need to re-think how we manage our seasonal peaks and 
troughs." (Store Manager)
While head office was keen to see the continuing use of full-time temporary contracts 
mainly to resource seasonal peaks, store level managers felt they had the wrong 
priorities. Faced with recruitment shortages during the entire year, they wanted to see 
more initiatives from head office to address this longer-term problem. They were
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totally unaware that head office had been assessing the use of more part time 
employees to overcome recruitment problems, and attempting to introduce such a 
policy for five years. This again clearly highlights the particularly poor communication 
between head office and store level managers in this company, confirming Mintzberg's 
notions of'thin' and 'thick' management operating at different levels of an 
organisation.
Further differences between head office and store level managers in employee 
resourcing policy were revealed when examining Homeco's overtime policy. While 
head office officially banned the use of premium overtime as a cost reduction measure, 
the majority of store level managers claimed to be unaware of this policy. Of those 
managers who knew of the premium overtime ban, many admitted that they continued 
to authorise premium overtime in their stores:
"Officially we don't use overtime in the store because there's a complete ban - but 
unofficially yes we do use it." (Assistant Manager)
It would appear that even when company policy was successfully communicated to 
store level managers, there was the opportunity for it to be ignored, without 
repercussions.
Despite a public commitment to equal opportunities the reality at store level was very 
different. There was evidence of gendered occupational segregation, selection 
decisions based on managers' stereotypes, and the segregation of workers according to 
personal circumstances. This supports Hunter et al's (1993) findings that decision- 
making over types of contracts is often based on managers' stereotypes. Previous 
research has also found this (Beechey and Perkins 1987; Burchell and Rubery 1990,
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1994; Collinson et al 1991; Hunter and Maclnnes 1991), which has been corroborated 
by research conducted specifically in the retail industry (Bradley 1989; MacEwan Scott 
1994; Tomlinson et al 1997).
At Homeco women were concentrated in a small number of sections within each store, 
such as checkouts, customer service desk and administration, traditionally 'female' 
jobs. Skill requirements of a job linked to the traditional perceptions of male work was 
also evident. The Hardside department contained power tools, timber, building 
materials, and was considered more suitable for male employees. It was believed that 
female employees were less likely to have experience of carrying out repairs around 
their homes, due to the domestic division of labour, and were therefore viewed by 
managers as unsuitable for these departments:
"the dirtier, messier side of DIY - the side that women don't get involved in at 
all." (Hardside Manager)
As a result a smaller proportion of females was found in the Hardside than the Softside 
department. This illustrates the phenomenon of horizontal occupational segregation, 
which was evident in both case study stores.
While head office was hoping to attract more working mothers to the company, some 
managers at store level were reluctant to recruit from this sector of the labour market. 
Working mothers with family responsibilities were perceived as very inflexible. 
Outside commitments prevented them working additional hours, or changing their shift 
patterns easily. For some managers this played an important role in the recruitment 
decisions they made, which was again at variance with the company's equal 
opportunities policy:
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"The least flexible workers are women with children who have child care 
restrictions. It is a difficult decision when recruiting new staff and you are faced 
with a very capable person who can do the job well, but will be limited in the 
flexibility which they can offer. It is a big issue and if you do offer them the 
job you usually end up shooting yourself in the foot." (Store Manager)
Linked with managers' reluctance to recruit working mothers, there were problems at 
store level for employees who needed to change their working hours. The attitude of 
store level managers was firmly towards the needs of the business, rather than the 
needs of employees:
"They have to fit around what the company requires and not the 
other way round." (Hardside Manager)
This lack of balance between company and employee demands would discourage many 
working mothers from working for Homeco, as their personal circumstances often 
requires a more flexible approach. Therefore, the reality at store level was often in 
direct contrast to head office's intentions to recruit more part-time working mothers.
This research has revealed indisputable differences between the views of those 
strategically managing the organisation at head office, and those managing the 
operational functions at store level. Not only did interpretation of corporate strategy 
differ between written statements and reality, but so too did head office expectations 
and understanding of store operations. Head office's ability to develop any effective 
long-term employment strategy was treated with scepticism at store level, and head 
office was often ridiculed:
"The company is very short-sighted and has gone through a lot of changes. 
Two years ago they even had an American theme making us do drill exercises 
before work. That's how mad they are up at head office." (Hardside Manager)
"The company is very short-term in perspective, and the result is that it only 
ever follows trends." (Assistant Manager)
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It was at the operational level where the gap between head office intentions and day- 
to-day reality was fully exposed. Stores were meeting budgets and achieving their 
profit targets, but also circumventing the methods and policies of head office. There 
appeared to be a large gap in communications between head office and stores, together 
with diametrically different conceptions about the most effective management of 
stores' operations. The notions of Mintzberg's 'thin' and 'thick', and Duncan's (1975) 
'philosophical' and 'art' management, have been clearly borne out in this research. 
This research found much evidence in favour of Mintzberg's 'diversified' 
configuration. Few co-ordinating mechanisms were set up by head office, which gave 
significant control of day-to-day operations to store level managers. Where head 
office attempted to exert control over stores, it was met with covert opposition from 
store-level managers who employed various tactics to evade control and manipulate 
the information sent to head office. Evidence of these strategies of independence were 
found during interviews conducted with store level managers.
The 'Renewals' stores had a higher profile within the company because this format was 
viewed as the future success of Homeco. As a result these stores were subject to a 
greater number of visits from head office senior managers, who regularly checked that 
the strategy of store refurbishment was successful. This demonstrated efforts by head 
office managers to become involved in operational, 'thick' (Mintzberg 1989) 
management, whilst monitoring store performance. However Mintzberg (1989) noted 
that as organisations grow in size it becomes very difficult to practice 'thick' 
management at a senior level. This was evident at Homeco, where even visits from 
head office management failed to escape from local managers' strategies of
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independence. Such visits from head office managers caused particular problems for 
the Oxford store. Its staff shortages meant it could not deliver the premium level of 
customer service expected of it. In order to ensure that the store operated at its 
optimum level of customer service when a visit from head office took place, staff were 
requested, by local managers, to work overtime to conceal the staffing shortages. 
Consequently, when head office managers visited the Oxford store there was a full 
complement of staff. For example, door greeters were present on the day of a head 
office visit, when in reality there was never a sufficient complement of staff to provide 
this enhanced level of customer service. Due to the high proportion of full timers 
working in the Oxford store, these visits meant requiring them to work overtime, at a 
premium rate:
"Now that Oxford is a Renewals store it has become more high profile and 
receives more visits. This causes staffing problems where a greater proportion 
of part timers would be useful to 'flex up 1 to cover for these visits, rather than 
using full timers at premium rate." (Softside Manager)
Managers at store level effectively concealed the extent of their employee resourcing 
problems, rather than exposing them. As a result head office were of the belief that 
stores were running according to their expectations. Store level managers appeared to 
be fulfilling the company's strategy, within prescribed budgets which gained them 
credibility with head office. Legge (2000) also found that managers seek ways of 
demonstrating their loyalty and commitment to senior management, in order to 
enhance their career prospects. These strategies of independence significantly 
contributed to the discrepancies between the views of head office and store level 
managers about the effectiveness of the company's strategies and policies.
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This case study research has exposed the divergence between the rhetoric and reality 
of corporate strategy at Homeco. It also reveals the degree of decentralisation and its 
impact at store level, and the strategies of independence deployed at operational level 
to circumvent any head office control. It has demonstrated the realities of local HUM 
and employee resourcing in a multiple retail organisation.
Using Mintzberg's (1989) classification of organisations, Homeco operated along the 
lines of a diversified configuration. It had a strong informal organisation, which gave 
significant autonomy in decision-making to store-level managers. This resulted in a 
dichotomy between the espoused corporate strategy and the operational realities, and a 
diversity of operations between stores. Such divergence between strategy formation 
and implementation has been found in previous research (Mintzberg 1989; Heller 
1997).
This research highlights the difference between the rhetoric and reality of Homeco's 
corporate strategy. Equal opportunities, training and customer service were not 
priorities for managers at store level, despite the prominence given to these areas in 
company literature. There were indisputable differences between the perceptions of 
managers at head office, and those at store level. The lack of experience of operations 
at store level of head office graduates must contribute to this. A change in policy in 
graduate training and development may be called for. While managers at head office 
intended to have a more considered approach to managing human resources, they 
seemed unable to produce any clear strategy or supporting policies. This was
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particularly clear from their abortive and ineffective attempts to increase part-time 
working. There was also poor communication between head office and store level 
managers. Few managers at head office had any great experience of managing at 
operational level, in part caused by the company's graduate trainees taking jobs at head 
office, rather than at store-level. Consequently, there was minimal involvement from 
head office in a store's management of human resources, and very little respect for 
head office at store level.
The greatest dichotomy was apparent between company policy and practice in the 
management of human resources. While head office aimed to increase the proportion 
of part timers, the reality at store level was one of differing work force compositions, 
and varying attitudes amongst managers. The failure of three successive project teams 
set up to examine the validity of increased part time deployment, highlights the inability 
of the company to produce any coherent long-term employment strategy. This meant 
a minimal involvement of head office in employment policy and procedure, and led to 
little conformity between stores in their approach to the management of human 
resources.
The role of managers at store level was very significant, in terms of the management of 
human resources. While subject to some aspects of centralisation in the form of 
budgets, targets, and stock management, it was clear that employment issues were 
devolved to store level with very few guidelines from head office. Even the company's 
commitment to equal opportunities was questionable at store level, with managers' 
stereotyped perceptions playing a key role in employee resourcing decision making.
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Any other attempts by head office to intervene in labour decisions at store level were 
on an ad hoc basis, or were never developed into clear policies, and hence not 
communicated to store level. The lack of central control of stores' management of 
human resources meant there was much informality. Managers had the autonomy to 
dictate their own preferences for the type of workers they recruited and developed, 
using the methods they felt most suitable. This informality became more important in 
the new organisational structure of'Renewal' stores with greater degrees of delegation 
afforded to Department Managers.
Nevertheless there were some areas where head office had control of a store's 
operations, and store level managers were keen to retain autonomy of their remaining 
decision-making powers. To do this they employed elaborate tactics to ensure a 
facade of effective management was demonstrated to head office. In doing this they 
hoped to assure managers at head office that the current autonomy trusted to them was 
well-founded. This would then avoid any further centralisation of their tasks, and 
allow them to continue to manage stores with their own preferred methods and styles.
While head office's main control over staffing in stores was through budgetary 
constraints, store level managers used various techniques to project an image of 
effective store management. Managers were able to conceal store staffing deficits, 
even when visited by head office managers, through the use of overtime. As long as 
managers kept within the prescribed budgets and met the targets set by head office, the 
management of their human resources was rarely questioned. This again gave much 
autonomy to store level managers in local employee resourcing.
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This research highlights that the minimal involvement from head office, in terms of 
employment practices, meant the stores' approaches to employee resourcing varied 
greatly. Managers were keen to maintain their autonomy over staffing issues and used 
various techniques to bypass head office centralisation as far as possible. This 
approach was used by store level managers to preserve their independence from head 
office, and safeguard their roles. While head office were attempting to generate 
greater centralisation and control of store activities they were clearly unable to do this. 
The strength of the informal organisation meant many policies, particularly 
employment policies, were rarely formalised. This led to some confusion at 
operational level, as was also identified by Stewart (1999), which granted store-level 
managers a notable degree of autonomy in the decision-making process. Because of 
the tradition of relative freedom of operation at store level at Homeco, head office 
attempts to increase control tended to be thwarted, head office's history of failure to 
implement initiatives also further exacerbated the bifunction between stores and the 
centre.
This chapter has presented a discussion and analysis of the empirical data for the 
Homeco case study. Background information providing a contextual perspective to 
the case study organisation and stores was given, before an examination of local 
management constraints and autonomy. The existence of various strategies of 
independence was detailed, and subsequent conclusions drawn. The following chapter 
will discuss the comparative findings from the three case study organisations, before 
the thesis is concluded in chapter twelve.
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This chapter will draw together the findings of the research and relate the primary 
results back to the literature review. It will examine and discuss the main findings of 
the empirical research, focusing particularly on the similarities and differences between 
the three case study organisations.
The retail industry is a major employer in the UK. Its market leaders are amongst the 
country's largest companies in both financial and employment terms (Labour Research 
1994). Research has confirmed the retail industry as a low pay sector, as well as 
primarily a feminised and youthful industry (Craig and Wilkinson 1985; MacEwan 
Scott 1994; NRTC 1995; Sparks 1992b). All three case study companies employed a 
large proportion of female workers, particularly in Superco and Groceryco - the two 
food retailers. The industry is also characterised by high levels of labour turnover, and 
low levels of unionisation (Sparks 1992a, 1992b). Homeco was a good example of 
this with high levels of labour turnover causing staffing shortages and no trade union 
recognition.
Retail organisations employ a large number of part time workers (Hakim 1987; IDS 
1993a; IRS 1994; Naylour 1994; NRTC 1995; Sparks 1992a, 1992b), with a 
significant increase occurring between 1984 and 1994 (Dex and McCulloch 1995;
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Naylour 1994). We have witnessed the introduction of zero hour contracts in an 
attempt to achieve maximum flexibility of working time (IDS 1993 a; 1993b; Neathey 
and Hurstfield 1995). All three case companies in this research were large 
organisations, operating within the multiple branch retailing sector. Within this sector 
they operated predominately within the superstore sector. This sector has been 
characterised by a higher use of part time staff than high street stores (Dawson et al 
1986; MacEwan Scott 1994). This was evident in the two food retailers, with an 
average 69 per cent of their combined store workforces employed on a part time basis, 
and the introduction of minimum hours contracts in Superco.
Large multiple branch retailers have been associated with the most modern changes in 
the labour process, particularly through their use of technology (Walters and Hanrahan 
2000). The deployment of EPOS has enabled managers at head office to enhance their 
control of store operations, and impose cost savings (Lloyd and Rawlinson 1992; 
Retail Business 1990; Tomlinson et al 1997; Tordjman 1994). Advancements in 
information technology have been cited as a key component of competitive advantage 
in the retail industry (Johnson 1992), with the adoption of EPOS hailed as having 
revolutionary implications (Retail Business 1990; Smith 1988). This was evident in all 
three case study companies, particularly the food retailers, where a sophisticated use of 
technology to save costs and control store operations was witnessed.
Each of the case study companies were under competitive pressures, although this 
seemed more exigent in the food retailing sector. As Ogbonna and Whipp (1999) 
noted, the UK food retailing sector is "intensely competitive" (p.80). As a result food
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retailers tend to be at the forefront of the retail industry in terms of competitive 
strategies. This was apparent during this research study with Homeco remaining 
market leader of the home improvement sector, and being relatively unchallenged 
competitively for over a decade. Meanwhile, at the time of the research, Superco had 
only recently become the leading food retailer, while Groceryco was employing 
significant strategic changes to maintain its Number 3 position. Thus, Superco and 
Groceryco appeared to be under greater competitive pressures, and subject to the 
development of more exacting competitive strategies than Homeco. This may account 
for the differences between the two supermarkets and Homeco in this research, and for 
the concurrent similarities that tended to exist between Superco and Groceryco.
In conjunction with competitive pressures each case study company was answerable to 
several stakeholders. The two major pressure groups were shareholders and 
customers. As publicly quoted companies the maintenance of a high share price was 
essential to all three companies, particularly with the possibility of mergers and 
acquisitions in such a competitive industry (Freathy and Sparks 1996). As outlined in 
the literature (Blyton and Morris 1992; Burnes 2000; Legge 1995; Sisson 1994), such 
a focus on shareholder value, usually leads to the predominance of short term financial 
results, and hence cost savings. In addition to the pressures from shareholders, each 
organisation had to satisfy increasing customer demands for longer opening hours, 
lower prices, plus improved standards of product and service (Christopherson 1996; 
Doogan 1992; Freathy and Sparks 1996). This led to the twin strategic focus of cost 
minimisation and customer service, in attempts to satisfy these stakeholders, 
particularly in Superco and Groceryco.
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The achievement and retention of a competitive advantage is seen to be crucial to a 
firm's growth and prosperity in large-scale, multiple store retailing (Walker 1992). 
Competitive strategies must also be devised in consideration of the pressures and 
demands from various stakeholders, as discussed above. This led many retailers to 
pursue cost-saving strategies in an attempt to satisfy both shareholder and customer 
demands (Brewster 1998, Freathy and Sparks 1996; Ogbonna and Wilkinson 1988; 
Ogbonna and Whipp 1999). All three case study companies emphasised their 
commitment to increasing shareholder value. This was apparent in all three case 
companies who were pursuing a competitive strategy based on the achievement of cost 
savings, through improving efficiency. Superco and Homeco were aiming to achieve 
£20 million worth of cost savings, while Groceryco had set a target of £60 million. To 
realise this target, efficiency measures and cost reduction policies were introduced in 
all three companies. It was hoped that these measures would be reflected on the 
bottom line by increasing shareholder value.
A second major feature of the competitive strategy of the case study companies was a 
focus on improving the quality of customer service. All three publicly stated in their 
company literature the importance of a high standard of customer service delivery in 
their stores, (as also found by Doogan 1992; Gardner and Sheppard 1989; Ogbonna 
and Whipp 1999; and Sparks 1992c). However, this was only apparent at operational 
level in the two food retailing organisations. While Homeco articulated that improved 
customer service was a key factor in its competitive strategy, the reality was a lack of 
attention to customer service at both head office and store level. Instead Homeco 
focused on store refurbishment as a means of improving the shopping experience for
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customers. Meanwhile, efforts were made to reduce queue lengths at checkouts, 
improve store layout, offer bag-packing services, and provide other additional services 
in the two supermarket chains. Superco quantified some of its promises, the most 
public and ambitious being its 'One in Front' pledge to customers. Meanwhile, 
Groceryco was more ambiguous about the nature and expectations of its customer 
service improvements, and did not make public quantifiable performance pledges to its 
customers.
In all three case study companies, adaptations to organisational structure were made to 
accommodate corporate strategy. This commonly took the form of de-layering, 
although more radical re-structuring took place at Groceryco where functional 
restructuring had taken place. Redundancies also formed a major role in Groceryco's 
restructuring programme. Superco instigated its restructuring policy in 1991, at least 
three years ahead of the other two companies. Further efforts to improve customer 
service, and retain customer loyalty were seen in the introduction of loyalty cards by all 
three companies. This occurred in 1995 at Superco, and 1996 for both Groceryco and 
Homeco. Financial services were also offered by the two supermarkets. Superco was 
again ahead of Groceryco with the introduction of this additional service for 
customers, starting its financial service in 1996, compared to 1997 for Groceryco. 
This highlights the extent to which Superco was the 'first mover' in many strategic 
aspects in the multiple store retailing sector, with the other case study companies using 
copying tactics to react to Superco's innovations.
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Managers in the case study stores were subject to corporate strategies that focused on 
a simultaneous programme of cost reduction and quality enhancement, particularly at 
Superco and Groceryco. This trend in retail competitive strategy has been previously 
outlined in the literature (Christopherson 1996; Doogan 1992; Freathy and Sparks 
1996; Gardner and Sheppard 1989; Sparks 1992c). While the aim of strategy in 
retailing has been outlined as the need to differentiate a company from its competitors 
(Walker 1992), this was subject to difficulties, as highlighted by these research 
findings. The case companies formulated strategy to enable their attainment of a 
competitive advantage. It was therefore ironic that all three were pursuing such similar 
strategies, albeit to varying degrees. This might be likely to negate any competitive 
advantage that could be gained.
The ease with which competitors can replicate strategy in the retail industry has been 
well documented (Christopherson 1996; Doogan 1992; Freathy and Sparks 1996: 
Gardner and Sheppard 1989; Walker 1992). Consequently, the benefits of'first mover 
advantage' are often minimal in retail, as shown by this research. While Superco was 
often innovative in its approach to the formation of corporate strategy, its competitors 
often just simply copied those initiatives. This was apparent with Groceryco 
introducing strategies of 'QueueBusters', loyalty cards, cost reductions, and financial 
services, within a year of Superco doing so. As a result the services, prices, and 
opening hours offered by the companies were of such similar nature there was little 
distinction between them, thus eventually invalidating the strategic advantage of being 
'first mover' in the sector. This could be termed as a 'strategic vicious circle', 
whereby innovative retailers' strategies would inevitably be replicated by competitors.
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However, competitors would suffer competitively if they did not at deploy these 
replication tactics by falling behind other retailers in their service to customer. This 
made it essential to at least try to maintain pace with the 'first mover' in the industry, 
which contributed to the competitive pressures on retailers and demanded ever more 
innovative strategies to try and break the 'strategic vicious circle'.
It is suggested that the main strategic focus of the case study companies was a 
reduction in costs combined with a corresponding improvement in the quality of 
customer service. This contradicts Porter's (1985) theory that companies can only 
successfully pursue one strategic direction at any one time. This research subsequently 
supports Murray's (1988) proposition that generic strategies are not always mutually 
exclusive. Nevertheless, these apparently contradictory strategies were in operation in 
the case companies. The three case study organisations could therefore be termed 
'schizophrenic' because their strategies were motivated by the contradictory and 
conflicting principles of quality enhancement and cost reduction. These strategies 
amounted to demands for higher quality service and longer opening hours, but with the 
provision of fewer resources. The emphasis clearly rested on the notion of 'more for 
less', supporting Sisson's (1994: 15) conclusion that even where strategic rhetoric 
emphasises customer service, the reality is more one of "market forces supreme". This 
had implications for local employee resourcing, as the 'more for less' focus impacted 
on the decision-making process for store level employee resourcing (see section 
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11.2 THE CONTEXT OF RETAIL MANAGEMENT
The context of the retail industry and structure of multiple store retail companies 
influenced the nature and role of management at store level. As Child (1984) noted, 
geographical dispersion is a contingent factor, which sets up pressures for delegation. 
All three companies were organised on a regional basis, with a large span of control 
for Regional Managers. It was management at head office who formulated strategy, 
which was then translated into policy and communicated to store level managers, often 
via the regional office. These policies were accompanied by demands in the form of 
budgets and performance targets. Therefore head office could be described as the 
'strategic level' (Child 1984), 'strategic apex' (Mintzberg 1979), or the 'corporate 
group' (Beetham 1987) in all three case study organisations. For the purpose of this 
research study the term 'strategic level' will be adopted to describe head office senior 
management formulating corporate strategy.
The size and geographical dispersion of stores meant that managers based at head 
office were both physically, and operationally, remote from the branches. They relied 
on a degree of formalisation as a means of controlling store operations, particularly in 
Superco and Groceryco. Consequently, head office managers relied heavily on 
feedback information provided by stores, as a basis on which to make further strategic 
decisions. This relates to Mintzberg's (1999) 'controlling role', whereby senior 
management use information in a directive way to develop systems, design structures, 
and impose directives. This led them to rely heavily on information, or 'superficial 
knowledge' (Mintzberg 1989: 354), to formulate strategies and policies.
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Few attempts were made by managers at head office to become closely involved in 
store operations, beyond periodic 'royal' visits to selected stores. As a result a gulf 
between head office and store level managers was clearly discernible in all three case 
study companies. This confirms previous research findings regarding the lack of 
understanding that often exists between staff at head office and the operational level 
(Tamkin et al 1997; Truss et al 1997; Watson and Harris 1999). Consequently the 
strategic level in all three retail organisations was far removed from the reality of store 
operations. Conversely, store level managers were heavily involved in the operational 
aspects of retail management, but were very distant and uninvolved in the strategic 
decisions of the company.
These research findings identify managers at head office as symptomatic of 
Mintzberg's (1989) 'thin', or Duncan's (1975) 'philosophical' managers. Even where 
head office managers at Homeco were visibly attempting to become involved in local 
management through frequently visiting stores, the existence of 'thin' management at 
head office level remained. This accords with Mintzberg's (1989) conclusion that 
"when organisations become large, complex and diversified......they are precluded from
managing in thick ways" (p.254). Ironically at Homeco, despite numerous visits to 
stores by the strategic level, there appeared to be a greater division between head 
office and store management than in either Groceryco, or Superco. This could be 
attributed to the dominance of the informal organisation at Homeco, poor 
communication between Head office and stores, a lack of co-ordinating mechanisms 
(Mintzberg 1989), and the extent to which strategies of independence were deployed 
by store level managers (see section 
306
Conversely, managers at store level displayed characteristics of Mintzberg's (1989) 
'thick', or Duncan's (1975) 'art' management styles. In all three companies local 
managers were heavily involved in day-to-day operations, and responsible for 
implementing policies developed by 'thin' managers at head office. While assuming 
seniority within a store in terms of the branch management hierarchy, within the wider 
organisational structure this level could be described as middle management. They 
were located between senior management at regional and head office level, and junior 
managers and shop-floor employees at local level. These managers had to constantly 
juggle the needs of head office with those of junior managers "to make other people's 
policies work" (Watson and Harris 1999: 178). They worked within increasing 
constraints playing the role of "man in the middle" (Roethlisberger 1945). As Sayles 
(1999) described, middle managers often become the players who facilitate necessary 
trade-offs to make systems work. This was evident in the case study organisations 
where store level managers were involved to some extent in strategies of 
independence.
The dichotomy and tensions between store and head office management were clear in 
all three case study companies. Senior management at Superco's head office even 
acknowledged this circumstance, but attributed it to the nature of the industry, and so 
did little to address the issue. With these differences there were effectively "two 
worlds" in operation in each organisation. The first 'world' existed at the strategic 
level, while a very different 'world' operated in the stores. This was exacerbated by 
the employment of graduates in an attempt to professionalise the management role 
(Freathy and Sparks 2000; Hendry and Pettigrew 1987). At Homeco and Groceryco,
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graduates were more likely to be employed at head office, with relatively little 
experience of store operations. Meanwhile at Superco, where they were employed at 
store level it was only at senior management level, and not at as Section Managers. 
This contributed to the dichotomy between managers at head office and store level. 
The absence of interaction and operational communication between head office and 
store level managers meant a lack of understanding of the other's role. This widened 
the dichotomy between the two organisational levels, contributing to the existence of 
'thin' and 'thick' management (Mintzberg 1989).
In addition to the disparity between head office and store level managers there also 
appeared to be a divergence between management levels within the stores themselves. 
There was a greater similarity between head office and store managers' perspectives 
and opinions at the senior levels of the store, than at junior level. Previous research 
findings have found that the higher a manager in the organisational hierarchy, the 
higher their level of commitment to that organisation (Brager 1969; Cummings and 
Elsalami 1968; Mintzberg 1983). These research findings concur with this theory, as 
junior managers demonstrated a lower level of loyalty to, and empathy with, the 
strategic level. They experienced at first-hand the problems of juggling the realities of 
increasing demands and constraints with fewer resources. As previous research has 
found, junior management represents two organisational families (see section 3.4). 
This level of management related more closely to shop floor staff than to senior store 
or head office management, particularly at Superco, with differences between senior 
store managers and junior managers being more marked. As previously discussed, 
graduates in this organisation were recruited to senior store management positions,
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which may have created a social and educational gap between senior and lower level 
managers. Additionally the dichotomy between management levels at operational level 
in Superco could also be also be attributed to the size of managers' span of control 
because it was far higher than in either Groceryco or Homeco. The ratio of staff to 
managers varied from 22:1 at Superco, 13:1 at Groceryco, and 11:1 at Homeco. As 
Mintzberg (1989) concluded, the larger the span of control, the less likely managers of 
that unit are able to adopt a 'thick' management approach because "there is simply too 
much to do and too much to know" (p.354). This research supports Rawson's (1997) 
observations that tensions appear to exist between all levels of management, 
throughout the organisational structure, from the strategic level to the most junior 
management.
As previous commentators have noted, the role of the junior manager has been a 
largely neglected aspect of the literature, particularly in the management of human 
resources (Kinnie 1989; Lowe 1992). Yet it was at this level in the case study 
companies where the realities of implementing corporate strategy were most acutely 
felt. Junior managers had to successfully transact head office strategy and policies into 
day-to-day operations. Their efforts were devoted to everyday operational work, 
juggling the realities of head office's increasing demands within a context of escalating 
constraints.
To summarise, the dichotomy between head office and the operational level was 
clearly visible during this research study. It could be attributed to a number of reasons, 
which varied for each company, but included the regional structure of the firms, the
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recruitment of graduates to head office, the strength of the informal organisation, poor 
communication between management levels, and the superficiality with which head 
office managers were involved in store operations. At Superco this dichotomy was 
also apparent between the management levels within the stores themselves. Possible 
explanations for this could be their wider spans of control, and the recruitment of 
graduates to senior store management positions. As a result Mintzberg's (1989) 
'thick' and 'thin' management characteristics were clearly in operation, which 
contributed to the existence of two very distinct, and different 'worlds' in operation at 
head office and stores. This resulted in managers being very familiar with their own 
'world', whether it be at head office or operational level, but had very little experience 
or understanding of the 'world' at the opposing organisational level.
As previously outlined by Freathy and Sparks (1996), retail head offices commonly 
develop strategies and systems to which store level managers must adhere. In the 
three case study companies, in order to deliver shareholder and customer promises, 
head office needed to ensure consistency in both its delivery of customer service, and 
efforts to attain cost savings. As Stewart (1991) outlined, retail chains usually exercise 
control of stores through the standardisation of outputs to ensure that each branch 
delivers the same 'shopping experience' to customers. This was particularly apparent 
in the two food retailers of Superco and Groceryco, where greater efforts to assimilate 
stores were made, compared to Homeco where fewer 'co-ordinating mechanisms' 
(Mintzberg 1989) existed.
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The degree of centralisation versus decentralisation varied across all three case study 
companies, although there were some similarities relating to the level of head office 
control over the operational decision-making process. There was evidence in all three 
companies that efforts were being made to increasingly centralise what in the past had 
been store level managers' decision making powers. These included stock 
management and pricing, store opening hours, and the formal organisational structure. 
The major enabling mechanism for this increased head office control was technology. 
The literature outlines how retailers have utilised technology to standardise the retail 
process and make efficiency savings (Child 1984; Houlton and Thomas 1990; 
Huczynski and Buchanan 2001; Lloyd and Rawlinson 1992; Ogbonna 1992; Smith 
1988; Tordjman 1994; Walters and Hanrahan 2000). This has often been achieved 
through technology assuming many of the tasks previously undertaken by lower level 
managers and staff (Freathy and Sparks 1994). In the case study companies there was 
clear evidence of this, with computerised stock management, and pilot schemes of 
computerised staff scheduling taking place. Even at Homeco, where head office 
control was minimal and erratic, there were attempts being made (albeit unsuccessful), 
which aimed to increase head office control of store operations, and further standardise 
the decision-making process. Mintzberg (1989) claimed that such an obsession with 
control is a major factor that drives organisations towards a machine bureaucracy.
As found by Armstrong (1989) and Kinnie (1989) the main control system exerted by 
head office, in all three case study companies, was financial. Keeping within budgets 
was vital for local managers. As suggested by Mullins (1999), and Mintzberg (1983;
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1989), bureaucratic organisations often make use of accounting control systems, and 
hence these three retailers can be seen as conforming to Goold and CampbelFs (1987) 
financial mode of management. In doing so, it enabled head office to monitor cost 
reduction policies to ensure the savings promised to shareholders and customers were 
delivered. As Mintzberg (1989) stressed, managers concerned with efficiency will 
always favour tangible benefits, because "he or she can measure them and attribute 
them to his or her efforts" (p. 333). This budgetary control publicly determined the 
boundaries within which store level managers operated, by defining their latitude of 
decision-making (Mintzberg 1983; 1989; Stewart 1991; Walters and Hanrahan 2000). 
This was even apparent in Homeco, although staff shortages reduced the budgetary 
pressures on employee resourcing. As portrayed in the literature, budgetary control is 
often viewed as imposing restrictions on managers' autonomy (Mullins 1999; Prior 
1984; Stewart 1999; Walters and Hanrahan 2000). This was evident in all three case 
companies, particularly the two food retailers, where cost reduction policies were more 
pervasive, severely impeding the financial self-determination of store level managers. 
These restrictions were in turn resented by local managers.
As part of the budgetary control systems present in all three case study companies, 
head office maintained control of all quantifiable aspects of human resources. This 
meant stores were subject to labour budget constraints. The method of budgetary 
control varied between the three companies, with closer monitoring of staffing budgets 
evident in the two food retailers. Here, a more sophisticated model of labour budget 
determination was in operation, with labour productivity rates determined by head 
office and set at departmental level. Compliance with these rates was monitored by
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analysts at head office, which further constrained the resourcing abilities of store level 
managers. These analysts are part of Mintzberg's (1983) 'technostructure', which he 
described as "favouring economic efficiency, expressed as tangible goals, and deployed 
through increasing bureaucratisation" (p. 130). At Homeco the staffing budget was 
determined using sales figures. Consistent staff shortages made it difficult for head 
office to identify stores that were running above or below their staffing budget, as 
store level managers seemed very knowledgeable of this more simplistic control system 
and its capacity for manipulation. This gave greater flexibility, in terms of employee 
resourcing, to store level managers because their budgets were not so closely 
monitored by head office. This allowed them to circumvent head office policy to 
satisfy local conditions. As a consequence, the use of premium rate overtime, the 
employment of a predominately full time workforce at the Oxford store, and the 
recruitment of expensive agency staff at the West Thurrock store, without detection by 
head office was found. These findings accord with Piper's (1980) conclusions that a 
greater emphasis is placed on more elaborate and specific accounting controls in the 
retail industry, when an organisation is under greater competitive pressures. Store 
level managers at Superco and Groceryco appeared to be under more rigorous and 
limiting budgetary controls than those at Homeco, whose competitive pressures 
seemed to be lower.
Compounded by the physical and operational distance between head office and stores, 
the focus for control and co-ordination of store operations became the management 
and monitoring of outputs, rather than processes (Merchant 1985; Mintzberg 1983, 
1989; Stewart 1991). As Child (1984:160) stated, output control makes use of formal
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structural mechanisms to preserve managerial control without having to rely on close 
personal supervision, considered impractical in large multiple store retailing 
organisations. In the case study companies, where store activities could be directly 
centralised (such as stock management), the technology was exploited to achieve this. 
In other functions, where the assumption of store level tasks by technology was less 
feasible, head office quantified these functions where possible by setting stores 
performance targets to achieve. The quantification of customer service standards 
(such as Superco's 'One-In-Front' promise), combined with improved technology, 
meant that head office could measure individual store and employee achievements of 
these targets. This quantification of customer service values was advocated by Walters 
and Hanrahan (2000), so as to give clear performance parameters for each element of 
service. As Ogbonna (1992) found, increased centralisation in the retail industry has 
been the consequence of improved technology. Such advancements facilitated the 
closer monitoring of store performance, particularly in the area of customer service 
and employee performance. However, the consequence of this increased centralisation 
and head office control was an emphasis on the measurable, often at the expense of 
more intangible functions such as 'soft' HRJVI practices.
While the focus of head office management control was on budgets and targets 
through the standardisation and monitoring of outputs, there were additional 
constraints for store level managers. These emanated both from within the 
organisation itself, and through the external environment. As Mintzberg (1980) 
suggested "all management jobs are constraining" (p. 112). These constraints included 
internal factors such as company policies and procedures (for example, equal
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opportunities), the use of technology, and trade unions (where recognised). External 
factors that constrained store level managers' decision-making powers included 
legislation, the economic environment, customer demands, and the supply of local 
labour. This was demonstrated at Homeco's Oxford store where the full time 
composition of the store's workforce was attributed to the external supply of labour, 
rather than any internal company constraints to the recruitment and selection process.
It was clear from this research that head office in all three case study companies 
increasingly centralised store operations, where it was possible to do so. These 
attempts to control store operations conform to Mintzberg's 'machine' configuration, 
with rationalising often becoming the solution to organisational problems and external 
pressures. This was particularly evident in the two food retailers, where increasing 
competitive pressures had led to strategies focusing on 'more for less'. There was less 
evidence of this at Homeco, where competition was weaker and the company had 
successfully maintained its market leadership for over a decade. Instead a cost 
reduction strategy was in place to address the shortfall in profits caused by the 
recession of the early 1990s. The demands placed on store level managers with the 
accompanying constraints led to a focus on tangible targets, often at the expense of 
intangible benefits (this will be discussed further in Chapter 12).
Whilst store level managers were experiencing an increasing centralisation of their 
tasks, together with a close monitoring and co-ordination of their remaining tasks, 
there was also an element of formal discretion granted to them by head office. As
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previously discussed, and described by Child (1984) and Mullins (1999), the 
geographical dispersion of stores, and size of the case study organisations, meant an 
element of decentralisation was necessary. Together with the 'thinness' of head office 
management and a focus on output management, a less prescriptive approach to some 
store processes was subsequently adopted.
While head office exercised control by monitoring stores' achievement of tangible 
activities, there was a delegation of tasks judged by head office as impractical to be 
executed from the centre. Those elements of store operations difficult for head office 
to quantify and measure, were the aspects of decision making decentralised to store 
level. In all three companies, this largely equated to local HRM, particularly employee 
resourcing, as also found in previous research (Neathey and Hurstfield 1995; 
Tomlinson et al 1997). While head office devised equal opportunity, and health and 
safety policies (i.e. those elements of HRM subject to explicit legislation), the 
deployment and management of labour was largely dealt with at store level, albeit 
within budgets and targets imposed by head office. Consequently, much of the 
responsibility for local HRM and employee resourcing was subject to minimal control 
by head office. Store level managers in all six case stores had some degree of 
involvement in, and responsibility for, local employee resourcing. This included 
recruitment and selection, on-the-job training, staff scheduling, and the day-to-day 
management of staff, including the delegation of tasks. There were some aspects of 
local HRM that were 'action controlled' (Merchant 1985:4), in that the procedures 
required were more specified. These included the setting of labour budgets, the 
prescribing of an equal opportunities policy, an induction training programme, and the
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recruitment and selection process in Groceryco and Superco. At Homeco local 
managers were afforded the greatest autonomy due to a lack of head office co- 
ordinating mechanisms, particularly HR policies. In the two food retail organisations, 
the degree of autonomy for store level managers was more constrained, and head 
office monitored the management of human resources to a greater extent. This was 
enabled by improved technology, and a tighter control of financial budgets. It can be 
concluded that in the two supermarket chains, a move towards "results control" 
(Merchant 1985:4) of human resources was apparent, as new technology enabled some 
quantification of outcomes.
These research findings support Sparks's (2000b) observations that the main functional 
responsibility remaining for store level managers is the management of their 
employees. This illustrates the extent to which the responsibility for the management 
of human resources was delegated to local level. Therefore, it is argued that the case 
study organisations support the model of HRM which prescribes the delegation of HR 
responsibility to line managers, and previous research which has found this facet of 
HRM model to be practised in organisations (Armstrong 1989; Bevan and Hayday 
1994; Guest 1992; Hill and Pickering 1986; Hutchinson 1995; Kinnie 1989; Maund 
2001; Sisson and Scullion 1985; Tamkin et al 1997; Tyson and Fell 1986). The 
findings of this research study suggest that local managers in the retail industry have 
significant HR responsibility. However, as Section outlines, managers do not 
necessarily exercise their autonomy in accordance with organisational policy.
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While a degree of formal management discretion was officially delegated to store level, 
this was augmented by the activities of store level managers that extended beyond their 
official discretionary powers. As described in the literature (for example, Ackroyd and 
Thompson 1999; Berry et al 1995; Child 1984; Hales 1993; Mintzberg 1980,1983, 
1989; Mullins 1999; Sayles 1999; Stewart 1999), the interests and actions of 
employees are not necessarily the same as those of their employing companies. This 
was evident, to varying degrees, in all three case study companies. There were signs 
that store level managers developed 'strategies of independence', which circumvented 
company policy and control systems. These included recruitment freezes, an informal 
store structure, the manipulation of technology to meet performance targets, the 
contravention of equal opportunity policy, the mis-employment of customer service 
designated staff, and stage-managing store operations during visits from head office 
managers.
It was evident from this research study that the increasing demands and centralisation 
of store operations had an inauspicious impact on store level management. As Child 
(1984) noted, increased centralisation and formalisation is susceptible to employee 
resistance, as it is often "seen as an attempt to reduce discretion" (p. 153). The 
findings of this research study show that store level managers responded to increased 
head office control by developing strategies of independence. Hence, the case study 
companies were demonstrating characteristics of Mintzberg's (1989) diversified 
organisation with store level managers attempting to 'balkanise' the structure to resist 
head office control and maintain their autonomy.
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Where feasible, various attempts were made to override centralisation to different 
magnitudes across the three case study companies. Compared to Groceryco where 
fewer strategies of independence were found, more elaborate tactics were evident at 
Superco and Homeco. This could be attributed to the control systems at Superco 
being in place for longer than at Groceryco. Strategic change at Superco, similar to 
'Groceryco 2000', had been operational since 1991. This could account for store level 
managers at Superco having a greater awareness of the control systems, and as a result 
had learnt how to 'make out' (Roy 1974) against the system. Conversely, at 
Groceryco the changes were very recent, and together with demoralised local 
managers may have contributed to a lower propensity to 'make out' against the control 
systems. As such there was greater conformity between head office and store levels at 
Groceryco than the other two case companies and there appeared to be were fewer 
strategies of independence in operation.
At Homeco, the laissez faire approach of head office, and the resulting lack of policies, 
meant there was little system to 'make out' against. Nevertheless, the practice of 
strategies of independence was still evident, particularly at the Oxford store. This 
branch had been subject to re-structuring and was under greater head office 
surveillance than the West Thurrock store, due to its 'Renewal' status. The large 
divergence between the strategic level and local managers at Homeco meant that head 
office was very ignorant of store operations. Together with a lack of formal policies to 
follow, store level managers had to act as 'executives', taking decisions appropriate to 
the individual store, which resulted in stores being very unlike each other. The 
'thinness' of head office management in all three case study companies, and their
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remoteness from store operations, meant these strategies of independence went 
seemingly undetected, despite on occasion contravening corporate policy. While such 
behaviour has been previously identified in the literature (see Berry et al 1995; Sayles 
1999; Stewart 1999), little research to date has been conducted from a management 
perspective, and not within the retail industry.
Strategies of independence operated within the informal part of the organisation, which 
provided managers with greater opportunities to use their own initiative and creativity, 
developing mechanisms to circumvent formal organisational control systems (Mullins 
1999). The strength of the informal organisation at Homeco meant that store level 
managers retained a high degree of choice in their role. This enabled them to exploit 
the informal organisation through the use of strategies of independence. As Stewart 
(1999) found, where formal policies are not clearly devised, this can lead to confusion 
for lower level managers about what exactly is the organisational policy. Retail 
companies might develop good strategies which subsequently fail because the 
organisation has poor control systems. This was clearly evident at Homeco where 
ambitious strategies were devised at head office, but with an accompanying inability to 
implement these ideas and communicate them effectively to store level.
The rationale for the existence of strategies of independence were numerous, and 
varied between the three case study companies. As commentators have previously 
observed there is not always a precise correspondence between employees' interests 
and those of their employing organisation (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999; Berry et al 
1995; Heller 1997; Mintzberg 1989). Added to this is the suggestion that inventive
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human minds will always manipulate systems designed to control them (Berry et al 
1995). Using Mintzberg's 'thick' and 'thin' management typology, 'thick' store level 
managers considered that within the operational context, head office policies and 
demands were impractical to implement. As Hales (1993) commented, workers at the 
operational level may consider corporate policies "as being inappropriate and out of 
touch with operational realities" (p. 104). Local managers had to juggle the 
contradictory demands of schizophrenic' corporate strategies, which demanded 
improved store performance on fewer resources. The reality of this was a 
manipulation of company policies, to enable store level managers to deliver on the 
'demands' of their jobs, within the constraints imposed upon them. Managers at store 
level could be said to be acting largely as 'disturbance handlers' (Mintzberg 1989: 20), 
involuntarily responding to the demands of the strategic level. The organisational 
changes were often beyond their control, instead instigated by managers at head office, 
very distant from the reality of store operations. As Berry et al (1995) noted, there is 
often a tension in retail companies between centralised control and delegating decisions 
to stores. This tension in the case companies was between store level managers' 
knowledge of what was feasible, and what head office management considered to be 
desirable.
Store level managers assumed the role of'man in the middle' (Roethlisberger 1945) 
acting between head office managers and the shop floor workers; responsible for 
implementing policies and decisions taken by head office (see section Watson 
and Harris (1999) spoke of the notion of'dual control' whereby whatever managers 
"think of the policies they have to implement, they have to find ways of getting others
321
to comply, to achieve the necessary results" (p. 178). Having detailed knowledge of 
the operational level through their 'thick' management approach, store level managers 
conjectured that some head office strategies were untenable. Instead they 'rejiggled' 
(Sayles 1999) company policies and procedures to accommodate the constraints and 
demands of the operational level, executing their role as 'disturbance handlers' 
(Mintzberg 1989). Where fewer prescriptive procedures existed, i.e. in the 
management of human resources, store level managers had a wider scope to deploy 
strategies of independence, undetected by head office, to satisfy the demands of their 
role.
As the head office in all three case study companies was so remote from store 
operations, strategic level decisions relied heavily on data from stores via information 
management systems. As Hales (1993) and Stewart (1999) observed, this upwards 
form of communication can be subject to incorrect or incomplete information. Senior 
managers are more liable to receive a simplified, edited, or wholly inaccurate account 
of store operations. As illustrated by this research, store level managers often took 
decisions they considered optimal for branch operations, despite sometimes 
contradicting or undermining company policy and procedure. Berry et al (1995) 
considered this outcome to be the main disadvantage of a divisionalised structure. In 
the three case study companies, strategies of independence were most frequently 
deployed at the points where the 'two worlds' of head office and store converged. 
This encompassed management information systems, formal meetings, and head office 
visits to stores. Store level managers would temporarily adopt the persona of head 
office ideology and provide an imagery that conformed to head office expectations.
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They 'played the game' to ensure store operations gave the impression of meeting 
head office demands. As suggested in the literature (Jackal 1988; Pettigrew 1973, 
Watson 1977, 1995), such managerial politics often exist in organisations.
Increasing demands within a context of escalating constraints led store level managers 
to focus on the specific demands of their job, in order to be seen by head office to be 
achieving their quantified performance targets. This was particularly evident in the 
two food retailers where demands on store level managers appeared to be more 
onerous. The remoteness of head office led to a focus on performance targets that 
were measurable. Head office closely monitored tangible goals on which store level 
management performance and ability was largely assessed. As a result, intangible 
functions, such as human resources, were largely left to store level managers' 
discretion. This focus on tangible goals led to a situation where store level managers 
were biased towards the measurable. This led to a distortion in objectives at store 
level, as predicted by Mintzberg (1983), when he argued that if objectives are 
incomplete lower management efforts tend to be directed towards favouring the goals 
which get operationalised as objectives. Hence, store level managers concentrated on 
achieving tangible performance targets, often circumventing policies and procedures 
that were not closely monitored and measured by head office. A consequence of this 
was a neglect of the intangible. This sometimes resulted in the sacrifice of 'soft' HRM 
policies, due to the priority assigned to more tangible management activities.
An additional motivation for store level managers to instigate strategies of 
independence was to enhance their promotional opportunities. The career progression
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of senior store level managers in all three case study companies, was largely based on 
their ability to execute head office performance targets. In delivering head office 
demands, senior store level managers hoped to improve their promotional prospects. 
This became more critical after the delayering exercise which diminished managers' 
promotional opportunities. Therefore, the strategies of independence employed by 
senior store managers could be attributed to their need to maintain credibility and job 
security, while improving their career prospects, as also found by Legge (2000). Hales 
(1993) noted that those who "play the careerist game" can develop a preoccupation 
with politicking concentrating on "the things which are rewarded rather than what 
needs to be done" (p. 105).
It was evident that store level managers 'played the game' by conforming to head 
office expectations hoping to improve their credibility for promotion with those in 
control of their career progression at the centre. Consequently, a store level manager 
could not risk disclosing the reality of store operations. This was even more apparent 
as store managers became greater rivals for career advancement in the newly created 
de-layered structures (Watson and Harris 1999). With peers in other stores also 
'playing the game' managers felt they had little choice but to conform to head office 
expectations to preserve their career prospects. The impact of peer pressure on 
performance levels and subsequent strategies of independence was witnessed in the 
Bank Wiring Room of the Hawthorne experiments, and supported by Mintzberg 
(1983). As Argryis (1985 in Berry et al) found, organisational defensive routines soon 
become "patterns of behaviour deployed by people in an organisation to protect 
themselves from embarrassment or anxiety" (p. 132). This often results in an
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undisclosed game of pretence in which all participate (Watson and Harris 1999). As 
seen in this research study, strategies of independence would continue to exist until 
store level managers revealed the reality of store operations to head office. However, 
such a divulgence provided a potential risk to store level managers' career 
development, and so local managers across the branch network appeared to indulge in 
the pretence, thus perpetuating the deployment of strategies of independence.
Further rationale for the existence of strategies of independence was the potential 
evasion from head office control that they offered. By employing these tactics store 
level managers produced a facade of effective management capabilities to their 
superiors, which while improving their career prospects, could also help to preserve 
their independence from head office. The pursuit of autonomy is said to be central to 
organisational misbehaviour (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999, Hales 1993). As previous 
research has found (Cummings and Elsalami 1968; Resell 1971), line managers tend to 
exhibit needs for autonomy and achievement, favouring growth, survival, and 
balkanisation. Store level managers in the case study organisations were keen to 
bypass head office control and resist the increased centralisation of their tasks. Thus, 
strategies of independence satisfied managers' intrinsic need for autonomy (Mintzberg 
1983), particularly in a context of increasing centralisation of their responsibilities.
This research shows little support for Sayles' (1999) proposition that middle managers 
now take risks and disagree with their superiors in order to 'fix' inadequate systems. 
The store level managers in this research more closely resemble the type of middle 
manager Sayles (1999) described as 'old-fashioned', who manage by results, massage
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data, and devote their attention to looking good and pleasing their superiors. The 
consequences of this in all three case study companies was a belief at head office that 
the company's strategic goals and supporting control systems were successful. This 
would probably ensure that the 'schizophrenic' corporate strategies of multiple store 
retailers would continue into the foreseeable future. These findings illustrate how 
store level managers inadvertently supported inapt systems through deploying 
strategies of independence, and not challenging the increasing demands of the strategic 
level.
This chapter has discussed the findings of the empirical research by outlining the 
similarities and differences of the three case study organisations. Throughout the 
discussion references have been made to relevant literature, which was reviewed in 
chapters two to five.
This research study has demonstrated how the choices and constraints of store level 
managers emanate from the corporate strategy of their organisation. The increasing 
centralisation of store level managers' tasks was confronted with the deployment of 
strategies of independence. This increased the divergence between head office and 
store level management, enhancing the practice of 'thin' management techniques at 
head office, compared to 'thick' management practices at store level. This contributed 
to a disparity between the rhetoric and reality of corporate strategy. While store level 
managers 'played the system' and orchestrated store operations accordingly, head 
office management appeared unconscious of the realities of the true 'world' that 
existed at store level. The largest divergence between policy and actual procedure was
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witnessed in the management of human resources. Store level managers were given 
greatest discretionary powers over local HRJVI, which amounted to a manipulation of 
employee resourcing to ensure head office demands were met within operational 
constraints.
The following chapter will conclude this thesis by outlining the implications of the key 
findings of the empirical research, before outlining the contribution of this work to 
existing knowledge.
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This chapter will examine the implications of the empirical findings for the study of 
employee resourcing in the retail industry. It will present a model that outlines the 
choices and constraints of management, with specific application to local management 
in multiple store retailing. It will then describe the contribution of this work to current 
knowledge, and the ramifications for future research.
This research study aimed to identify the role of local managers in the management of 
human resources, and to assess how their choices and constraints impact on the 
employee resourcing decision-making process in multiple store retailing. This 
incorporated an examination of the extent and influence of head office, compared to 
store level management, in the local employee resourcing process.
The companies used for this research were large, geographically structured retailers 
operating in the multiple store superstore sector. All three organisations existed within 
very competitive markets, although the two food retailers appeared to be under greater 
competitive pressures than Homeco. This led to corporate strategies developed along 
the lines of cost minimisation and quality enhancement, two apparently contradictory 
strategic directions. The twin focus of these strategic goals motivated the application
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of the term 'schizophrenic' to be used to described the case study organisations in this 
research, particularly applicable to Superco and Groceryco.
The empirical research found that store level managers' autonomy and discretion was 
being increasingly curtailed by head office efforts to centralise store functions in order 
to achieve economic efficiency. Increased head office control and tightening of 
constraints, in terms of budgets and targets was taking place in all three case study 
companies, but was most discernible at Groceryco and Superco. The increased use of 
budgets and technology to centralise, and thus control operations is well documented 
in the literature (Armstrong 1989; Deery & Mahoney 1994; Economist 1999; Freathy 
& Sparks 1994; Goold & Campbell 1987; Huczynski & Buchanan 2001; Kinnie 1989; 
Lloyd & Rawlinson 1992; Marginson et al 1993; Ogbonna 1992; Retail Business 1990; 
Smith 1988; Sparks 1987; Stewart 1991; Tomlinson et al 1997; Walters & Hanrahan 
2000). Technology, particularly in the food retailing sector, also enabled the 
imposition of more sophisticated labour budgeting control systems, and the setting of 
performance targets, with a corresponding higher level of surveillance, as witnessed at 
Superco and Groceryco.
The management of outputs set the boundaries for autonomy within which store level 
managers operated (Stewart 1999). This focus, with a corresponding emphasis on 
efficiency, is typical of Mintzberg's (1989) machine configuration. Control was vested 
with head office who devised strategies and policies imposing the requisite budgets and 
targets onto stores. The responsibility for meeting those targets within the budgets 
remained with store level managers (Berry et al 1995; Freathy and Sparks 1996), and
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constituted the of store level managers' jobs. Head office monitored these 
budgets and targets to varying degrees between the three case study companies. 
Nevertheless, store level managers in all three case study companies had to adhere to 
these because it would be obvious to head office if they did not. These 
of the job are similar to those outlined by Stewart (1982) in her 'Choices 
for Managers' model. For the purpose of this research study will be defined 
as 
Meanwhile, other constraints further reduced the discretionary powers of store level 
managers. These exuded from both within the organisation, as well as from the 
external environment. These can be termed the of store level 
management, as they restricted a manager's scope of discretionary power. These 
can be defined as 
There is a subtle, but important difference in emphasis between the 
constraints and demands of a manager's job. Demands must be adhered to in order to 
avoid retribution from superiors. As a result they constitute the priority for managers 
in the execution of their role. However, managers have to be mindful of the 
constraints under which they operate. These include labour supply, legislation, trade 
unions, economic conditions, customer demands, use of technology, and 
accompanying company policies and procedures (see also Mintzberg 1980).
All three case study companies operated on a diversified basis, their geographical 
structure and large size necessitating some decentralisation of tasks to store level 
responsibility. Decentralisation of decision-making was formally recognised by head
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office, and formed the discretionary powers of store level management. Local 
employee resourcing was the main component of HRM that remained under store level 
managers formal control and discretion. This functional area was subject to fewer 
tangible measurements, and therefore less closely controlled and monitored by head 
office. Local management control in all three companies was maintained over 
recruitment and selection, on-the-job training, staff scheduling, and the delegation of 
tasks. At Homeco, the strength of the informal organisation, together with poor 
communication between head office and store management prevailed. This led to little 
conformity between stores themselves in their approach to the management of human 
resources. Both Superco and Groceryco had greater conformity in their approach to 
managing staff due to tighter control by head office. The formally divested 
by head office, can be defined as This 
element of formal in the case study companies largely equated to local 
employee resourcing - a function difficult to ascribe quantitative measurements to, and 
thus be controlled by the strategic level.
To satisfy head office demands store level managers focused on tangible elements of 
their role. While store level managers juggled the conflicting demands of their 
'schizophrenic' organisations, this led to a number of consequences and outcomes for 
local employee resourcing decision-making. Managers in the case study stores were 
primarily concerned with meeting the of their jobs, which amounted to 
tangible targets set by head office. This was despite having the knowledge that many 
of these were unrealistic, and difficult to implement within the operational 
context. As a result store level managers deployed to
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ensure they satisfied the demands of their jobs. These 
were manifest in the areas of formal management discretion, where processes were less 
closely scrutinised by head office managers. In manipulating their main area 
namely employee resourcing, store level managers could ensure they met 
the demands of their role within increasing constraints and with minimal detection by 
head office. This ensured they retained a reputable image of management ability while 
hoping to ensure they maintained some of their autonomy. These 
can be defined as 
This research has outlined the nature of choices and constraints for store level 
managers in the retail industry. This in-depth empirical work and subsequent analysis 
requires a modification of Stewart's (1982) 'Choices for Managers' model (see section 
5.2) to more realistically reflect the complex nature of management. In its existing 
form, Stewart's model largely ignores the concept of management discretion and the 
prevalence of strategies of independence. This research study has consequently 
advanced our understanding of the role and nature of management. Figure four details 
Stewart's model of'Choices for Managers' to facilitate a comparison between this and 
the subsequent revision of Stewart's work developed from the findings of this research 
study in figures five and six.
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DEMANDS CONSTRAINTS CHOICES
For example, meeting 
minimum criteria of 
performance, complying 
with bureaucratic 
procedures which cannot 
be avoided.
For example, legal, trade 
unions, technology, 
physical location, 
organisational constraints, 
attitudes of other people.
For example, what work is 
done in a defined area, to 
change the area of work, 
the sharing of work, and 
participation in 
organisational or public 
activities.
Figure five tabulates the discussion to date. It modifies Stewart's model and defines 
the limitations and choices of managers, according to the empirical findings of this 
research study. Despite using the retail industry as a basis for the model, it could be 
applied to all management roles in a variety of sectors in this generic form.
LIMITATIONS CHOICES
DEMANDS CONSTRAINTS FORMAL 
DISCRETION
STRATEGIES OF 
INDEPENDENCE
What managers 
MUST do
The internal or 
external factors 
that LIMIT what 
a manager can do
Official
DELEGATION 
of responsibilities
The INFORMAL 
conduct of 
managers that 
circumvents the 
formal organisation
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The following figure (figure six) applies the model directly to the retail industry, as per 
the empirical findings of this thesis. This demonstrates its adaptability to enable the 
model to be applied to different levels of management, and a variety of industries.
LIMITATIONS CHOICES
DEMANDS CONSTRAINTS FORMAL 
DISCRETION
STRATEGIES OF 
INDEPENDENCE
  performance 
targets
  budget control 
systems
company 
policies and 
procedures 
technology 
labour supply 
employment 
legislation 
trade unions
full-time: part- 
time ratio of 
staff
recruitment and 
selection 
on-the-job 
training
staff scheduling 
delegation of 
tasks
  recruitment 
freezes
  unofficial 
appointments 
(re-layering)
  manipulating 
technology
  using premium 
rate overtime
  resisting staff 
scheduling 
deadlines and 
policies
  'stage- 
managing' 
store
operations 
during head 
office visits
As previously discussed, various strategies of independence were deployed by store 
level managers, and for a multitude of reasons. Acknowledgement of the existence of 
these strategies of independence is important, as it advances our understanding of the 
processes of organisational behaviour. However, it is salient that the impact of these
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strategies of independence are also considered to assess their importance to the 
academic study of management. This thesis has taken the impact on employee 
resourcing as its focus of study. This section will attempt to outline the implications of 
strategies of independence for the management of employee resourcing, in the three 
case study companies under research, before developing a model to illustrate this 
phenomenon.
Where store level functions were difficult to measure and monitor, there was evidence 
of practices that contravened company policy. This was apparent in all three case 
study companies and their six stores. The greatest dichotomy between company policy 
and practice was found in the management of human resources. Local employee 
resourcing was the predominant area where the rhetoric and reality of company policy 
was most divergent because store level managers had greatest discretion over local 
employee resourcing. This led to a gap between corporate policy, and the reality of 
store operations in all three case study companies (as outlined in section 
The 'schizophrenic' strategies of all three case study retailers inadvertently fostered the 
existence of store level strategies of independence. This was particularly evident in the 
two food retailers where conflicting strategic goals, of quality enhancement and cost 
minimisation, were being most vehemently pursued. As a consequence, inconsistencies 
arose in customer service provision. The promises made to customers and the 
expectations of head office were often unfulfilled at store level. Only where 
components of customer service were measurable, and thus monitored by head office, 
was some conformity to company policy observed. However, there were indications
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that even where customer service targets were quantified, store level managers found 
methods to manipulate the data provided to head office, such as with Superco's 'One- 
in-Front' promise. In terms of employee resourcing, the working hours of sales 
assistants were altered in both Superco and Groceryco, to accommodate customer 
service demands. This illustrates the priority placed on achieving customer service 
goals over the quality of working life for employees.
A large disparity existed between company policy and operational reality in the 
execution of equal opportunities. All three companies were publicly committed to 
equal opportunities, with both Groceryco and Homeco founder members of 
'Opportunity 2000'. As previous research has also found (for example, Bradley 1989; 
Broadbridge 1995; Craig and Wilkinson 1985; Dawson et al 1987; Freathy 1993; 
MacEwan Scott 1994; Sparks 1991; Tomlinson et al 1997), both horizontal and 
vertical occupational gender segregation was prevalent in all six case study stores. 
Store level managers, particularly junior managers, perpetuated the segmentation of 
the labour market, according to their own frames of reference. As previous research 
has revealed, managers' individual personalities and their ingrained assumptions about 
employees can be problematic and influence human resource decisions that are 
followed (Beechey and Perkins 1987; Bradley and Hill 1983; Burchell and Rubery 
1990, 1994; Flecker et al 1998; Horrell and Rubery 1991; Hunter and Maclnnes 1991; 
MacEwan Scott 1994; Marchington 1995b). Despite these stereotypes being 
developed through personal attitudes and experience, they were highly uniform in all 
the case companies. Store level managers' perceptions often contravened equal
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opportunity policy and highlighted the difference between the rhetoric and reality of 
employee resourcing in operation, compared to company policy.
The standardisation of outputs as a method of controlling store operations was 
consistent across all three case study companies. The constraining mechanisms of 
budgets and performance targets, combined with increased surveillance via technology, 
formed the basis of organisational control systems in all three companies. As Berry et 
al (1995) noted, a focus on tangible measurements results in managerial behaviour 
geared towards the achievement of reported results. In trying to deliver head office 
demands store level managers manipulated their discretion in the area of employee 
resourcing. This transcended to budget-driven management techniques, which in turn 
influenced their employee resourcing decisions.
To meet financial budgets and cost reductions store level managers generally increased 
their employment of part timers. The only exception to the increased employment of 
part timers was seen at Homeco's Oxford store, where the high proportion of full time 
employees was attributed to characteristics of the external local labour market, outside 
the remit of management control and influence. Elsewhere, store level managers 
claimed they had little choice but to employ a high ratio of part time staff. With the 
exception of Homeco's Oxford store, all stores attributed their high use of part time 
employment to the constraints of budgets set by head office. They maintained that the 
employment of full timers was too expensive and would make it impossible to satisfy 
head office budgets. This accords with previous research findings, which has found 
that non-standard labour is often viewed by employers as a cheaper option to full-time,
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permanent employment, citing cost savings as the main reason for their employment 
(Brewster et al 1993; Blyton & Morris 1992; Freathy & Sparks 1996; Gregory 1991, 
Hunter et al 1993; Marginson et al 1993; Neathey & Hurstfield 1995; O'Reilly 1994). 
This was evident at Homeco where attempts were being made at the strategic level to 
increase the numerical flexibility of its workforce to reduce costs and alleviate 
recruitment problems.
Other strategies of independence, deployed to meet tight budgets and performance 
targets included an increase in the numerical flexibility demanded of sales assistants, 
mainly those on part time contracts. This was particularly noticeable at Superco's 
Surrey Quays's store, where a local recruitment freeze was operated on occasions to 
ensure budgetary targets were met. This was driven by store level managers' 
expectation that part timers would offer numerical flexibility to cover vacancies while 
the recruitment freeze was in operation. This numerical flexibility included changing 
shift patterns and working above contracted weekly hours. As part timers did not 
attract a premium rate (as noted by Dickens 1995) for working above their contracted 
weekly hours, they were considered a more viable and attractive option by many junior 
managers who were ultimately responsible for the efficient management of human 
resources. At Homeco the same situation occurred, but for different reasons. Here 
labour budget constraints were not so onerous, but both stores suffered from staffing 
shortages. An inability to recruit sufficient numbers of staff to the store, particularly at 
West Thurrock, meant that part-timers were often required to increase their working 
hours to cover these shortages. The minimal level of head office monitoring of budget 
expenditure also meant full timers often worked overtime, despite this contravening
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head office policy. This was evident at the Oxford store where a high full time 
complement of staff necessitated the use of premium rate overtime. Ironically, this 
was most often used to 'stage-manage' head office visits to the store to ensure the full 
range of services was provided - another strategy of independence deployed by local 
managers.
The increasing demands, particularly in terms of efficiency savings, also impacted on 
the recruitment and selection choices made by store level managers. There was a 
move towards employing students as part time workers, in preference to working 
mothers and older workers - the traditional source of supply for part time jobs. 
Students were perceived as more numerically flexible and therefore more readily able 
to change their shifts and increase their weekly hours. Dex and McCulloch (1995) 
suggested that because women's part time employment linked to family formation 
appears to be at a peak, employers are increasingly turning to student workers to 
maximise flexibility. This research argues that retail employers are increasingly turning 
to student workers, to satisfy their heightened demand for numerical flexibility, and not 
because of a fall in supply of part time working mothers. With many store level 
managers perceiving working mothers as very inflexible, this led them to prefer to 
recruit from the increasing supply of new, and more 'flexible' labour, in the form of 
students. The findings of this research study suggests that the recruitment of students 
in multiple store retailing will continue to increase.
An outline of the impact of store level managers' strategies of independence on the 
management of human resources and employee resourcing has been presented in this
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thesis. As Huczynski and Buchanan (20001:286) observed it is the unstructured 
decisions that tend to be more open to 'politicking'. A focus on the standardisation of 
outputs left processes, such as employee resourcing, less closely monitored, as 
predicted by Mintzberg (1983). In order to manage the conflicting demands of head 
office, strategies of independence were deployed to circumvent policies and 
procedures that store level managers believed to be impractical. Their efforts were 
concentrated on those policies that were subject to a lower level of head office 
scrutiny. Therefore employee resourcing was often their focus of attention and an area 
of flexibility for store level managers to manipulate to ensure budgets and targets were 
met.
Throughout the interviews store level managers cited that the 'needs of the business' 
took precedence over the 'needs of employees'. This inevitably led to a hard 'HRM' 
approach to employee resourcing at store level. The intangible, or 'softer', facets of 
HRM, were of less importance to store level managers in the case study organisations, 
because their performance in these areas was not as strictly monitored by head office. 
This concurs with Marginson et al's (1993) findings that lower level managers place 
less of a priority on those management activities not measured by head office. This 
meant 'soft' HRM practises were more subject to neglect by store level managers than 
tangible targets, or 'hard' HRM practices. Consequently, store level managers tended 
to emphasis a 'hard' HRM approach to managing their workforce, regardless of any 
'soft' HR company policies that might have existed. As a result, the delegation of 
employee resourcing responsibilities to line managers weakened corporate attempts to
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introduce 'soft' HRM techniques, thus undermining the value of any corporate HR 
policies.
As discussed in Section local managers in the case study companies deployed 
strategies of independence to ensure they met the demands of head office. These 
demands largely equated to management through a standardisation of outputs using 
budgets and performance targets as the main tools of control. These emanated from 
organisational corporate strategy which focused on the dual goals of improvements to 
customer service and a simultaneous reduction in costs. These led to an increasing 
centralisation of store activities with increased demands and constraints placed on local 
managers. The schizophrenic nature of these strategic goals led store level managers 
to deploy strategies of independence in their efforts to meet head office demands 
within this context of increasing constraints.
With organisational control systems focusing on output control, this left the more 
unstructured store level decision-making processes open to 'politicking' (Huczynski 
and Buchanan 2001:286). This amounted to local employee resourcing, where the 
intangible nature of the HR function left employee resourcing less closely monitored by 
head office, and less subject to the centralisation witnessed in other store activities. As 
a result it was in the area of local HRM, namely employee resourcing, where strategies 
of independence were most conspicuous. By manipulating local labour resources 
through a variety of methods, store level managers were able to meet head office 
demands. This invariably led to a focus on 'hard' HRM techniques, because of the
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emphasis placed on head office tangible measurement of results. This had the 
concomitant effect of managers at the strategic level believing their strategic goals had 
been achieved, thus confirming the success of their corporate strategy.
It can be concluded that the head offices of all three case study companies will 
continue to develop schizophrenic corporate strategies, and make increasing demands 
on local managers, with the provision of fewer resources. From the empirical findings 
of this research it can be predicted that local managers will have to develop more 
sophisticated strategies of independence if they are to continue meeting these ever 
intensifying demands. This leads to a 'vicious circle' of organisational behaviour, 
whereby local managers inadvertently support the perpetually increasing demands of 
the strategic level, as illustrated in Figure seven. This model works along similar lines 
to Crozier's (1964) bureaucratic vicious circle. As local managers develop strategies 
of independence in response to increasing limitations, they achieve the output targets 
set by the strategic level. This leads to the formulation of strategy with the same or 
more demanding goals, leading to increasing constraints for local managers, who must 
then devise more sophisticated strategies of independence to meet the output targets, 
and so forth.
With employee resourcing the remaining area of local management autonomy in the 
three case study companies, it can be predicted that an increasing emphasis will be 
placed on 'hard' HRM to the detriment of'soft' HRM. Even where organisational 
policy and the strategic level demands a focus on 'soft' HRM practices, local managers
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are likely to continue with a focus on the tangible i.e. 'hard' HRM to meet the 
increasing demands of their role.
ISTRATEGIC GOALS ACHIEVED1
OUTPUT 
TARGETS MET
1
CORPORATE
STRATEGY
FORMULATION
STRATEGIES OF 
INDEPENDENCE
INCREASED 
DEMANDS & 
CONSTRAINTS
The purpose of this research study was to make an original contribution to the body of 
knowledge. A review of the literature (see chapters two to five) identified gaps in 
existing knowledge, to which this study aimed to contribute.
This thesis goes some way to addressing the lack of research conducted into the 
employment implications of organisational change in multiple store retailing (see 
Dawson et al 1987; Doogan 1992; Shackleton 1998; Sparks 1983, 1987, 1991). The 
empirical research adopted an organisational-wide perspective through the hierarchical 
structure in an attempt to develop theory which is true to organisational reality. This
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was strengthened by the inductive approach to data analysis that was adopted. This 
addresses Marchington's (1995a) criticism that existing research on HRM in retailing 
has taken a very narrow perspective, limiting the ability to develop an holistic theory. 
He argued that a broad theory should be capable of analysing employer strategies and 
practices, employee strategies and practices, the relationship between employers and 
employees, as well as the interaction between managers, employees and the political, 
social and economic context within which organisations operate. This research 
attempted to look at the variety of influences on the role of store level management, 
adopting a methodology that encompassed a variety of management levels within the 
case study companies. This provided a richer source of data, with perspectives from 
different levels of management. Added to the long-standing nature of the empirical 
work, this thesis satisfies Ackroyd and Thompson's (1999) claim that longitudinal 
studies offer "the best chance of picking up what is happening on the ground" (p. 161).
In adopting a cross-section research methodology through the management hierarchy, 
this thesis addresses the difficulties previous research has found in differentiating 
between the formulation of strategy and its implementation (Child 1984; Marchington 
and Parker 1990; Mintzberg 1983). By investigating local management 
implementation of strategy, this research study depicts how even the best conceived 
corporate policies and efforts to formalise control can be thwarted by the actions of 
line managers. This was evident when comparing the rhetoric with the reality of 
corporate strategy, particularly the execution of employee resourcing policies. It also 
questions the overly rational view of management, and the assumption that managers
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at operational level will reveal their problems in relation to complying with head office 
policy - concealment and subterfuge appear to be more likely responses.
Research has previously identified some of the issues relating to management including 
the 'man-in-the-middle' syndrome (Roethlisberger 1945); the divorce between the 
responsibilities and authority assigned to lower level managers (Child and Partridge 
1982; Patten 1968); and the disparity between junior managers and their superiors 
(Child and Partridge 1982). However, many commentators have tended to overlook 
the role of junior managers, or supervisors, in the management of human resources 
(Lowe 1992). Given this neglect, the empirical work of this research aimed to examine 
the influence of store level managers on employee resourcing at store level, by 
examining the role of management choices and constraints. The findings illustrate how 
corporate strategies and actual practice can significantly differ, and highlights the role 
of lower and middle managers in this divergence. As a result, this exposes the reality 
of employee resourcing in the retail industry as being very complex, combining a 
myriad of issues. As previous research on HRM in the retail industry has been 
typically based on only one perspective of organisational life, and often at head office, 
the full picture of employer and employee strategies and practices has never before 
been fully revealed.
Another gap in the literature, which this thesis addresses is the neglect of management 
as an important retail labour issue (Freathy and Sparks 1996), particularly the absence 
of junior management and their HR responsibilities in more generic management 
literature (Kinnie 1989; Lowe 1992). This research found that junior managers in
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multiple store retailing play a pivotal role in the execution of employee resourcing in 
the retail industry. The majority of employee resourcing decisions were not taken by 
HR specialists, but instead by line managers. Therefore their ability to influence 
employee resourcing policy and practice was relatively substantial. As Purcell and 
Ahlstrand (1994) argued, what determines HR policies and practises, is in part the 
ability of local managers to follow through goals in the context of specific 
environmental conditions. This research has shown that many retail managers are 
essentially poor HR managers. They tend to neglect 'softer' HRM practices, in favour 
of pursuing tangible goals. This research therefore supports Hill and Pickering's 
(1986) and Armstrong's (1989) assertion that the view of HRM as strategic is too 
naive because it ignores the fact that decision-making on HR issues often takes place at 
a level considerably subordinate to budgetary planning and control. As Armstrong 
(1989) stressed, the line manager acting as a simultaneous HR manager and budget 
holder, means that the management of human resources can simply turn into an 
instrument for the achievement of short-run accounting targets. Combined with the 
evidence from these research findings, that retail line managers are not necessarily very 
effective HR managers, this gives cause for concern about the future execution and 
viability of 'good practice' employee resourcing.
The focus of this research study on store level managers revealed that these managers 
were involved in deliberate, relatively complex, sophisticated strategies of 
independence, which circumvented the formal organisation. As outlined by Ackroyd 
and Thompson (1999), the subject matter of traditional organisational behaviour has 
largely overlooked misbehaviour and yet they point out (1999) that "people in
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organisations actually get up to all sorts of tricks" (p. 8). Some of these 'tricks' have 
been disclosed in this thesis and termed as strategies of independence. This also helps 
to address the difficulty previous research has had in differentiating between the 
formulation of strategy, its implementation, and the impact of employee resistance.
This thesis also addresses the neglect of previous research, in considering management 
resistance to corporate strategy and organisational control systems. While this 
resistance to authority and control has been previously noted in some of the literature, 
much of the focus has been on a mass employee approach, with little empirical 
evidence from a management perspective. Even those authors who have concentrated 
on dissenting behaviour in organisations have tended to ignore management. In 
Ackroyd and Thompson's (1999) recent book 'Organisational Misbehaviour' the focus 
remained on the mass employee, with scant mention of management. This was 
attributed to a reluctance in the field of organisational behaviour, to acknowledge any 
resistance by managers to corporate policies. As Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) 
expressed.
"what managers do defines what behaviour should be, so that it is difficult to 
envisage what they do as involving malfeasance." (p.2)
This is despite their acknowledgement that "managers have greater resources to 
misbehave" (p.4). As a result much of the literature has largely ignored managers' 
strategies of independence, or where discovered, has only hinted at their existence. 
This research supports Ackroyd and Thompson's (1999) claim that organisational 
misbehaviour needs to be considered as an inherent part of any study of organisational 
behaviour. However this thesis has clearly demonstrated that organisational 
misbehaviour needs to be considered at all levels of an organisation, not just at lower
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ends from a mass employee perspective. As has been borne out through these case 
studies, the informal organisation and managers 'making out' (Roy 1974) against 
control systems plays a pivotal role in the reality of organisational life, with subsequent 
repercussions for the management of human resources.
This thesis has provided a rare insight into the informal processes of the management 
of human resources, which much of the current literature fails to do. The strategies of 
independence deployed by store level managers were in response to the limitations of 
their roles. As their main functional area of discretion was the local management of 
human resources, mainly employee resourcing, this became the focus of their strategies 
of independence. Consequently human resources were manipulated accordingly to 
satisfy local management limitations. This thesis has exposed the realities of HRM and 
employee resourcing at the store level of multiple store retailing. It demonstrates a 
focus on 'hard' HRM, regardless of head office rhetoric and organisational HR 
policies. The empirical findings of this research suggest that the delegation of 
responsibility for HRM to local management negates the practice of'soft' HRM due to 
a preoccupation with the achievement of tangible targets.
As a result of this thesis, Stewart's 'Choices For Managers' (Figure four) model has 
been modified to illustrate the realities of management choices and constraints more 
accurately (see section This thesis has also presented a model called 'The 
Organisational Vicious Circle' (Figure seven). With HR the main area of opportunity 
for manipulation at operational level in the case study companies it became clear that 
the rhetoric of HRM, both from its theoretical perspective, and at the organisational
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strategic level, is very different from the reality of its execution by local managers. 
This calls for a re-examination of HRM theory to ensure it more accurately reflects the 
reality of management practice.
This thesis has offered a rare insight into the informal organisation in three multiple 
store retail organisations. By looking at a cross-section of organisational structure it 
can be concluded that the extent to which corporate strategy becomes reality at 
operational level can be minimal. This is particularly important for the management of 
human resources, where local managers held greater responsibility, and so were able to 
deploy strategies of independence undetected by senior management in the case 
companies.
This thesis casts a new light on the model of HRM and the devolution of HR 
responsibilities to line managers. In a context of increasing competitive pressures for 
many organisations, and the perennial difficulty of quantifying desired human resource 
outcomes, further research needs to be conducted to establish the impact of delegating 
of employee resourcing responsibilities to line managers. If HRM becomes the main 
discretionary area for all line managers, will 'soft' HRM practices be forfeited through 
managers' strategies of independence, in the drive to fulfil tangible targets set by senior 
management? The empirical findings of this research study suggest that the delegation 
of HRM to line managers weakens 'soft' HRM policies in organisations. Further 
research, beyond the remit of this thesis needs to be conducted to enable this 
conclusion to be generisable. Nevertheless, the 'The Organisational Vicious Circle'
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applied to the three case study organisations in this research study, would suggest that 
'soft' HR practices will continue to diminish for the foreseeable future.
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[Insert name] 
Personnel Director 
[insert company address]
[insert date] 
Dear [insert name]
I am a PhD student with the University of Greenwich based in the Faculty of Business 
in the School of Marketing and Management. My research centres around 
employment issues in the retail industry and I am interested in using your company as a 
case study. As you will be aware patterns of employment are changing and the subject 
continues to one of the most widely discussed issues in labour market studies. I am 
specifically looking at the importance of factors which may affect employment 
practices in retail companies.
I would like to learn from your company's experiences of employing part-time and 
temporary workers by talking to a cross-section of your managers. This will involve 
interviews through the managerial hierarchy in order to gain a company-wide view of 
the employment issues relevant to the retail industry and flexible employment.
I understand that you are a busy person, but I would very much appreciate the 
opportunity to discuss this further. I am very happy to present the research request to 
interested organisational managers as I feel this could be a valuable exercise for both 
you company and your employees as well as my research.
I will call you within the following couple of weeks with regard to a date to meet to 
discuss the research proposal further. If you have any queries in the meantime please 
do not hesitate to contact me on telephone number 0181-310-9427.
Thanking you for your time.
Yours sincerely
Samantha Lynch (Miss)
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[Insert name] 
Personnel Director 
[insert company address]
[insert date] 
Dear [insert name]
I am a PhD student with the University of Greenwich based in the Faculty of Business 
in the School of Marketing and Management. My research centres around 
employment issues in the retail industry and I am interested in using your company as a 
case study. As you will be aware patterns of employment are changing and the subject 
continues to one of the most widely discussed issues in labour market studies. I am 
specifically looking at the importance of factors which may affect employment 
practices in retail companies.
I would like to learn from your company's experiences of employing part-time and 
temporary workers, in particular, by talking to a cross-section of your staff. This will 
involve interviews from managerial level down to shop-floor staff in order to gain a 
company-wide view of the employment issues relevant to the retail industry and 
flexible employment.
I understand that you are a busy person, but I would very much appreciate the 
opportunity to discuss this further. Please find enclosed a brief outline of my research 
proposal. I would be very happy to present the research request to interested 
organisational managers as I feel this could be a valuable exercise for both your 
company and your employees, as well as my research.
I will call you within the following couple of weeks with regard to a date to meet to 
discuss the research proposal further. If you have any queries in the meantime please 
do not hesitate to contact me on telephone number 0181-310-9427.
Thanking you for your time. 
Yours sincerely
Samantha Lynch (Miss)
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I am a PhD student at the University of Greenwich, based at the Woolwich campus in 
South East London. I am conducting my research under the auspices of the School of 
Marketing and Management within the Faculty of Business.
My background is in the field of personnel and as a result I have undertaken a PhD and 
chosen flexible working patterns as my area of research. The subject of flexibility has 
been the source of considerable comment and some controversy over recent years, but 
of very little in-depth case study based research, particularly in the service industry.
I hope to gain a thorough understanding of 'flexible working' in the retail industry by 
learning from the companies themselves. Ideally this would involve interviews with 
managerial staff at different levels in order to gain a company-wide view of the 
relevant employment issues, but would be concentrated at store level.
The research project is now in its second year - the first years of which has been spent 
gathering secondary evidence and preparing for the case study. As previously
382
outlined, the research centres around 'flexible' forms of employment in the retail 
industry, with the official title of the project being:
"An investigation into the importance of factors affecting numerical flexibility practices 
in multiple retail companies and their relationship with business strategy."
The research aims to achieve the following:
1. Ascertain the changes that have occurred in the nature of employment over the past 
few years within the case study organisation.
2. Investigate how the organisation makes decisions regarding labour usage and the 
relationship of this to their business strategy.
3. Learn about what influences the organisation labour use strategies and determined the 
level of part time and temporary employment within retail stores.
In using a case study approach I hope to gain an insight into flexible forms of 
employment through seeking the experiences of the organisation and its employees. In 
doing so it will help me to gain an in-depth understanding of the organisation and an 
appreciation of its employment issues.
The case study approach requires a close relationship between the organisation and 
researcher, but not necessarily an obtrusive one. The proposals with regard to my 
research are outlined below:
availability of employment data and statistics to satisfy the first aim of the research and 
understand the history of the organisation in order to build up an appropriate profile.
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